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Abstract 
In this thesis, I argue that although he is not always recognised as such, Søren 
Kierkegaard has been an important ally for Catholic theologians since the early twentieth 
century. Moreover, properly understanding this relationship and its origins offers valuable 
resources and insights to contemporary Catholic theology. Of course, there are some negative 
preconceptions to overcome. Historically, some Catholic readers have been suspicious of 
Kierkegaard, viewing him as an irrational Protestant irreconcilably at odds with Catholic 
thought. Nevertheless, the favourable mention of Kierkegaard in John Paul II’s Fides et Ratio is 
an indication that Kierkegaard’s writings are not so easily dismissed.  
My thesis investigates the writings of emblematic Catholic thinkers in the twentieth 
century to assess their substantial engagement with Kierkegaard’s writings. I argue that 
Kierkegaard’s writings have stimulated reform and renewal in twentieth century Catholic 
theology, and should continue to do so today. To demonstrate Kierkegaard’s relevance in pre-
conciliar Catholic theology, a number of Catholic theologians with a reform agenda need to be 
examined, paying close attention to their emphases and responses to Kierkegaard. I set this 
backdrop by investigating the wider evidence of a Catholic reception of Kierkegaard in the 
early twentieth century—looking specifically at influential figures like Theodor Haecker, 
Romano Guardini, Erich Przywara, and other Roman Catholic thinkers that are typically 
associated with ressourcement. A thesis could be written on any one of these figures, and space 
does not permit an exhaustive index of Catholic engagement with Kierkegaard. However, I 
have chosen to focus upon the writings of Henri de Lubac, Hans Urs von Balthasar, and the 
Italian Thomist, Cornelio Fabro.  
I turn to de Lubac as a Catholic reformer that offers a model of positive engagement 
with Kierkegaard’s writings, and to Balthasar as a negative model. In Kierkegaard’s writings, 
de Lubac finds the appropriate grammar to name the shared Enlightenment presuppositions 
of both Neo-scholasticism and the atheistic humanism of his day, and to express anew the 
insights retrieved from the Church Fathers. In Balthasar’s case, Kierkegaard serves as a kind 
of Protestant foil in his account of theological aesthetics, which I argue distorts Balthasar’s 
own theology of anxiety and Christology. As an original contribution, I introduce for the first 
time in English a necessary supplement to the Catholic reception of Kierkegaard in the 
underexplored writings of the Italian Thomist, Cornelio Fabro. In particular, Fabro draws 
heavily upon Kierkegaard’s account of freedom and attempts to provide concrete examples of 
Kierkegaard’s high regard for Mary and his critique of Christendom in ways that parallel John 
Henry Newman and makes Kierkegaard more palatable to Catholic readers. In selecting de 
Lubac, Balthasar, and Fabro, my aim is not just to narrate a history of Catholic engagement 
with Kierkegaard, but also to provide a range of representative entry points for Kierkegaard’s 
writings to continue to stimulate reform and renewal in Catholic theology today in the shadow 
and spirit of the ressourcement movement. 
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Epigraph 
 
See what love the Father has given us, that we should be called children of God; and 
that is what we are. The reason the world does not know us is that it did not know 
him. Beloved, we are God’s children now; what we will be has not yet been revealed. 
What we do know is this: when he is revealed, we will be like him, for we will see him 
as he is. 
1 Jn 3:1-2 (NRSV) 
 
 
As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix), when Holy Writ declares that nothing is like God, it 
does not mean to deny all likeness to Him. For, “the same things can be like and 
unlike to God: like, according as they imitate Him, as far as He, Who is not perfectly 
imitable, can be imitated; unlike according as they fall short of their cause,” not merely 
in intensity and remission, as that which is less white falls short of that which is more 
white; but because they are not in agreement, specifically or generically.  
 
St. Tommaso d’Aquino (ST 1 q. 4, a. 4 ad 1) 
 
Just as the ocean, when it lies still this way, deeply transparent, aspires to heaven, so 
the pure heart, when it is still, deeply transparent, aspires solely to the good; or just as 
the ocean becomes pure when it aspires only to heaven, so the heart becomes pure 
when it aspires only to the good ... If the least thing comes between them, between the 
sky and the ocean, between the heart and the good, indeed, even if it was impatience 
in desiring the reflection, then the ocean is not pure, then it does not purely reflect the 
sky. 
Søren Kierkegaard (UDVS, 121) 
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Kierkegaard was by far the most  
profound thinker of the last century.  
Kierkegaard was a saint. 
 
- Ludwig Wittgenstein1 
 
 
Introduction: Catholic Theology after Kierkegaard 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Upon receiving a letter announcing that one of his former students had converted to 
Catholicism, Ludwig Wittgenstein wondered whether he had been partly responsible for the 
conversion by having this student read Søren Kierkegaard.2 At first glance, this might seem 
like a strange reply to such news. Upon further examination, however, Wittgenstein’s odd 
response is a fitting response. In this thesis, I argue that although he is not always recognised 
as such, Søren Kierkegaard has been an important ally for Catholic theologians since the early 
twentieth century. Moreover, properly understanding this relationship and its origins offers 
valuable resources and insights to contemporary Catholic theology.  
Of course, there are some negative preconceptions to overcome. Historically, some 
Catholic readers have been suspicious of Kierkegaard, viewing him as an irrational Protestant 
irreconcilably at odds with Catholic thought. Nevertheless, the favourable mention of 
Kierkegaard in John Paul II’s Fides et Ratio (n. 76) is an indication that Kierkegaard’s writings 
are not so easily dismissed. Most philosophers baulk at the claim that had Søren Kierkegaard 
lived longer, he would have become a Roman Catholic.3 Such wild speculation has become 
synonymous for what is conventionally understood as the Catholic interpretation of 
Kierkegaard’s work.4 And yet during the twentieth century, Kierkegaard’s critique of the 
                                                
1 Rush Rhees, Ludwig Wittgenstein : Personal Recollections (Oxford: Blackwell, 1981), 102. 
 
2 Ray Monk, Ludwig Wittgenstein : The Duty of Genius (London: Cape, 1990), 463-464. 
 
3 Not long after Kierkegaard’s death, Danish scholars began to speculate if he had lived longer whether he too 
would have become Roman Catholic. See, Georg Brandes, Sören Kierkegaard: Ein Literarisches Charakterbild 
(Leipzig: J.A. Barth, 1879), 239. ‘In ihm ward die Probe auf das Exempel gemacht. Er endete damit, selber die 
Axt wider sein Gottesbild zu erheben. Durch ihn ward das dänische Geistesleben zu jenem äußersten Punkte 
hingedrängt, von wo ein Sprung geschehen muß, ein Sprung in den schwarzen Abgrund des Katholizismus 
hinab, oder hinüber auf die Landspitze, von der die Freiheit winkt’. Later on, Høffding says that Kierkegaard had 
a ‘Sympathie mit dem Katholizismus’, Harald Høffding and Christoph Schrempf, Sören Kierkegaard Als Philosoph 
(Stuttgart: Frommanns, 1896), 169. See the extensive treatment of Brandes and Høffding in Habib C. Malik, 
Receiving Søren Kierkegaard : The Early Impact and Transmission of His Thought (Washington: Catholic University of 
America Press, 1997), 228-282; 319-331. 
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established State-church was decisive for some scholars in their conversion to Roman 
Catholicism.5 It is well established that although Kierkegaard had studied theology, his 
experience of Roman Catholicism was limited—not to mention his knowledge of St. Thomas 
Aquinas.6 However, this did not deter Catholic readers from receiving Kierkegaard’s writings 
as a resource to their own tradition.7  
To be clear, my thesis does not seek to rehearse the threadbare debate of whether 
Kierkegaard himself was actually a Protestant or Catholic. Instead, I want to highlight the 
significance and the extent to which Kierkegaard’s writings have been disseminated and 
appropriated by Catholic thinkers. Throughout the twentieth century, a small but 
representative body of work sporadically appears which attests to the importance of 
Kierkegaard’s writings for Catholic theology.8 On the face of it, the small number would 
suggest that this topic in Catholic theology is quite marginal, and even more so when 
considered in relation to the wider concerns of Kierkegaard studies. However, my thesis 
demonstrates that Kierkegaard’s reception by Catholic thinkers was nurtured in a wider 
context of reform and renewal in Catholic theology leading up to the Second Vatican Council 
(1962-1965). 
But since there is resistance among Catholic readers to Kierkegaard’s writings, the 
central aim of my thesis is to provide a more sophisticated account of the wider Catholic 
reception of Kierkegaard, illuminating in particular the relevance of Kierkegaard’s writings for 
the ressourcement movement.9 The desired outcome of this aim can be expressed in a modest 
                                                                                                                                              
4 For instance, the most cited account endorsing this perspective is Heinrich Roos, Søren Kierkegaard and 
Catholicism, ed. Richard M. Brackett (Westminster: Newman Press, 1954). 
 
5 Roos, Søren Kierkegaard and Catholicism, ix-xiii. For more on conversion see Malik, Receiving Søren Kierkegaard : The 
Early Impact and Transmission of His Thought. Especially pp. 130-1, 288; 371-92; 386-7, 396. 
 
6 George L. Stengren, 'Thomism,' in Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana 6: Kierkegaard and Great Traditions, ed. Niels 
Thulstrup and Marie Mikulová Thulstrup (Copenhagen: Reitzel, 1981), 111. However, in his Journals Kierkegaard 
does seem to be somewhat familiar with Johann Adam Möhler, see Papirer I A 37; II A 304; II C 29-31. 
 
7 Cf. Papirer I A 38; I A 138; II A 265. 
 
8 For an overview of French theological scholarship, see François Bousquet, 'Kierkegaard Dans La Tradition 
Théologique Francophone,' in Kierkegaard Revisited, Kierkegaard Studies. Monograph Series (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1997), 
339-366. See also, Margaret Teboul, 'La Réception De Kierkegaard En France 1930-1960,' Revue des sciences 
philosophiques et théologiques 89 (2005), 315-336. For Kierkegaard’s reception in Catholic theology, see Adolf Darlap, 
'Die Rezeption S. Kierkegaards in Der Katholischen Theologie,' in Die Rezeption Søren Kierkegaards in Der Deutschen 
Und Dänischen Philosophie Und Theologie. Vorträge Des Kolloquiums Am 22. Und 23. März 1982, [Text Und Kontext, 15], 
ed. Heinrich Anz, Poul Lübcke, and Friedrich Schmöe (Münichen: 1983), 225-238. 
 
9 By ‘ressourcement’, I have in mind the method of returning to patristic and biblical texts as a resource for the 
reform and renewal of Roman Catholic theology prior to the Second Vatican Council. During this time, it was 
also pejoratively referred to as ‘la nouvelle théologie’ by critics. I have in mind theologians associated with Marie-
Dominique Chenu, Yves Congar, Edward Schillebeeckx, Henri de Lubac, Karl Rahner, Bernard Lonergan, Hans 
Urs von Balthasar, Hans Küng, Karol Wojtyla, and Joseph Ratzinger. 
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three-fold proposal: i) that conventional pre-conceptions about the fruitfulness of 
Kierkegaard’s writings for Catholic theology would be re-examined; and ii) that contemporary 
Catholic theologians laying claim to the legacy of ressourcement theologians would read 
Kierkegaard’s writings and take them seriously as a theological resource; and iii) that in light of 
the Catholic reception of Kierkegaard, the nature and scope of ressourcement would be 
expanded for contemporary Catholic theology. 
1.2 Rationale of Thesis: Why Study the Catholic Reception of Kierkegaard? 
In the vast secondary literature on twentieth century Catholic theology, a sophisticated 
account of the reception of Kierkegaard is notably absent. Long-standing robust accounts of 
the influence of Heidegger,10 Nietzsche,11 and Marx12 make the neglect of Kierkegaard even 
more striking. Hence, my thesis fills a noticeable gap in Catholic theology in general, and in 
particular, recent literature on ressourcement, which is noticeably silent on the influence of 
Kierkegaard's writings.13  
                                                
10 A notable example would be the works of Jean-Luc Marion and Louis-Marie Chauvet. For more on Marion, 
see Lorenz B. Puntel and Alan White, Being and God : A Systematic Approach in Confrontation with Martin Heidegger, 
Emmanuel Levinas, and Jean-Luc Marion (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2011). For more on Chauvet, 
see Hal St John, The Call of the Holy: Heidegger--Chauvet--Benedict Xvi, ed. Laurence Paul Hemming and Susan Frank 
Parsons, T&T Clark Studies in Fundamental Liturgy (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2012). Glenn P. Ambrose, 
The Theology of Louis-Marie Chauvet : Overcoming onto-Theology with the Sacramental Tradition (Farnham: Ashgate, 2012). 
For more on Heidegger’s relation to Neo-Scholasticism, see Peter S. Dillard, Heidegger and Philosophical Atheology : 
A Neo-Scholastic Critique (London: Continuum, 2008). See also, Laurence Paul Hemming, Heidegger's Atheism : The 
Refusal of a Theological Voice (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002). For Heidegger’s theological 
inheritance, see George Pattison, Heidegger on Death : A Critical Theological Essay (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013). Judith 
Wolfe, Heidegger's Eschatology: Theological Horizons in Martin Heidegger's Early Work, Oxford Theology & Religion 
Monographs (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). Benjamin D. Crowe, Heidegger's Religious Origins : Destruction 
and Authenticity (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006). 
 
11 Most Catholic thinkers engaging in discussions about Nietzsche today, confront the following secular/radical 
theology trajectories: Richard Kearney, Anatheism : {Returning to God after God} (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2010). John D. Caputo, Gianni Vattimo, and Jeffrey W. Robbins, After the Death of God (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2007). Lissa McCullough and Brian Schroeder, Thinking through the Death of God : A 
Critical Companion to Thomas J.J. Altizer (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004). David Deane, 
Nietzsche and Theology : Nietzschean Thought in Christological Anthropology (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007). Bruce Ellis 
Benson, Pious Nietzsche : Decadence and Dionysian Faith (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008). It is 
significant that Nietzsche appears as an interlocutor in Pope Francis’ encyclical Lumen Fidei §2. 
 
12 Some trajectories include: 
Bruno Bosteels, Marx and Freud in Latin America : Politics, Psychoanalysis, and Religion in Times of Terror (London: 
Verso, 2012). Christopher Rowland, The Cambridge Companion to Liberation Theology, 2nd ed. ed. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007). Marcella Althaus-Reid, Ivan Petrella, and Luiz Carlos Susin, Another Possible 
World (London: SCM Press, 2007). 
 
13 For instance, Kierkegaard is only mentioned twice in Gabriel Flynn and Paul D. Murray, Ressourcement : A 
Movement for Renewal in Twentieth-Century Catholic Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 273-275. Only 
once in Hans Boersma, Nouvelle Théologie and Sacramental Ontology: A Return to Mystery (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2009), 4. And for all the discussion of paradox, there is no mention of Kierkegaard in John Milbank, The 
Suspended Middle: Henri De Lubac and the Debate Concerning the Supernatural (London: SCM Press, 2005).  
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Prior to my thesis, only a few attempts have been made recently in Kierkegaard studies 
to address Kierkegaard’s relation to, and influence upon Catholic theology.14 The first attempt 
is by the Italian Archbishop of Chieti, Bruno Forte (b. 1949) with his short book Fare Teologia 
Dopo Kierkegaard.15 Forte’s book is geared toward a popular audience and gives a brief thematic 
reflection upon Kierkegaard’s concepts of the infinite qualitative difference between God and 
humanity, the singularity of truth and the individual, and even paradox and contemporaneity. 
Forte’s reflections provide a bricolage of quotations from Kierkegaard as a way to introduce 
the reader to some theological aspects of Kierkegaard’s writings. My contribution in this thesis 
could be read as fleshing out some of these key themes in a deeper, more engaged fashion 
with those figures who are an important influence on Archbishop Forte. 
A second attempt is made by Jack Mulder’s Kierkegaard and the Catholic Tradition, which 
comes in the form of a hypothetical encounter that identifies potential dogmatic conflicts if 
Kierkegaard’s writings were to be taken seriously by Catholics today.16 Mulder’s book 
creatively envisions potential Kierkegaardian responses to dogmatic topics like purgatory and 
the salvation of non-Christians, but fails to illuminate the actual Kierkegaardian tradition 
already within Catholicism. An important collection of essays edited by Jon Stewart entitled 
Kierkegaard’s Influence on Catholic and Jewish Theology, is a third attempt that indexes the actual 
engagement of Kierkegaard by some prominent Catholic and Jewish thinkers.17 Whilst 
Stewart’s volume brings legitimacy to my enquiry from within Kierkegaard studies, it 
overlooks the massive contribution of Cornelio Fabro and six (of the eight) additional 
Catholic thinkers that will be treated in this thesis.18 Moreover, my thesis provides more 
historical background than Stewart’s volume, which introduces various thinkers in chapters 
that stand alone without situating this reception in the wider development of Catholic 
theology in the twentieth century.  
1.3 Distinctive Contributions 
                                                
14 For instance, see Gregory R. Beabout, 'Kierkegaard Amidst the Catholic Tradition,' American Catholic 
Philosophical Quarterly 87, no. 3 (2013), 521-540. 
 
15 Bruno Forte, Fare Teologia Dopo Kierkegaard, Il Pellicano Rosso (Brescia: Morcelliana, 1997). 
 
16 Jack Mulder, Kierkegaard and the Catholic Tradition: Conflict and Dialogue (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
2010). 
 
17 Jon Stewart, Kierkegaard's Influence on Theology: Catholic and Jewish Theology, ed. Jon Stewart, Kierkegaard Research: 
Sources, Reception and Resources (Vol. 10, Tome 3) (Surrey: Ashgate, 2012). 
 
18 One notable exception: Ingrid Basso, 'The Italian Reception of Kierkegaard's Concluding Unscientific Postscript,' in 
Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook 2005, ed. K.B.S.N. Cappelorn, N.J. Cappelorn, and H. Deuser (Berlin: Walter de 
Gruyter, 2005). 
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As an essential supplement to Kierkegaard studies and recent literature on ressourcement 
in Catholic theology, my thesis critically situates the relevance of Kierkegaard’s writings in the 
story of reform and renewal in twentieth century Catholic theology prior to the Second 
Vatican Council. Specifically, my thesis provides an original contribution to recent scholarship 
by: i) bringing together Kierkegaard studies and Catholic theology in mutually informative way 
to offer an account of the Catholic reception of Kierkegaard’s writings; ii) investigating a 
distinctive Protestant influence on a Catholic renewal movement before the Second Vatican 
Council, to illuminate a shared theological heritage between denominations as a new 
ecumenical resource; iii) highlighting theological themes in Kierkegaard’s writings that have 
not been adequately integrated with Catholic theology before: his Mariology, his conception of 
anxiety, and his portrayal of a natural desire for the supernatural; iv) engaging with a range of 
writings from representative Catholic thinkers during the twentieth century like Henri de 
Lubac and Hans Urs von Balthasar, to provide a fresh perspective upon Kierkegaard’s 
writings that seeks to overturn common misconceptions; v) for the first time in English, my 
thesis highlights Cornelio Fabro as a key figure in what has been heretofore an impoverished 
account of the vibrant Kierkegaardian tradition within Catholicism; vi) reaching a new 
conclusion that Kierkegaard’s writings have stimulated reform and renewal in Catholic 
theology, and should continue to do so today. As a result, my thesis provides a more 
constructive account of Catholic engagement with Kierkegaard’s thought in the twentieth 
century by showing what Kierkegaard’s writings do for Catholic theology, and what 
conclusions they pushed Catholic theologians to draw.  
1.4 Chapter Outline 
My thesis investigates the writings of emblematic Catholic thinkers in the twentieth 
century to assess their substantial engagement with Kierkegaard’s writings. I argue that 
Kierkegaard’s writings have stimulated reform and renewal in twentieth century Catholic 
theology, and should continue to do so today. In the next chapter, to corroborate my 
argument, I re-examine one of the most common preconceptions of Kierkegaard—that is, the 
theological aspects of Kierkegaard’s writings simply reiterate Martin Luther’s theology. After 
questioning the validity of this preconception, I go on to suggest how a structural affinity 
between the basic aim of ‘returning to the sources’ in contemporary Catholic theology and 
Kierkegaard’s paradoxical presentation of the Christian faith as the ‘autopsy of faith’ begins to 
shed light on the ‘Catholic soul’ of Kierkegaard’s writings. 
To demonstrate Kierkegaard’s relevance in pre-conciliar Catholic theology, a number 
of Catholic theologians with a reform agenda need to be examined, paying close attention to 
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their emphases and responses to Kierkegaard. I set this backdrop by investigating the wider 
evidence of a Catholic reception of Kierkegaard in the early twentieth century—looking 
specifically at influential figures like Theodor Haecker, Romano Guardini, Erich Przywara, 
and other Roman Catholic thinkers that are typically associated with the generation before the 
ressourcement movement. Here I sketch the level of awareness that these thinkers had of 
Kierkegaard’s writings at this time. Also, I outline the objections that these thinkers raised 
against Kierkegaard’s writings, which contribute to the conventional preconceptions that 
possess readers today. A thesis could be written on any one of the figures treated in this 
chapter, and space does not permit an exhaustive index of Catholic engagement with 
Kierkegaard. However in the three subsequent chapters, I have chosen to focus upon the 
writings of Henri de Lubac, Hans Urs von Balthasar, and the Italian Thomist, Cornelio Fabro.  
I turn to de Lubac as a Catholic reformer that offers a model of positive engagement 
with Kierkegaard’s writings, and to Balthasar as a negative model. In Kierkegaard’s writings, 
de Lubac finds the appropriate grammar to name the shared Enlightenment presuppositions 
of both Neo-scholasticism and the atheistic humanism of his day, and to express anew the 
insights retrieved from the Church Fathers. In Balthasar’s case, Kierkegaard serves as a kind 
of Protestant foil in his account of theological aesthetics, which I argue distorts Balthasar’s 
own theology of anxiety and Christology. Although de Lubac and Balthasar engage with, and 
were influenced by Kierkegaard’s writings, they represent the culmination of the early Catholic 
reception, which was dependent upon the French and German scholarship that offered a 
preliminary sketch of Kierkegaard’s more constructive theological commitments.  
To counteract this reception, I introduce for the first time in English a necessary 
supplement in the underexplored writings of the Italian Thomist, Cornelio Fabro. In this 
chapter, I sketch the contours of Fabro’s life-long engagement with Kierkegaard. Fabro 
learned Danish and translated Kierkegaard’s writings and journals into Italian to overturn a 
French and German perception of Kierkegaard as merely a precursor to atheistic 
existentialism. As a Thomist, Fabro is sensitive to the Platonic and Aristotelian resonances in 
Kierkegaard’s writings. In particular, Fabro draws heavily upon Kierkegaard’s account of 
freedom and attempts to provide concrete examples of Kierkegaard’s high regard for Mary 
and his critique of Christendom in ways that parallel John Henry Newman and makes 
Kierkegaard more palatable to Catholic readers. In selecting de Lubac, Balthasar, and Fabro, 
my aim is not just to narrate a history of Catholic engagement with Kierkegaard, but also to 
provide a range of representative entry points for Kierkegaard’s writings to continue to 
stimulate reform and renewal in Catholic theology today in the shadow and spirit of the 
ressourcement movement. 
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One generation is not better because it understands  
that a previous generation is wrong, 
 if at the moment it does not itself understand  
how to distinguish between the views of the moment  
and of the eternal on the matter! 
– Søren Kierkegaard 1 
 
 
Kierkegaard’s soul is Catholic in its core.  
– Cornelio Fabro 2 
 
 
 
The Catholic Soul of Kierkegaard’s Writings? 
 
2.1 Introduction 
One of the basic aims of ressourcement theology is to recover a theology of history—that 
is, an account of God’s action in and through history, which makes theology more historical 
and history more theological.3 In Kierkegaard’s idiom, one might say a theology of history is 
concerned with the relation of that which has a beginning and end (time), and that which is 
without beginning or end (eternity). The difficulty of such a task is giving an account of the 
continuity between the historical development of past events and salvation history—that 
which has a beginning yet does not end—in such a way as to retain the decisive character of a 
single event like the Incarnation. Both the writings of ressourcement theologians and 
Kierkegaard’s writings endorse the sacramental character of time—that is, in the words of 
Jean Daniélou a view that says ‘salvation is no longer merely promised but given, and only its 
manifestation is awaited’.4Or as Kierkegaard puts it, the eternal ‘does not want to have its time 
but wants to make time its own and then permits the temporal also to have its time’.5 
                                                
1 Søren Kierkegaard, Howard V. Hong, and Edna H. Hong, Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2009), 92-93. 
 
2 Cornelio Fabro, S. Kierkegaard Diario (3rd Ed.), vol. 1 (Brescia: Morcelliana, 1980), 88-89. As cited in Andrea 
Scaramuccia, 'The Italian Reception of Kierkegaard's Journals and Papers,' in Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception 
and Resources. Kierkegaard's International Reception. Southern, Central and Eastern Europe, ed. Jon Stewart (Farnham: 
Ashgate, 2009), 368. 
 
3 Jean Daniélou, 'The Conception of History in the Christian Tradition,' The Journal of Religion 30, no. 3 (1950), 
171-179. I am gratefully indebted to Lewis Ayres for bringing this article to my attention. 
 
4 Ibid., 174. As a shared basic aim, endorsing a theological view of history sets both Kierkegaard and ressourcement 
theologians apart from Karl Marx’s materialist view of history. For more, see ‘The German Ideology’ in Karl 
Marx and David McLellan, Karl Marx : Selected Writings, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), ch. 14. 
For more on Kierkegaard’s importance here, see ‘La Salvezza nell’Abbandono alla Divina Provvidenza’ in 
Cornelio Fabro, Tra Kierkegaard E Marx: Per Una Definizione Dell'esistenza, ed. Christian Ferraro (Firenze: Vallecchi, 
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Although some have scoffed at attempts to link Catholic theology and Kierkegaard’s 
writings,6 one obvious Kierkegaardian concept that negotiates continuity amid change is 
repetition.7 Indeed, this concept does lend itself to appropriation by contemporary heirs of 
ressourcement theologians concerned with the ‘non-identical repetition’ of doctrinal 
development.8 But I will not treat this concept here because—whether the concept was 
perhaps too close to Hegel’s dialectics,9 or to Freud’s interpretation of compulsory 
behaviour,10—ressourcement theologians engaging with Kierkegaard’s writings during the 
twentieth century did not reach for this analogue. Because of the lack of textual evidence of 
‘repetition’ in the writings of ressourcement theologians,11 I will seek instead to address two 
obstacles that immediately present themselves to my thesis: i) a common preconception that 
Kierkegaard’s writings are antithetical to the Catholic faith; and ii) the paradoxical problem of 
endorsing a theological view of history from a contingent perspective in the flux of time.  
In the first part of this chapter (2.2), I turn to Kierkegaard’s Works of Love to resist a 
commonly held presupposition that Kierkegaard’s writings simply reiterate Martin Luther’s 
theology in every instance—a conflation that historically, both Catholic thinkers and 
Kierkegaard scholars respectively have embraced. In the second part (2.4), I investigate 
                                                                                                                                              
1952), 56-59. Fabro says that ‘historical materialism, as a doctrine and praxis, is the most prominent symbol of 
the sickness unto death that Western civilization suffers from’ (p. 15 translation mine).  
 
5 Kierkegaard, Hong, and Hong, Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, 11. For more, see Arne Grøn’s excellent 
essay on Kierkegaard, time, and history in Nicholas Adams, George Pattison, and Graham Ward, The Oxford 
Handbook of Theology and Modern European Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 435-455. 
 
6 For an ardent dismissal of Catholic readings of Kierkegaard, see Daphne Hampson, Christian Contradictions : The 
Structures of Lutheran and Catholic Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 263-264. For a 
legitimization of Catholic appropriations of Kierkegaard, see Stewart, Kierkegaard's Influence on Catholic and Jewish 
Theology. 
 
7 For a full account, see Niels Nymann Eriksen, Kierkegaard's Category of Repetition : A Reconstruction (Berlin: W. de 
Gruyter, 2000). See also, John D. Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics : Repetition, Deconstruction, and the Hermeneutic Project, 
Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), ch. 1. 
 
8 For instance, see John Milbank, 'The Sublime in Kierkegaard,' The Heythrop Journal 37, no. 3 (1996), 298-321. 
John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory : Beyond Secular Reason, 2nd ed. (Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 2006), 278-326. 
Milbank, Suspended Middle, 60; John Milbank, The Future of Love : Essays in Political Theology (London: SCM Press, 
2009), 145-174. See also, Catherine Pickstock, After Writing : On the Liturgical Consummation of Philosophy, Challenges 
in Contemporary Theology (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1998), 18-35; 109; 160; 221-224. Also see, Marcus Pound, 
Theology, Psychoanalysis, Trauma, Veritas Series (London: SCM Press, 2007), ch. 2. Following Milbank, Clare Carlisle 
attempts a similar link between Aristotelian virtue ethics, repetition, and ressourcement in ‘The Self and the Good 
Life’, see Adams, Pattison, and Ward, The Oxford Handbook of Theology and Modern European Thought, 19-39. 
 
9 Jon Stewart, Kierkegaard's Relations to Hegel Reconsidered, Modern European Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), ch. 6. 
 
10 ‘Remembering, Repeating and Working-Through (1914)’, in Steven J. Ellman, Freud's Technique Papers (London: 
Karnac Books, 1991), ch. 3. 
 
11 In fact, many had read Fear and Trembling, but there is little textual evidence indicating that Catholic theologians 
during this era had even read Kierkegaard’s Repetition. 
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Kierkegaard’s paradoxical presentation of the Christian faith as autopsy—that is, his account 
of how one relates to the act of, and appropriates the content of the Christian faith. By the 
end of this chapter, the reader should have a better sense of the thematic groundwork 
required to establish a firmer link between the basic aims of Kierkegaard’s writings and 
ressourcement theologians. 
2.2 Re-examining the Lutheran Preconception of Kierkegaard’s Works of Love 
One does not have to look far into treatments of Kierkegaard’s theology to find 
preconceptions about the antithetical nature of Kierkegaard’s writings to the Catholic faith. 
For instance, Daphne Hampson claims that Kierkegaard’s theology ‘stands in a Lutheran 
tradition of Nachfolge and not a Catholic imitatio tradition’.12 And yet Hampson’s claim must be 
weighed against the evidence in Christopher Barnett’s recent work where he argues that 
Kierkegaard’s writings are actually ‘a reiteration and advance’ of the Catholic imitatio 
tradition.13 In this section, I will investigate the commentary by Amy Laura Hall, who endorses 
the Lutheran presupposition throughout her concentrated reading of Kierkegaard’s Works of 
Love (1847).14 Hall claims that Kierkegaard can be read as providing ‘a dense commentary’ on 
Luther’s treatise entitled the Freedom of a Christian (1520).15 Hall also claims that ‘a productive 
reading’ of Works of Love sees Kierkegaard as deliberately indicting the reader using Luther’s 
                                                
12 Hampson, Christian Contradictions : The Structures of Lutheran and Catholic Thought, 266. In her most recent book, 
Hampson goes further, ‘Kierkegaard is not a Catholic who thinks in terms of our receiving infused grace, 
enabling us to do what we could not do unaided. The Lutheran Reformation overturned such ways of thinking, 
shedding also the Aristotelian metaphysics through which alone it could make sense’, in Daphne Hampson, 
Kierkegaard : Exposition & Critique (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 56 n. 27. Hampson frames the 
difference between these two antithetical spiritual traditions as the difference between viewing the Christian 
believer as ‘a little Christ’ (Lutheran) versus becoming like Christ (Catholic), see Hampson, Kierkegaard : Exposition 
& Critique, 270-271. 
 
13 Christopher B. Barnett, Kierkegaard, Pietism and Holiness (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), 188. For more, see ch. 6 in 
Barnett. 
 
14 Amy Laura Hall, Kierkegaard and the Treachery of Love, Cambridge Studies in Religion and Critical Thought 9 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). Henceforth KTL. 
 
15 Hall, Kierkegaard and the Treachery of Love, 37. Hall is not the only commentator to adopt the Lutheran 
preconception. For more, see, M. Jamie Ferreira, Love's Grateful Striving: A Commentary on Kierkegaard's Works of 
Love (Oxford University Press, 2001), 20-21. See also, Craig Hinkson, 'Luther and Kierkegaard: Theologians of 
the Cross,' International Journal of Systematic Theology 3, no. 1 (2001). Also see Hinkson, ‘Will the Real Martin Luther 
Please Stand Up! Kierkegaard’s View of Luther versus the Evolving Perceptions of the Tradition,’ in Robert L. 
Perkins, International Kierkegaard Commentary, Vol. 21: For Self-Examination and Judge for Yourself! (Macon, Ga.: Mercer 
University Press, 2002), 37-76. Also in the same volume see Lee Barrett’s ‘Faith, Works, and the Uses of the Law: 
Kierkegaard’s Appropriation of Lutheran Doctrine,’ 77-109. Also Andrew Burgess’ article ‘Kierkegaard’s 
Concept of Redoubling and Luther’s Simul Justus,’ in Robert L. Perkins, International Kierkegaard Commentary, Vol. 
16: Works of Love (Macon: Mercer University Press, 1999), 39-56. WL is thought to be the ‘first visible result’ of 
Kierkegaard’s serious interaction with Luther’s theology, see Regin Prenter, ‘Luther and Lutheranism,’ in Niels 
Thulstrup and Maris Mikulová Thulstrup, Kierkegaard and Great Traditions [Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana 6] 
(Copenhagen: C. A. Reitzel, 1981), 131. Joel D.S. Ramussen and David Yoon-Jung Kim, 'Martin Luther: Reform, 
Secularization, and the Question of His True Successor,' in Kierkegaard and the Renaissance and Modern Traditions: 
Theology, Tome Ii, ed. Jon Stewart (Surrey: Ashgate, 2009), 173-217.  
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notion of Law and Grace so that the reader might ‘request the radical grace requisite for any 
work of love’ (KTL 12).  
Hall is right to emphasise the importance of Works of Love for understanding 
Kierkegaard’s writings as a whole (KTL 49). However, I propose that in Works of Love, 
Kierkegaard does not offer an endorsement, but rather an indirect critique of Luther’s 
theology in Freedom of a Christian. Where Luther seeks to convince Pope Leo X that faith alone 
justifies the believer and the merit in good works is merely a deception, Kierkegaard claims 
that the suspicion of merit in good works can itself lead to self-deception to such an extent 
that even an expression of love becomes suspect. Alternately, Kierkegaard views human works 
of love toward others as the locus of our participation in God. But in order to lend support to 
this claim, I must briefly inspect the first chapter of Works of Love, which is entitled ‘The 
Hidden Life of Love and its Recognisability by its Fruits’. 
In part, Kierkegaard takes the title for his reflection directly from Luke 6:44, ‘For each 
tree is known by its own fruit. For figs are not gathered from thorns, nor are grapes picked 
from a bramble bush’ (ESV). Indeed, it is no coincidence that Luther also comments on this 
same text in his treatise. In fact, Kierkegaard even mentions Luther later on in this reflection 
(WL 30). This link alone may tempt some hasty readers to claim it as providing evidence of 
Kierkegaard endorsement of Luther’s theology. But such a temptation requires more scrutiny. 
For in order to distinguish good fruit from bad, Luther says in his treatise on Christian liberty 
that good works necessarily flow from belief and evil works necessarily flow from unbelief.16 
Here, Luther stakes his analysis on rightly identifying Christ as the source of our justification by 
faith alone and distinguishing that source from the necessary but still deceptive result which is 
good works.17 Luther implies that in God’s economy, we should not trust the result to indicate 
the presence of the source because living our life as if the merit of our good works could put 
us in the black, is merely to be deceived by a counterfeit accounting practice.18 Luther illustrates 
this point with a fable about a ‘dog who runs along a stream with a piece of meat in his mouth 
                                                
16 M. Luther, H. J. Grimm, and others, Luther's Works, Vol 31: Career of the Reformer I, vol. 31 (Philadelphia: 
Fortress, 1958). Luther says that ‘true faith in Christ is a treasure beyond comparison which brings with it 
complete salvation and saves man from every evil’ (AE 31: 347). And he goes on to say that an unbelieving 
person ‘is not served by anything. On the contrary, nothing works for his good, but he himself is a servant of all, 
and all things turn out badly for him because he wickedly uses them to his own advantage and not to the glory of 
God’ (AE 31: 355). Henceforth, AE [volume] : [page number]. 
 
17 Luther says ‘those who do not recognize the gifts bestowed upon them through Christ, however, Christ has 
been born in vain; they go their way with their works and shall never come to taste or feel those things’ (AE 31: 
367). 
 
18 Quoting Scripture, Luther says ‘“Thus you will know them by their fruits” (Matt. 7:20). All this remains on the 
surface, however, and very many have been deceived by this outward appearance and have presumed to write 
and teach concerning good works by which we may be justified without even mentioning faith’ (AE 31: 362). 
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and, deceived by the reflection of the meat in the water, opens his mouth to snap at it and so 
loses both the meat and the reflection’ (AE 31:356). In Luther’s story, the salvific activity of 
faith occurs on the riverbank and the reflection in the stream is to be avoided since it is the 
deception of merit in good works. This brings Luther back to comment on the gospel passage 
about good fruit in order to show how good works unmistakably flow from faith: 
Fruits do not bear the tree and the tree does not grow on the fruits, ... on the contrary, 
the trees bear the fruits and the fruits grow on the trees. As it is necessary, therefore, 
that the trees exist before their fruits and the fruits do not make trees either good or 
bad, but rather as the trees are, so are the fruits they bear; so a man must first be good 
or wicked before he does a good or wicked work, and his works do not make him 
good or wicked, but he himself makes his works either good or wicked. (AE 31: 361) 
From the citation above it can be seen that for Luther, belief is always the source of good 
works and unbelief is always the source of wicked works.19 Bearing Luther’s comments in 
mind, it is conceivable that Kierkegaard’s mention of Luther and the reflection on ‘fruit’ in 
Works of Love could lead some interpreters to also look for an endorsement of Luther’s 
theological position here. Yet I want to claim that if we look more closely at how Kierkegaard 
treats this passage of Scripture, we may find a criticism of Luther’s theological position. 
Where Luther needs to distinguish himself morally from the Pope in his treatise, 
Kierkegaard actually discourages his reader from Luther’s task of busily ‘tracking down 
hypocrites’ seeking to ‘unmask or even shame every hypocrite who comes near him’ because 
such an endeavour is, according to Kierkegaard, ‘hardly the fruits of love’ (WL 32). 
Kierkegaard views the preoccupation with the demand to see other people’s fruit in order to 
judge their interior status with God as a kind of work-scepticism that mistrusts a person’s 
behaviour in advance. The outworking of such a suspicion of works is ‘that one should believe 
nothing which he cannot see by means of his physical eyes’ (WL 23). According to 
Kierkegaard, such a work-sceptic ‘ought to give up believing in love’ for ‘fear of being 
deceived’. Playing with the misrelation of original and copy, Kierkegaard says that ‘the one 
deceived is still related to love, and the deception is simply that it is not present where it was 
thought to be; but the one who is self-deceived has locked himself out and continues to lock 
himself out of love’ (WL 24). Since the deception is the copy without the presence of the 
original, eternity is where the original is present and the copy is no more. This is why 
Kierkegaard says that the one who is self-deceived ‘has prevented himself from winning the 
eternal’ because in eternity ‘he cannot dispense with love and cannot escape discovering that 
he has lost everything’. Kierkegaard’s claim here is not that faith alone ‘really binds the 
                                                
19 Consider remarks like: ‘from faith flow forth love and joy in the Lord, and from love a joyful, willing, and free 
mind, that serves one’s neighbour willingly and takes no account of gratitude or ingratitude, of praise or blame, 
of gain or loss’ (AE 31: 367). 
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temporal and eternal’, but rather it is love which is ‘before everything else and remains when 
all else is past’.20 Kierkegaard criticises scepticism because of its posture of mistrust that 
doubts an expression of love in advance as a deception and risks mistaking even the God of 
love for a deceiver.  
For Kierkegaard, love’s revealed fruit gestures toward the whence of love.21 Kierkegaard 
says this source is ‘hidden or is in that which is hidden’ and may be described as ‘a human 
being’s most inward depths’ from which ‘proceeds the life of love’ (WL 26). This source 
‘withdraws itself into remoteness and hiding; even if you have thrust in as far as possible, the 
source is still always a bit farther in’. These comments indicate a view that substantially differs 
from Luther who could identify the source and result of all things whether it is the Creator or 
wickedness within the creature. But here Kierkegaard implies that the source and result of love 
repel our grasp and yet humans still are already addressed by, and respond through the gift of 
love. 
As God dwells in the light from which streams every beam which lights the world and 
yet no one can penetrate back by these paths to see God, for the path of light changes 
to darkness when one turns toward the light: so love dwells in the hidden or is hidden 
in the inmost depths. (WL 26) 
To describe this mystery, Kierkegaard compares the hidden life of love to a ‘quiet lake’ that  
is fed deep down by the flow of hidden springs, which no eye sees, so a human being’s 
love is grounded, still more deeply, in God’s love. If there were no spring at the 
bottom, if God were not love, then there would be neither a little lake nor a man’s 
love. As the still waters begin obscurely in the deep spring, so a man’s love 
mysteriously begins in God’s love. As the quiet lake invites you to look at it but the 
mirror of darkness prevents you from seeing through it, so love’s mysterious ground 
in God’s love prevents you from seeing its source. (WL 27) 
Significantly, Kierkegaard urges that ‘when you think you are seeing [the source], then it is a 
reflection which deceives you, as if it were the bottom, this which only conceals the deeper 
bottom’. Kierkegaard goes on to make the following analogy, just as ‘the clever cover to a 
treasure appears to be the floor, in order to completely hide the treasure, so the reflection 
                                                
20 Kierkegaard’s position here bears a striking similarity to St. Thomas as presented in Otto Hermann Pesch, 
'Existential and Sapiential Theology: The Theological Confrontation between Luther and Thomas Aquinas ' in 
Catholic Scholars Dialogue with Luther, ed. Jared Wicks (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1970), 59-82; esp. pp. 74-
75. 
 
21 Cf. Kierkegaard, EUD 127 : ‘What is the good, where is the perfect to be found? If it exists, where is its 
source? ... [can we] find out what the good and perfect is without learning where it came from, would [we] be 
able to recognize the eternal source without knowing what the good and perfect is?’ 
 
 13 
 
deceptively appears to be the depth of the source—but only conceals that which is still 
deeper’.22  
 In Luther’s story about the dog and the reflection, the salvific activity of faith occurs 
on the riverbank and the reflection in the stream is to be avoided since it is the deception of 
good works. Whereas Kierkegaard’s analogy, takes us through the deception in order to get at 
the deeper mystery of God’s love which generates the love of the human being. In Luther’s 
theology, love of the human being is always a good work which is secondary to, and can even 
deceive faith;23 but Kierkegaard says that love is the movement of ‘the eternal in itself’ and the 
link between the ‘fresh and everlasting life’ of God and ours (WL 27).  
After his discussion about the recognisability of love’s fruit, Kierkegaard recalls 
Luther’s comparison of trees and fruit but adapts it by adding a third element. For 
Kierkegaard, ‘the tree is known by its fruits’ but it ‘is also known by its leaves’ (WL 28). So, if 
                                                
22 Cf. UDVS 192. 
 
23 Consider the following passages from Luther’s Commentary on Galatians (1535): ‘They [Luther’s opponents] 
teach faith in a way that attributes more to love than to faith; for they imagine that God regards and accepts us 
on account of the love with which we love God and our neighbour after we have already been reconciled. If this 
is true, then we have no need whatever of Christ. In this way they serve, not the true God but an idol of their 
own heart—an idol they have made up for themselves. For the true God does not regard or accept us on account 
of our love, virtue, or newness of life (Rom 6:4); He does so on account of Christ. But they raise the objection: 
“Yet He commands that we love Him with all our heart.” All right, but it does not follow: “God has 
commanded; therefore we do so.” If we loved God with all our heart, etc., then, of course, we would be justified 
and would live on account of that obedience, according to the statement (Lev 18:5): “By doing this a man shall 
live.” But the Gospel says: “You are not doing this; therefore you shall not live on account of it.” For the 
statement, “You shall love the Lord,” requires perfect obedience, perfect fear, trust, and love toward God. In the 
corruption of their nature men neither do nor can produce this. Therefore, the Law, “You shall love the Lord, “ 
does not justify but accuses and damns all men, in accordance with the statement (Rom 4:15): “The Law brings 
wrath.” But “Christ is the end of the Law, that everyone who as faith may be justified” (Rom 10:4).’ (AE 26: 
398); Or consider how Luther comments on Paul’s phrase ‘faith working through love’ (Gal 5:6): Luther says that 
‘the sophists apply this passage in support of their doctrine that we are justified by love or by works. For they say 
that even when faith has been divinely infused—and I am not even speaking of faith that is merely acquired—it 
does not justify unless it has been formed by love. They call love “the grace that makes one acceptable,” namely, 
that justifies, to use our term, or rather Paul’s; and they say that love is acquired by our merit of congruity, etc. In 
fact, they even declare that an infused faith can coexist with mortal sin. In this manner, they completely transfer 
justification from faith and attribute it solely to love as thus defined. And they claim that this is proved by St. 
Paul’ (AE 27: 28; cf. AE 24: 321); Or again, Luther says that ‘Faith and hope must remain, so that we may be 
justified by the former and encouraged by the latter to persevere in adversity. Finally, we are servants of one 
another through love, because faith is not idle even though love is tiny and weak. Thus when I command you to 
walk by the Spirit, I make it abundantly clear that you are not justified by love. “Moreover, when I say that you 
should walk by the Spirit and should not obey the flesh or gratify the desires of the flesh, I am not requiring of 
you that you strip off the flesh completely or kill it, but that you restrain it”’ (AE 27: 68). 
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someone could identify the tree by the appearance of its leaves, there is no contradiction 
between form and content until the fruit season demonstrated whether it ‘really was not the 
tree which according to the leaves it appeared to be’ (WL 29). Kierkegaard also says that no 
one should ‘regard [words] as sure marks of love’ because ‘by such fruits or by their being 
merely leaves, one should know that love has not had time for growth’ (WL 29). Only 
‘immature and deceitful love is known by the fact that words and techniques of speech are its 
only fruit’ and thus, if a human love ‘is really to bear fruit and consequently be recognisable by 
its fruit, it must form a heart’. Indeed for Kierkegaard, having ‘a heart in this natural sense is 
infinitely different from forming a heart in the eternal sense’ which is ‘the essential condition 
for bearing love’s own fruit by which it is known’ (WL 30). Unlike Luther’s soteriology24—
whereby, the salvific status of a person is independently established prior to and distinguishable from 
good works—Kierkegaard implies here that the innermost depths of a person is constitutive of 
and formed through our participation in the mystery of God through the infused theological 
virtue of love.  
So if, in the search for certainty between belief and good works, Luther mistakes the 
natural sense for the eternal sense here and what Luther identifies as fruit may only be leaves, 
then what shall we make of love’s fruit? Kierkegaard says that whether our words or deeds are 
mere leaves or love’s fruit, only time will tell. There is no feasible way to guarantee in advance 
that the saying of a single word or that the doing of a single deed will furnish the certainty that 
we have indeed made love’s fruit visible and circumvented deception once for all. No, 
Kierkegaard says ‘it all depends on how the deed is done’ and ‘how the word is said and, above 
all, how it is meant’ (WL 30). But even in admitting the decisive factor of appropriation, 
Kierkegaard quickly says it still ‘holds true that there is nothing, no in such a way, of which it 
can unconditionally be said that it unconditionally proves the presence of love or that it 
unconditionally proves there is no love’ (WL 31). For appropriation in love is not a universal a 
priori but rather it is an individualising gift of grace that at once elicits within us the task and 
demand of love for others. Thus, Kierkegaard tells his readers that we are not encouraged ‘to 
get busy judging one another’, and neither are we to meant ‘to work in order that love becomes 
                                                
24 Consider Luther’s nuptial theology: ‘Christ is God and man in one person. He has neither sinned nor died, and 
is not condemned, and he cannot sin, die, or be condemned; His righteousness, life, and salvation are 
unconquerable, eternal, omnipotent. By the wedding-ring of faith he shares in the sins, death, and pains of hell 
which are His bride’s. As a matter of fact, He makes them His own and acts as if they were his own and as if he 
himself had sinned; He suffered, dies, and descended into hell that He might overcome them all. Now since it 
was such a one who did all this, and death and hell could not swallow him up, these were necessarily swallowed 
up by him in a might duel; For His righteousness is greater than the sins of all men, His life stronger than death, 
His salvation more invincible than hell. Thus the believing soul by means of the pledge of its faith is free in 
Christ, its bridegroom, free from all sins, secure against death and hell, and is endowed with the eternal 
righteousness, life, and salvation of Christ its bridegroom. So He takes to Himself a glorious bride, “without spot 
or wrinkle, cleansing her by the washing of water with the word” (Eph 5:26-27) of life, that is, by faith in the 
Word of life, righteousness, and salvation. In this way He marries her in faith, steadfast love, and in mercies, 
righteousness, and justice (Hosea 2:19-20)’ (AE 31: 351-352). 
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known by its fruits’ but rather we are meant ‘to work to make love capable of being recognised 
by its fruits’ (italics mine). Kierkegaard’s subtle distinction here highlights the importance of 
not mistaking the means for ends, or to instrumentalize love into some reward. But even here, 
we are still not meant to ‘judgingly demand continually and perpetually to see the fruits in the 
relationship of love with one another’ (WL 32). 
In closing, Kierkegaard reemphasises that instead of being sceptical of love, it is 
imperative that ‘one must believe in love’ because only those who mistrust love insist ‘upon 
seeing the fruits’. Here Kierkegaard associates love with non-sight and doubt with sight not in 
order to reintroduce scepticism but rather to remind us how faith stands in for sight and how 
love stands in for mistrust. By insisting on seeing another’s fruit, there is always the danger 
that we might ‘see something as less than it actually is’ but we must remember that even when 
it is hidden from view, ‘love also can see something as greater than it is’ (WL 33). Once ‘one 
has learned to know [love] by its fruits, one again returns to the beginning—to believe in 
love—and returns to [love] as the highest’. Love is the highest because even though the fruit 
may ‘make it manifest’, it is not reducible to that fruit because ‘the life itself is still more’ than 
‘all the fruits which one could enumerate at any moment’. Indeed for Kierkegaard, love itself 
is ‘known and recognised by the love in another’ and only ‘he who abides in love can 
recognise love, and in the same way his love is to be known’ (WL 33). 
In sketching this brief comparison between Luther and Kierkegaard, we might be 
persuaded to reconsider Hall’s original claim about reading Works of Love as ‘a dense 
commentary’ on, and endorsement of Luther. Upon a closer reading of the text, we might 
make the counterclaim that Kierkegaard offers instead a parody of Luther which carries within 
it an implicit criticism of an extrinsicist interpretation of grace. For Kierkegaard, grace names 
the life of God; the source of all love which does not exact recompense but spares nothing 
and gives all in love, so much that the ‘one who loves is what he is only by being in You!’  
With the distinction between these two positions made clear, it becomes more feasible 
to be hesitant, indeed suspicious of a widespread assumption that Kierkegaard simply 
reiterates Luther’s sola fide theology—which is often used to pigeonhole Kierkegaard as an 
irrationalist. Seeing this difference demonstrates the need—especially for Catholic readers of 
Kierkegaard—to reconsider their hasty dismissal of him. In fact, let us not miss (as the 
English translation unfortunately sets us up to do) the implicit references to Kierkegaard’s 
Works of Love in part two of Benedict XVI’s Deus Caritas Est.25 There, the English renders the 
                                                
25 <http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/encyclicals/documents/hf_ben-xvi_enc_20051225_deus-
caritas-est_en.html>. Kierkegaard also makes an appearance in Joseph Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity (San 
Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1969), 39. 
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title as ‘The Practice of Love by the Church’ whereas in German ‘das Liebestun der Kirche’ 
should be translated ‘The Work of Love by the Church’ in order to better reflect the German 
translation of Kierkegaard’s Der Liebe Tun.26 Space does not permit us to explore this here, but 
suffice it to say that Benedict XVI’s emphasis upon love as a work that must be performed by 
a community in concreto is an extension of Kierkegaard’s argument for love forming faith.  
2.3 Summary 
In this thesis, my overall claim is that Kierkegaard’s writings have a defining influence 
upon Catholic theologians in the twentieth century. In the first section of this chapter, I have 
identified a major objection to this claim—namely, the preconception that Kierkegaard’s 
writings are antithetical to the Catholic faith—and sought to provide an alternative reading of 
one of Kierkegaard’s most treasured texts, Works of Love. With the remainder of this chapter, I 
turn to explore the relevance of Kierkegaard’s notion of ‘the autopsy of faith’ and ‘the Socratic 
hypothesis’ as a way to highlight the shared concerns between Kierkegaard’s writings and 
ressourcement theologians—that is, a theology of history that recovers a sense of divine self-
disclosure in the past that remains alive in the present. 
2.4 The Autopsy of Faith  
 Martin Buber tells a story about a very learned person visiting Rabbi Levi Yitzchok of 
Berditchev in order to debate him. Upon his arrival, the scholar found the Rabbi pacing back 
and forth with a book in his hand paying no attention to him; Buber says that the Rabbi 
suddenly stopped, ‘gave him a brief glance, and said: “But perhaps it is true after all.” In vain 
did the learned man try to rally his self-confidence. His knees shook, for the zaddik was 
terrible to behold and his simple words were terrible to hear’; then the Rabbi turned to the 
scholar and said that many ‘could not set God and his Kingdom on the table before you, and I 
cannot do this either. But, my son, only think! Perhaps it is true.’ Buber says that over time, 
‘the terrible “perhaps” beat on his ears again and again and broke down his resistance’.27 
Buber’s enigmatic story brings into focus the difficulty of performing an autopsy on the 
source of faith, as well as the uncertainty with which such a task is carried out for believers 
                                                
26 I am so grateful for Werner Jeanrond pointing this out to me. See Werner G. Jeanrond, A Theology of Love 
(London: T & T Clark, 2010), 166. n. 108. Cf. Søren Kierkegaard, Howard V. Hong, and Edna H. Hong, Works 
of Love (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 44-90. For more on Kierkegaard, see Sharon Krishek, 
Kierkegaard on Faith and Love (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). See also, Ferreira, Love's Grateful 
Striving: A Commentary on Kierkegaard's Works of Love. M. Jamie Ferreira, 'The Glory of a Long Desire: Need and 
Commandment in Works of Love,' in Ethik Der Liebe : Studien Zu Kierkegaards "Taten Der Liebe", ed. Ingolf Dalferth 
(Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2002), 139-153.  
 
27 Martin Buber, Tales of the Hasidim (New York: Schocken Books, 1947), 229-230. 
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and unbelievers alike. In fact, Buber’s story suggests that both unbelievers and believers come 
away unsettled from the question of faith. 
When one normally sees the word ‘autopsy’, one thinks of a corpse spread out on an 
examination table, ready for inspection to see the cause of its demise. But when ‘autopsy’ is 
juxtaposed to ‘faith’, it becomes unclear what the object of inspection is—whether a less-than-
living ‘object’ of faith is under scrutiny by more enlightened minds, or whether it is the source 
of faith that is actually inspecting those of us who take ourselves to be learned. The phrase 
‘autopsy of faith’ (i Troens Autopsi) only appears a few times, and is primarily used by 
Kierkegaard’s pseudonym, Johannes Climacus in Philosophical Fragments and Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript. By qualifying this technical procedure with a religious notion of faith, 
Climacus notes the difficulty, as Buber’s story point out, of bringing the (deceased?) god 
before one’s eyes for inspection. What is needed then is an eyewitness; someone who claims 
to have seen the god. In other words, if an autopsy of faith cannot reliably be performed first 
hand, then in order to perform it, we must have second hand evidence from the (third person) 
perspective of a reliable witness as an occasion for seeing the god for ourselves. And so, 
Climacus appeals not only to the practice or act of faith, but also to reflection upon the 
content of faith (tradition) and notes a similarity between the task of the pathologist and that 
of the patrologist—one who inspects textual bodies of evidence from the patriarchs of the 
faith who have long since passed away but whose witness is made contemporary with the 
reader. But in reflecting upon the act and content of faith, does the gap between first and 
second hand still remain? Climacus says that to be contemporary in this respect implies seeing 
‘with the eyes of faith’ yet not as  
an eyewitness (in the sense of immediacy), but as a believer he is a contemporary in 
the autopsy of faith. But in this autopsy every noncontemporary (in the sense of 
immediacy) is in turn a contemporary. If someone coming later, someone who may 
even be carried away by his own infatuation, wishes to be a contemporary (in the sense 
of immediacy), he demonstrates that he is an imposter, recognizable, like the false 
Smerdis, by his having no ears—namely, the ears of faith—even though he may have 
the long donkey ears with which one, although listening as a contemporary (in the 
sense of immediacy), does not become contemporary. (PF 70) 
In this passage, Climacus suggests that in conducting an autopsy on the source of faith, it is 
possible for those who are not immediately present to be made present and those who are 
immediately present to be made as if they were not.28 The difference is not a matter of 
                                                
28 ‘Contemporaneity’ or ‘simultaneity’ is a theme that surfaces also in the work of Baron Friedrich Von Hügel 
(1852-1925). See Friedrich von Hügel, Eternal Life : A Study of Its Implications and Applications, 2 ed. (London: T&T 
Clark, 1913). For more, see David Law’s essay on von Hügel and Kierkegaard in Stewart, Kierkegaard's Influence on 
Catholic and Jewish Theology, 75-96. 
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curiosity or historical evidence but faith. In other words, Climacus draws a distinction between 
the practice of striving to see God for oneself, and theological reflection upon reports of such 
practice by those witnesses, emphasising the primacy of the practical over the theoretical. In 
short, when the striving to see God for oneself is made present to the believer in the autopsy 
of faith, as Nicholas Lash says, she does not ‘seek prematurely to behold’ because this is to 
‘substitute credulity for faith’.29 The point Climacus makes is quite similar to the one Christ 
makes regarding salvation in his story about the master of the house locking the door: 
You may find yourself standing outside knocking on the door, saying “Lord, open to 
us,” but he will answer, “I do not know where you come from.” Then you will start 
saying, “We once ate and drank in your company; you taught in our streets,” but he 
will reply, “I do not know where you come from; away from me, all evil doers!” (Lk 
13:25-27 NJB)30 
In Kierkegaard’s journals, we read that faith is neither fantasy, cognition, historical knowledge 
nor tangibility,31 but rather that ‘all faith is autopsy’.32 Kierkegaard continues, ‘all knowledge is 
concerned either with teaching or with historical knowledge about the teacher’33 and ‘by 
having merely historical information about the wonder, a person never comes further’.34 But 
striving ‘to be a contemporary’, Kierkegaard says, is not the same thing as being 
able to say, “We ate and drank before his eyes, and the teacher taught in our streets,” 
yet without having known the teacher, which, after all, only the believer (the person 
not immediately contemporary) did, and without being known by the teacher, and if 
the situation nevertheless is such that the teacher gives the condition, then one of 
course cannot know him without being known by him, and one knows him only 
insofar as one is known. (PF 198; Pap. V B 12:7 1844) 
Here, Kierkegaard suggests that the teacher gives not only the condition for knowing, but also 
the opportunity, as if the pupil lacked these two criteria. I will have more to say about this 
later, but for now, I want to observe that Kierkegaard claims that our knowledge of God must 
come from God.  
                                                
29 Nicholas Lash, Theology on Dover Beach (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1979), 163. Earlier in this essay, 
Lash says that ‘To confess the transcendence of the mystery of God is, amongst other things, to acknowledge 
that our experience and knowledge of God is mediated by those structures of particular meaning in which we 
order the flow of experience as we seek to discern what is, in fact, the case’ (p. 159). 
 
30 All quotations from Scripture are from the New Jerusalem Bible unless otherwise noted. 
 
31 PF 197; Pap. V B 6:7 1844. 
 
32 PF 198; Pap. V B 6:8 1844. 
 
33 Ibid.; Pap. V B 12:4 1844. 
 
34 PF 199; Pap. V B 12:8 1844. 
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But, Kierkegaard asks the reader, ‘is this all conceivable? For the single individual does 
relate himself absolutely to the absolute teacher—that is, to the god—and all faith, as we said 
before, is indeed autopsy’.35 From the perspective of the one who dissects and inspects, this 
task is very much an active one and the passive object of inspection is quite indifferent to the 
ordeal. But Climacus cautions theoretically-interested readers in search for certainty in ‘the 
reliability of autopsy’ because if the object of faith is not made ‘dialectically clear’ then ‘rare 
learning and great acumen are expended on particulars’ and ‘the issue becomes only more and 
more difficult’ due to the risk of ‘changing faith into something else, into another kind of 
certainty’ (CUP 11). However, regarding the seeking and being sought in the autopsy of faith, 
there is no gap between first and second hand; Kierkegaard and Climacus are on the same 
page:  
there is not and cannot be any question of a follower at second hand, for the believer 
(and only he, after all, is a follower) continually has the autopsy of faith; he does not see 
with the eyes of others and sees only the same as every believer sees—with the eyes of 
faith. (PF 102) 
In short, the autopsy of faith refers to the discovery of being able to see and do nothing at all 
on one’s own—not even with an outward, retrospective gaze in reflective observation, or 
through the report of an eyewitness testimony—but nevertheless being enabled by God with the 
gift of faith to see the truth of, and for oneself, through one’s own introspective and prospective 
glance in the search for self-knowledge, knowledge of God, and the knowledge of the good.36 
In other words, it is the capacity of being made to see by virtue of being seen by the god—a 
gaze that has particular significance in the book of Hebrews: 
The word of God is something alive and active: it cuts more incisively than any two-
edged sword: it can seek out the place where soul is divided from spirit or joints from 
marrow; it can pass judgement on secret emotions and thoughts. No created thing is 
hidden from him; everything is uncovered and stretched fully open to the eyes of the 
one to whom we must give account of ourselves. (Heb 4:12-13 NJB)  
Seen in this regard, the autopsy of faith is not so much a task to perform by dispassionate 
observers as much as a procedure that human creatures undergo. For Kierkegaard, this 
procedure is performed by the Word of God, which refers not just to the divine wisdom 
found in Scripture, but also to the divine wisdom encountered in Christ himself who sees into 
the inner most depths of an individual.37 Indeed, Kierkegaard also speaks of ‘the mirror of the 
                                                
35 PF 215; Pap. V B 6:17 1844. 
 
36 For more on Kierkegaard’s paradoxical stance (introspective/prospective-retrospective/outward) of self-
knowledge see, Daniel Watts, 'Kierkegaard and the Search for Self-Knowledge,' European Journal of Philosophy  
(2011). <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-0378.2011.00461.x/abstract>. 
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Word’ to refer to Christ who reflects back to us, not our external appearance, but the truth of 
our innermost self. In fact, the gaze of Christ is often portrayed in Kierkegaard’s reflections 
on sin and forgiveness—most often with women in the Gospels.38 So the autopsy that faith 
performs upon the human creature involves not only revealing the knowledge of the truth of 
one’s own self as being capable of nothing at all,39 but also involves the expectation of being 
addressed by God’s love and the transformation of one’s way of seeing that accompanies such 
an encounter.40  
So the autopsy of faith theologically refers to being addressed and transformed by the 
Word, the seeing of oneself with one’s own eyes before God, and lastly, the death to self that 
the human creature undergoes in order to be contemporary with the illuminating Word. It’s 
the movement from Voltaire’s view, ‘In order to know if he is a God, I ask only one thing of 
you: that is to open your eyes’,41 to St. Augustine’s, ‘It is a further matter to say that when a 
man sees something which is good, God in him sees that it is good’.42 
The difference between the conventional and theological sense of ‘autopsy of faith’ is 
the difference between interrogating and being interrogated by that which one set out to 
interrogate in the first place. It is also a difference in the act and content of ‘seeing’. In the 
conventional respect, ‘seeing’ is a judgment that the observer endorses reflectively in the act of 
judging the object before one’s eyes. Whereas in the theological aspect, ‘seeing’ is hardly a 
perception but rather reflectively opaque and resists mastery—in other words, the eyes of faith 
do not ‘see’ but as the author of Hebrews has it, ‘can guarantee the blessings that we hope for, 
or prove the existence of realities that are unseen’ (Heb 11:1 NJB). In fact, ‘faith’, like 
‘judgment’ can refer to both the act and content. So in speaking about either the act or 
                                                                                                                                              
37 For more, see Søren Kierkegaard et al., For Self-Examination ; Judge for Yourself! (Princeton University Press, 
1990), 25-35. Henceforth, FSE. 
 
38 For instance, see Søren Kierkegaard and Sylvia Walsh, Discourses at the Communion on Fridays, Indiana Series in the 
Philosophy of Religion (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011), 108-115. Henceforth, DCF. The recent 
encyclical Lumen Fidei, also uses this image: ‘Christ is the mirror in which [believers] find their own image fully 
realized’ §22.  
 
39 Kierkegaard says that the believer ‘continually keeps his eyes on God, that he, although he himself is capable of 
nothing at all, with God is capable of ever more and more’ in Søren Kierkegaard, Howard V. Hong, and Edna H. 
Hong, Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, Kierkegaard's Writings (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 325. 
Henceforth, EUD. See also, FSE 76-81, 116, 131-133. 
 
40 For more treatment of this insight elsewhere in Kierkegaard’s authorship, see M. Jamie Ferreira, 'Equality, 
Impartiality, and Moral Blindness in Kierkegaard's "Works of Love",' The Journal of Religious Ethics 25, no. 1 
(1997), 65-85. Arne Grøn, 'Ethics of Vision,' in Ethik Der Liebe : Studien Zu Kierkegaards "Taten Der Liebe", ed. 
Ingolf U. Dalferth (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2002), 111-122. 
 
41 François-Marie Arouet Voltaire, Histoire De Jenni: Ou Le Sage Et L’athée (Londres: 1775), 61. 
 
42 Augustine and Henry Chadwick, Confessions, Oxford World's Classics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 
xxxi (46), 301. 
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content of faith, it is important not to confuse the secondary place of the latter for the 
primacy of the former—as if faith were merely a product of one’s interrogative deliberation 
upon clear and distinct perceptions of an idea. It is good to remember that it is the Risen 
Christ who asks St. Thomas the doubter: ‘Have you believed because you have seen me? 
Blessed are those who have not seen and yet have come to believe’ (Jn 20:29 NRSV). For 
Kierkegaard, the eyewitness and the reader of the eyewitness’s report are equidistant from the 
self-revelation of God. Hence, Kierkegaard says that ‘every follower is only a witness, but the 
latest one is just as good as the first’; this is not to denigrate the value of the Fathers, but 
rather to show that ‘the one who comes later believes through the contemporary, but not in 
him, stands in just as free a relation to the god as the contemporary does’ (PF 216).  
Perhaps now we might be in a better position to see, in a later chapter, the relevance 
of Kierkegaard’s notion of ‘autopsy of faith’ for a patrologist like Henri de Lubac who shares 
a similar concern about retrieving the sources of the Christian faith and yet not being deluded 
by privileging one witness above another as if the self-revelation of God is not equidistant for 
all. However, what might be less clear to us now is how the autopsy of faith remains a real 
dilemma for both believers and unbelievers alike. Far from being a ‘proof’ for the existence of 
God, the autopsy of faith deprives the believer and unbeliever of objective evidence—that is, 
a fact which need not be interpreted; hence, from our contingent perspective how might one 
come to learn the truth or even discern the god’s eternal presence in history? Or, what if that 
which we are calling ‘the god’ is merely a deception? To see how Climacus treats this problem 
I must delve a bit further into his argument. 
2.4.1 The threat of plagiarism regarding the knowledge of God in history 
In numerous places throughout his authorship, Climacus claims to only present a 
thought-experiment about what Christianity is, and, unlike Kierkegaard,43 he disavows being a 
Christian or a religious person (CUP 483, 557, 597, 617). The central problem of Climacus’s 
authorship is phrased as a gloss on G.E. Lessing: ‘Can a historical point of departure be given 
for an eternal consciousness; how can such a point of departure be of more than historical 
interest; can an eternal happiness be built on historical knowledge?’ (PF 1).44 In other words, 
                                                
43 Of his entire project, Kierkegaard says ‘My task is to get persons deceived—within the meaning of truth—into 
religious commitment’ as cited in EUD x, cf. JP VI 6533 (Pap. X2 A 196). 
 
44 Quoting G.W. Leibniz, Lessing says ‘it is not so easy to decide between the three hypotheses, and much further 
reflection is needed to reach a conclusion’ in Gotthold Ephraim Lessing and Hugh Barr Nisbet, Philosophical and 
Theological Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 50. For more on Lessing, see the invaluable 
introduction by Nisbet on pp. 1-22. For more on Lessing’s relation to the Enlightenment and German Idealism, 
see Frederick C. Beiser, The Fate of Reason : German Philosophy from Kant to Fichte (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1987), 61-81. See also, Frederick C. Beiser, Diotima's Children : German Aesthetic Rationalism from Leibniz to 
Lessing (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 244-282. 
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how can one conceptualise an encounter between the historical and the eternal without the 
encounter itself becoming merely a further reflection and reiteration of the historical? The 
epigraph to Climacus’s authorship is referred to as ‘Lessing’s problem’ or Lessing’s ‘broad and 
ugly ditch’45 and it is meant to directly problematise dogmatic notions of the Incarnation and 
the natural desire for God by calling into question the possibility of even conceptualising a 
necessary (could not be otherwise) transition from eternity to history without plagiarising that 
transition from a contingent (could be otherwise) source.46 Throughout Climacus’s sprawling 
authorship, Lessing’s problem of the knowledge of God and the anxiety of plagiarising that 
idea serve as a central impetus to the enquiry itself.47 Although Climacus takes his point of 
departure, as well as the terms of the debate from Lessing, Climacus indirectly provides a 
defence of Christianity in the form of an attack—rather than vice versa.48  
In light of the anxiety of plagiarising the idea of God and Lessing’s problem of ‘the direct 
transition from historical reliability to an eternal decision’ (CUP 96), Climacus begins his 
thought experiment with an important question: how can the truth be learned? (PF 9). 
Climacus calls upon Socrates himself in order to portray the complexity of the question as to 
whether the pupil can be said to actually ‘seek’ the truth:  
a person cannot possibly seek what he knows, and, just as impossibly, he cannot seek what 
he does not know, for what he knows he cannot seek, since he knows it, and what he does 
not know he cannot seek, because, after all, he does not even know what he is supposed 
to seek. (PF 9)49  
                                                
45 Lessing and Nisbet, Philosophical and Theological Writings, 87. 
 
46 For Hegel, this problem was ‘resolved’ by the inexplicable necessity of contingency; see Georg Wilhelm 
Friedrich Hegel and George Di Giovanni, The Science of Logic, Cambridge Hegel Translations (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), 478-479. See also, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Klaus Brinkmann, and Daniel O. 
Dahlstrom, Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Basic Outline. Part 1, Science of Logic, Cambridge Hegel Translations 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), § 145, 215-217. For more, see Stephen Houlgate, 'Necessity and 
Contingency in Hegel's Science of Logic,' The Owl of Minerva 27, no. 1 (1995), 37-49. The dilemma of the relation of 
necessity and contingency was not unique to German Idealism and is not lost on ancient writers, especially 
Thomas Aquinas and his Islamic predecessors, see David B. Burrell, Faith and Freedom : An Interfaith Perspective, 
Challenges in Contemporary Theology (Malden: Blackwell, 2004), 76-90. 
 
47 My reading of Climacus follows very closely to that of Stephen Mulhall, 'God's Plagiarist: The Philosophical 
Fragments of Johannes Climacus,' Philosophical Investigations 22, no. 1 (1999), 1-34. See also, Stephen Mulhall, 
Inheritance and Originality : Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Kierkegaard (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001), 323-353. Henceforth, 
IO. 
 
48 For a parallel reading of Climacus and Lessing, see Cornelio Fabro, 'La Fenomenologia Della Fede: Ambiguità 
Della Fede in Soren Kierkegaard,' Archivio di Filosofia  (1957), 188-197. The notion of a ‘leap’ is often attributed to 
Kierkegaard but actually comes from Lessing’s salto mortale, see Lessing and Nisbet, Philosophical and Theological 
Writings, 246, 251. For more on Kierkegaard’s notion of the ‘leap’, see Ronald R. Johnson, 'The Logic of Leaping: 
Kierkegaard's Use of Hegelian Sublation,' History of Philosophy Quarterly 14, no. 1 (1997), 155-170. For Lessing’s 
influence on Johannes de Silentio’s Fear and Trembling, see Lasse Horne Kjaeldgaard, '"The Peak on Which 
Abraham Stands": The Pregnant Moment of Søren Kierkegaard's "Fear and Trembling",' Journal of the History of 
Ideas 63, no. 2 (2002), 303-321. 
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In order to respond to the problem of seeing the truth due to the lack of evidence and the 
problem of not having a distinct idea of that truth to begin with, Climacus distinguishes 
between two modes of learning the truth—the Socratic and the non-Socratic hypothesis. 
2.4.2 Climacus on the Socratic and non-Socratic approach to seeing the truth 
For Climacus, the Socratic hypothesis is the possibility that we learn the truth by 
remembering it. In this way, it is presupposed that the pupil is already in possession of, indeed 
has the capacity for understanding the truth, but just needs an occasion (or teacher) to remind 
her of it (PF 24). Importantly, both the teacher and the pupil stand in the same relation to the 
truth in need of recollecting (PF 23). Hence, it does not matter from which teacher the pupil 
remembers the truth—the teacher is a contingent factor in the pupil’s remembering the truth 
that emerges from within her (PF 12). Since the teacher is merely an arbitrary occasion, and 
since the pupil originally possesses the truth, the pupil owes the teacher nothing—the 
copyright stays with the pupil.  
By way of contrast, Climacus sketches the non-Socratic hypothesis, which is the possibility 
that we learn the truth only from the god. In this way, what the pupil discovers is her untruth 
and incapacity to obtain, not only the truth but also the condition for understanding it—the 
god gives both to the pupil (PF 14). Hence, the pupil and the god do not stand in the same 
relation to the truth and it does matter from which teacher the pupil learns—the teacher is 
necessary to the pupil’s learning and receiving the capacity to understand the truth. The result of 
an encounter with the god is re-birth: ‘the one who is born again owes no human being 
anything, but owes that divine teacher everything’ (PF 19). From this perspective, in so far as 
the truth is, there is indebtedness to the god. However, from the Socratic perspective, there is 
no indebtedness, since the truth originates with the pupil. From the non-Socratic perspective, 
such a claim is blatant plagiarism (PF 61). Stephen Mulhall puts it this way, 
If he has properly absorbed what his teacher teaches, he can help others to learn that 
lesson only by helping them to learn from his teacher; he must not even present himself as 
an occasion for them to learn, but rather find a way of removing himself entirely from the 
scene—a way of bridging other learners to the teacher without allowing them to assign any 
kind of authority to him, not even the authority of one who prepares the way to the 
teacher (for the teacher is the way). (IO 353) 
With the non-Socratic approach to learning the truth, there is an indispensably indirect 
mode of communication alluded to in the quote above.50 Precisely because the pupil is in 
                                                                                                                                              
49 Cf. Meno, 80e. Plato and Robin Waterfield, Meno and Other Dialogues (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 
113. 
 
 24 
 
untruth and stands in a necessary relationship to the god, the communication takes an indirect 
form so as not to deceive the pupil with the illusion of the god’s dispensability as well as 
‘maintain the learner’s bold confidence’ and freely given love (PF 27-8). From the Socratic 
view, deceit is inevitable and freedom is compromised if the teacher was to ‘let the pupil go on 
thinking that he actually owed him something, whereas the teacher was supposed to assist him 
to become sufficient unto himself’ (PF 30). Alternately, the non-Socratic view links the pupil’s 
indebtedness to the god’s love—since the god’s love ‘must be not only an assisting love but 
also a procreative love by which he gives birth to the learner, or as we have called him, one 
born again’ and so, ‘the learner owes him everything’ (PF 30). 
The difficulty arises for the pupil in distinguishing untruth from truth, deceit from love, 
Socrates from the god, innovation from indebtedness. The matter is not decided, as Voltaire 
suggests, by just ‘opening your eyes’. No, for Climacus the matter becomes rather tricky 
because with the non-Socratic view, the relation is not merely between the god and the 
pupil—eternity and history—since ‘the god will appear in the form of a servant’ (PF 31) and 
‘the form of the servant was not something put on’ (PF 32). The god is not identifiable by 
peeking underneath ‘the plebeian cloak, which, just by flapping open would betray the king’ 
but rather the self-revealed formal features of the servant are necessary to know the god of 
‘love that suffers, love that gives all’ (PF 33). For the king cannot directly elicit the poor 
maiden’s love as an unequal without allowing ‘understanding and equality [to] disappear’, thus 
making the love unhappy (PF 28). No, the mysterious form which risks misunderstanding 
from the start is the way that the god leads (or “misleads”?) the pupil into the truth—despite 
the gap of the pupil’s infinite and qualitative inequality.  
For love, any other revelation would be a deception, because either it would first have 
had to accomplish a change in the learner (love, however, does not change the beloved 
but changes itself) and conceal from him that this was needed, or in superficiality it 
would have had to remain ignorant that the whole understanding between them was a 
delusion (this is the untruth of paganism). For the god’s love, any other revelation 
would be a deception. (PF 33)  
As Climacus later says, the difficulty is not necessarily understanding ‘that the God becomes a 
particular human being’ but that ‘he becomes a lowly and despised human being’ since the 
‘paradox is that Christ entered into the world in order to suffer’ (CUP 596-7). For the non-
Socratic view, ‘it is love that gives rise to all this suffering, precisely because the god is not 
zealous for himself but in love wants to be the equal of the most lowly of the lowly’ (PF 34). 
So the self-revelation of the god’s love as mystery is the form that the god’s love assumes in and 
                                                                                                                                              
50 For more on Kierkegaard’s use of indirect communication, see Katherine Ramsland, 'Grice and Kierkegaard: 
Implication and Communication,' Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48, no. 2 (1987), 327-334. 
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as Christ. And in light of the self-revelation of God’s love in Christ, Stephen Mulhall says, ‘We 
are, it seems, dependent on the god for our idea of him as dependent on us’ (IO 334). 
At this point, Climacus brings the threat of plagiarism that was originally targeted at 
the Socratic perspective, and rolls the charge back on to the non-Socratic view, casting doubt 
on the possibility of knowledge of God in general and the Incarnation in particular as merely 
human invention, a poetic deceit (PF 35). After all, how would the pupil distinguish whether 
their teacher was Christ or merely Socrates? To this, Climacus says  
Presumably it could occur to a human being to poetize himself in the likeness of the 
god or the god in the likeness of himself, but not to poetize that the god poetized 
himself in the likeness of a human being, for if the god gave no indication, how could 
it occur to a man that the blessed god could need him? (PF 36) 
Stephen Mulhall frames the issue this way, ‘any modern follower of Socrates who claimed that 
the non-Socratic hypothesis was a human invention would be committed to claiming that she 
can not only think, but could also have thought up, what she is committed to regarding as 
unthinkable’ (IO 332). But it is precisely the difference between the thinkable and unthinkable 
that Climacus began his thought-experiment. In both approaches, by virtue of the historicality 
of the pupil and teacher, such an encounter would be eo ipso contingent (PF 60). Yet the truth 
which the pupil obtains is eternal—that is, either by virtue of the immortality of the soul 
(Socratic) or by the grace of the god (non-Socratic). However with the non-Socratic 
hypothesis, the teacher and teaching are necessarily inseparable (PF 55). Thus, the non-Socratic 
hypothesis gives rise to the paradox of understanding the relation between contingency and 
necessity which was previously outlined in the epigraphic reference to Lessing’s problem at 
the beginning of Climacus’s authorship. 
So, if ‘paradox is the passion of thought, and the thinker without paradox is like the lover 
without passion’ as Climacus suggests, then ‘the ultimate paradox of thought’ is ‘to discover 
something that thought itself cannot think’ (PF 37). Revisiting Lessing’s problem of the 
relation of the historical and the eternal, Climacus grants that the known is what can be 
thought and says ‘let us call this unknown the god. It is only a name we give to it’ (PF 39). Now, 
Climacus sets aside the possibility of ‘proofs’ for the existence of God as circular because such 
arguments tend ‘to have assumed that he exists’ or does not exist in advance (PF 40). Instead, 
Climacus sets out to show how human understanding is ‘continually colliding with this 
unknown, which certainly does exist but is also unknown and to that extent does not exist’ 
(PF 44). Moreover, Climacus argues that the  
understanding does not go beyond this; yet in its paradoxicality the understanding cannot 
stop reaching it and being engaged with it, because wanting to express its relation to it by 
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saying that this unknown does not exist will not do, since just saying that involves a 
relation. (PF 44) 
Thus, Climacus draws a crucial distinction between seeing this unknown as ‘a frontier’ or 
alternately as ‘the absolutely different’. For Climacus, if the unknown is pictured in terms of 
the latter, then it ‘is continually arrived at, and therefore when the category of motion is 
replaced by the category of rest it is the different, the absolutely different’ (PF 44). For 
Climacus, the problem is that ‘this difference cannot be grasped securely’ because ‘at the very 
bottom of devoutness there madly lurks the capricious arbitrariness that knows it itself has 
produced the god’ (PF 45). As Mulhall has rightly pointed out, either the non-Socratic view 
‘must be itself unthinkable or it must be surreptitiously helping itself to an idea of something 
other than the absolutely unthinkable—thus collapsing the distinction between human beings 
and the absolutely different’ (IO 340). So from the Socratic perspective, the non-Socratic 
claim to know the unknown god and the absolutely different helps itself to knowledge that is 
claimed to be beyond thought—hence, as a product of reflection ‘the god has become the 
most terrible deceiver through the understanding’s deception of itself. The understanding has 
the god as close as possible and yet just as far away’ (PF 46).  
But suppose we conceive the unknown instead as a frontier? For Mulhall, then there is no 
such thing as unthinkable thoughts and the task becomes not seeing the unknown as ‘the 
boundary of the thinkable, but at best a boundary within the boundary of the thinkable’ (IO 
342). The upshot of thinking the unknown as a frontier then for Climacus raises the question 
of divine self-revelation in history:  
If a human being is to come truly to know something about the unknown (the god), he 
must first come to know that it is different from him, absolutely different from him. The 
understanding cannot come to know this by itself (since, as we have seen, it is a 
contradiction); if it is going to come to know this, it must come to know this from the god, 
and if it does come to know this, it cannot understand this and consequently cannot come 
to know this, for how could it understand the absolutely different? (PF 46; emphasis mine) 
In other words, we only come to know the unknown through the god’s making it known to 
us, and yet, if we do in fact come to know, we can only say that we know because—according 
to Christian theology—the condition to know has been gifted by the Triune God who is 
unknowable since He reveals Himself as mystery.51 The distinction between God and creation 
is absolute and the causal relation between God and creation is non-reciprocal—theologians 
tend to describe this relation in terms of gift. For the relation between the pupil and the god is 
a necessary one, however the relation between the god and the pupil is not, because it is freely 
                                                
51 Burrell, Faith and Freedom, 207. See also, David B. Burrell, Knowing the Unknowable God : Ibn-Sina, Maimonides, 
Aquinas (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1986). 
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given—what theologians refer to as grace. The difference between necessity and grace then, is 
the difference between logical derivation and the freely and lovingly, indeed, we might in this 
sense say ‘unimaginable’ gift of existing. Moreover, the tension is not carving up the world in 
terms of necessity (could not be otherwise) and contingency (could be otherwise), but rather 
seeing the sheer wonder of creation as that which could-not-have-been-at-all yet freely-and-
lovingly-given-to-be.52 Hence, this relation to the unknown God manifests itself spontaneously as 
wonder—an immediate incongruity with the way things are supposed to go based on previous 
experience. And wonder is no respecter of persons, whether believer or unbeliever. 
For Climacus, picturing the unknown as absolutely different is a failure to understand 
analogical language and ‘confuses the difference with likeness’ (PF 46). Moreover, ‘in its 
paradoxical passion the understanding does indeed will its own downfall’ (PF 47). The 
problem of the understanding’s own downfall, as Climacus himself observes, is that 
‘everything [the understanding] says about the paradox it has learned from the paradox, even 
though, making use of an acoustical illusion, it insists that it itself has originated the paradox’ 
(PF 53). Such an acoustical illusion repels the understanding and ‘offense comes into existence 
with the paradox’ (PF 51). Indeed, Climacus says that the ‘offense remains outside the 
paradox—no wonder, since the paradox is the wonder’ (PF 52). Just as Climacus warns of 
picturing the unknown as the absolutely different rather than as a frontier, Climacus—who is 
not a religious thinker—sets out two ways of seeing the paradox: intellectually, in terms of 
offense as a logical contradiction; or existentially, in terms of faith as irreducible gift, which 
Socratically understood ‘is not a knowledge’ (PF 62). Hence, Climacus says that ‘faith itself is a 
wonder, and everything that is true of the paradox is also true of faith’ (PF 65). 
‘Suppose’, Climacus hypothesises, ‘that the difference in intellectual endowment is the 
difference in being able to state more and more clearly that it is and remains a mystery for 
existing human beings’ (CUP 213-214). Importantly, in Climacus’s presentation there is the 
distinction between the god and the human being and there is the non-reciprocal relation of 
dependency between them both.53 Climacus says that it is a ‘blessing’ that ‘one relates oneself 
to this mystery without understanding it, only having faith’ and that ‘the maximum of any 
eventual understanding is to understand that it cannot be understood’ (CUP 214). Although 
Kierkegaard has read very little of St. Thomas,54 what he has his pseudonym say here portrays 
                                                
52 Cf. Burrell, Faith and Freedom, 179. 
 
53 Ibid., 154 n. 24; cf. ST 1. q. 44-6. 
 
54 Stengren, 'Thomism,' 98-120. See also, Benjamin Olivares, 'Thomas Aquinas: Kierkegaard's View Based on 
Scattered and Uncertain Sources,' in Kierkegaard and the Patristic and Medieval Traditions, ed. Jon Stewart (Aldershot: 
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a remarkable inner unity with the Angelic Doctor.55 The affinity with Thomas in respect to the 
distinction and non-reciprocal causal relation between God and creation can be detected when 
Climacus speaks of revelation—that is, communicating the truth in such a way that what is 
said can be appropriated as if it were one’s own: 
No one is resigned as God, because he communicates creatively in such a way that in 
creating he gives independence vis-à-vis himself. The most resigned a human being can be 
is to acknowledge the given independence in every human being and to the best of one’s 
ability do everything in order to truly help someone retain it. (CUP 260) 
Here Climacus distinguishes God from creation and observes that this independence is a 
gift which comes into focus for existing human creatures in their relation to one another. With 
regard to the paradoxical distinction between the unknown god and creation, Climacus says 
that ‘more understanding goes no further than less understanding’ (CUP 607). Thus, what is 
required to answer Climacus’s opening question—Can the truth be learned?—is to not 
‘confuse the spheres’ (CUP 388) by treating an existential challenge as if it were an intellectual 
problem.56 From the Socratic perspective, faith always requires a ‘crucifixion of the 
understanding’ (CUP 600). For Mulhall, the upshot of Climacus’s thought-experiment is that 
what is difficult about Lessing’s problem is not conceptually ‘recognizing divinity in 
imperfection, but the practical one of recognizing oneself—a sinner—as nevertheless lovable 
by god, as having something of the divine that an incarnate god might redeem’ (IO 348). 
Mulhall’s interpretation of faith crucifying the understanding has several theological 
implications: 
First, the understanding suffers through its relation to the god; it must, indeed, 
undergo a self-inflicted crucifixion if it is to maintain that relationship. Second, an 
acoustical illusion is central to that relationship—the understanding is unwittingly but 
ineliminably indebted to the paradox for its words about the paradox. And finally, the 
understanding needs to step aside—to resign its self-given position of importance in 
relation to the paradox. (IO 348) 
Curiously, the pseudonym Johannes Climacus shares the same name as the saint who is 
famous for his theological reflection on ‘the ladder of ascent’.57 In a similar way, Kierkegaard’s 
                                                                                                                                              
Ashgate, 2008), 183-206. For more on Kierkegaard’s engagement with patristic sources, see the rest of Stewart’s 
volume dedicated to the issue. 
 
55 For more see, Burrell, Faith and Freedom, 116, 135, 146, 174. 
 
56 Stephen Mulhall, Faith & Reason, Interpretations (London: Duckworth, 1994), 50. See also, Michael Weston, 
'Kierkegaard: The Literature of Freedom,' in Kierkegaard and Freedom, ed. James Giles (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 
2000), 180. 
 
57 For more on the mystical ladder of the original ascetic, see Jonathan Zecher, 'The Symbolics of Death and the 
Construction of Christian Asceticism: Greek Patristic Voices from the Fourth through Seventh Centuries' 
(Durham University [PhD thesis], 2011), esp. ch. 4. See also, James Conant, 'Must We Show What We Cannot 
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pseudonym has been helping the reader climb up a dialectical ladder by way of his sprawling 
thought-experiment. But just before the end of the climb, Climacus kicks the ladder out from 
under the reader: 
Just as in Catholic books, especially from former times, one finds a note at the back of 
the book that notifies the reader that everything is to be understood in accordance 
with the teaching of the holy universal mother Church, so also what I write contains 
the notice that everything is to be understood in such a way that it is revoked, that the 
book has not only an end but has a revocation to boot. (CUP 619) 
Kierkegaard scholars continue to debate the significance of Climacus’s revocation since it does 
not make much sense that an anonymous pseudonym would also feel the need for self-
censorship.58 But bearing in mind Climacus’s comments about wonder and seeing with the 
eyes of faith, then such a revocation could be seen as being faithful to his ascetic namesake. 
As Stephen Mulhall astutely observes, 
The true teaching of the Postscript is that one must stop doing philosophy altogether—
not just restrict one’s philosophizing to attacks on the impulse to philosophize about 
faith, but stop philosophizing. It means realizing that even the Postscript, with its 
unremitting attack on philosophical pretensions, still retains philosophical pretensions 
which must be abandoned or revoked ... the persona [that Climacus] presents to the 
reader embodies not the truth but a further version of the misapprehension to which 
he is opposed, in the hope that we can recognize ourselves in him and so go beyond 
the perspective he pretends to occupy.59  
According to Mulhall, the saintly revocation of Climacus reveals the ‘extremity of 
writerly self-abnegation’ that avoids ‘the claim to authority apparently in the act of authorship 
by owning that one’s every word is owed to another’, hence the revocation should be seen not 
as ‘finding one’s way to words hitherto unspoken but as finding a way to mean what one says 
when one utters even the most common or familiar of words’ (IO 353). Thus, Climacus’s 
revocation at the end of his authorship can be seen as putting forward ‘old fashioned 
orthodoxy in its rightful severity’ (CUP 275) as the resource that provides the language to the 
reader to help her mean what she says, even in the most unfamiliar circumstances—that is, 
Climacus procures the possibility of a theology of history in such a way that models for his 
Catholic readers how ressourcement might be carried out in a contemporary age. And yet, 
                                                                                                                                              
Say?,' in The Senses of Stanley Cavell, ed. Richard Fleming and Michael Payne (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 
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58 See the respective essays of Jamie Ferreira and Alastair Hannay in Rick Anthony Furtak, Kierkegaard's 'Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript' : A Critical Guide, Cambridge Critical Guides (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
59 Mulhall, Faith & Reason, 51-52. 
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performing such an autopsy of faith can be quite difficult, especially if the body of evidence to 
be inspected cannot be produced—or worse that body is resurrected. 
2.5 Conclusion 
To sum up what has been covered in this second section, I have investigated 
Kierkegaard’s notion of the autopsy of faith and paid close attention to the paradoxical 
thought-experiment of Kierkegaard’s pseudonym, Johannes Climacus. I noted how 
Kierkegaard addressed Lessing’s problem of the knowledge of God in history and Climacus’s 
concern about plagiarising that idea. I then explored Climacus’s portrayal of the Socratic and 
non-Socratic approach to learning the truth, noting the irreducibly paradoxical nature of the 
enquiry.  
In this chapter, I have addressed two obstacles to my thesis: i) that Kierkegaard’s writings 
are antithetical to the Catholic faith; and ii) the philosophical problem with a theology of 
history. In doing so, I have laid the thematic groundwork to help the reader see a structural 
affinity between the basic aim of recovering a theology of history in ressourcement theology and 
Kierkegaard’s paradoxical presentation of the Christian faith as the ‘autopsy of faith’. My 
overall argument in this thesis is that Kierkegaard’s writings have stimulated reform and 
renewal in twentieth century Catholic theology, and should continue to do so today. By 
attending to Climacus’s treatment of the philosophical problem facing a theological account of 
history, I have identified one central, parallel concern between Kierkegaard and ressourcement 
theologians: the inescapable paradox of the unknown god’s self-revelation of love as mystery, 
which continues to be presented as an existential (rather than hypothetical or merely 
conceptual) challenge today. In light of this, I emphasised the role of grace in Kierkegaard’s 
thought, which underscores a sacramental view of time. As I will suggest in the next chapter, 
this is an important theological sensibility that will aide ressourcement theologians in a critique of 
Neo-Scholasticism. In subsequent chapters, I turn to the writings of particular Catholic 
reformers to offer a representative model of positive engagement with Kierkegaard’s writings. 
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The Wider Reception of Kierkegaard’s Writings by Catholic 
Thinkers in the 20th Century  
 
In the previous chapter, I re-examined a major preconception about the theological 
import of Kierkegaard’s writings: that he simply reiterates Martin Luther’s theology. As an 
alternative, I highlighted some theological themes in Kierkegaard’s writings have a structural 
affinity with the basic aims of Catholic thinkers in the twentieth century. To further support 
my case, in this chapter, I will investigate the wider Catholic reception of Kierkegaard in the 
twentieth century to shore up the main Catholic objections and to assess the degree of 
appropriation of Kierkegaard’s writings. In this chapter, I argue that there is a Catholic 
engagement with Kierkegaard’s writings that coincides with the beginnings of theological 
renewal in twentieth century Catholic theology and the dissemination and translation of 
Kierkegaard’s writings in Europe. With the wider reception in view, the reader will be better 
equipped to ascertain the influence of Kierkegaard’s writings in the particular figures treated in 
later chapters. 
3.1 Kierkegaard Renaissance in Europe 
Most accounts of Kierkegaard’s Catholic reception in France begin with the momentous 
influence of Jean Wahl’s (1888-1974) Études Kierkegaardiennes (1938)—that is of course, after 
the impact of the German reception writings of Karl Barth, Martin Heidegger, and Karl 
Jaspers to name but a few.1 Although Wahl himself criticised the Catholic portrayal of 
Kierkegaard,2 he was closely linked at the Sorbonne to several Catholic thinkers like Jacques 
Maritain and Gabriel Marcel.3 Moreover, due to the rise of Heidegger’s philosophical influence 
in Europe, a ‘return to the sources’ was generated among philosophers and Kierkegaard’s 
                                                
1 For more on Wahl, in relation to Hegel and Heidegger see Ethan Kleinberg, Generation Existential: Heidegger's 
Philosophy in France, 1927-1961 (Cornell University Press, 2007), 85f. For more on Wahl’s relation to Levinas, see 
Samuel Moyn, Origins of the Other: Emmanuel Levinas between Revelation and Ethics (Cornell University Press, 2007), 
177f. See also, D. Parodi, 'Philosophy in France, 1937-1938,' The Philosophical Review 48, no. 1 (1939), 1-30. Also, 
see Stephen J. Brown, 'Currents and Cross-Currents in Post-War France,' Studies: An Irish Quarterly Review 36, no. 
142 (1947), 211-216. See also, Tom Rockmore, Heidegger and French Philosophy : Humanism, Antihumanism, and Being 
(London: Routledge, 1995). Also see, Bruce Baugh, French Hegel : From Surrealism to Postmodernism (New York: 
Routledge, 2003), ch. 3. Prior to Wahl, there is the reception in Austro-Hungary (Lukacs, Buber, Kassner, Kraus 
von Hoffmansthal, Kafka, and Max Brod). Even in France, Wahl’s work was already responding to Shestov's 
anti-rationalist reading. 
 
2 Jean Wahl, Études Kierkegaardiennes (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1938), 380. 
 
3 Alejandro Cavallazzi and Azucena Palavicini Sánchez, 'Jean Wahl: Philosophies of Existence and the 
Introduction of Kierkegaard in the Non-Germanic World,' in Kierkegaard and Existentialism, ed. Jon Stewart 
(Surrey: Ashgate, 2011), 395. 
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popularity is not unconnected from this philosophical ressourcement. According to a review of 
Wahl’s book, Theodor Adorno says that despite the unimpressive role of Kierkegaard in 
French philosophy to date, Heidegger ‘may safely be regarded as a pupil of Kierkegaard’ and 
anyone following in the wake of Heidegger must necessarily ‘[go] back to the sources of the 
existential fashion now current in Germany’.4 Adorno says that Wahl’s book ‘serves this 
purpose’.5 In short, Kierkegaard had already become established as a major figure in the 
French and German intellectual tradition. 
For all its contributions to the field, Études frames the way subsequent authors will 
approach Kierkegaard biographically—and this is not without caricature. For instance, 
Alejandro Sánchez and Azucena Palavicini say that Wahl is responsible for presenting not only 
a metaphysical view of Hegel, but also ‘a belligerent Kierkegaard, a kind of anti-philosopher, 
whom [Wahl] sometimes compares to Pascal, an anti-rationalist who defines the limits of 
knowledge and the starting point of faith’.6 Also, Wahl is responsible for perpetuating the view 
which treats Kierkegaard’s pseudonyms as secondary to his Journals.7 Lastly, Wahl says that 
‘the word “existence” in the philosophical sense that it is used today was employed for the 
first time and discovered by Kierkegaard’.8 European Thomists like Etienne Gilson and 
Jacques Maritain9 latched on to this observation, but discarded Kierkegaard along the way in 
exchange for Henri Bergson in what eventually became known as ‘existential’ Thomism.10 
Hence after Wahl’s contribution, it is not surprising that Catholic theologians in France would 
be drawn to Kierkegaard but would ultimately dismiss him in favour of a Thomistic 
perspective. It is undeniable that Wahl’s Études is a watershed mark in the European reception 
of Kierkegaard. Indeed, it would seem that any account of a Catholic reception of Kierkegaard 
must begin with Jean Wahl—but there is more to the story than that. 
                                                
4 Theodor W. Adorno, 'Review: Études Kierkegaardiennes by Jean Wahl,' The Journal of Philosophy 36, no. 1 (1939), 
19. For more, see Peter Šajda’s ‘Theodor W. Adorno: Kierkegaard’s Triumphs and Defeats’ in Jon Stewart, ed., 
Kierkegaard's Influence on Philosophy: German and Scandinavian Philosophy, vol. 11, Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception 
and Resources (Farnham: Ashgate, 2012), 3-48.  
 
5 Ibid. 
 
6 Sánchez, 'Jean Wahl,' 399. 
 
7 See Eric Pons, 'The French Reception of the Papirer,' in Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook, ed. Niels J. Cappelørn, 
Hermann Deuser, and Jon Stewart (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2003). 
 
8 Jean Wahl, Petite Histoire De "L'existentialisme": Suivie De Kafka Et Kierkegaard (Paris: Limoges, 1947), 12; as cited 
in  Sánchez, 'Jean Wahl,' 402. 
 
9 For instance, see Nathaniel Kramer, 'Jacques Maritain: Kierkegaard As "Champion of the Singular",' in 
Kierkegaard and Existentialism, ed. Jon Stewart (Surrey: Ashgate, 2011), 217-232; esp. pp. 223ff.  
 
10 For more on Bergson and the French philosophical context of this era, see Gary Gutting, French Philosophy in the 
Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), chs. 3-4. For more on ‘existential Thomism’, 
see John F. X. Knasas, Being and Some Twentieth-Century Thomists (New York: Fordham University Press, 2003), chs. 
6-7; esp. pp. 14-17. Fergus Kerr, After Aquinas : Versions of Thomism (Malden: Blackwell Publishers, 2002), 80-87. 
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3.1.1 Theodor Haecker 
Habib Malik’s penetrating analysis of the European impact and transmission of 
Kierkegaard’s writings ends with Theodor Haecker (1879-1945). Malik says that after Haecker, 
‘there came forth a few individuals who followed his lead in attempting to claim Kierkegaard 
for the Catholic tradition, and to express Kierkegaardian insights in Catholic terms’.11 Malik 
goes on to say that the Catholic reception of Kierkegaard ‘represents a radical way of raising 
the legitimate question of Kierkegaard’s relation to Catholicism, both historically as regards his 
own acquaintance with it, and theologically in terms of affinities between his positions and 
Catholic doctrine’.12  
According to Haecker, the writings of Kierkegaard were virtually unknown to the French 
and English-speaking world at that time.13 In 1913, Haecker wrote his first essay entitled, 
Kierkegaard and the Philosophy of Inwardness.14 After the publication of Satire und Polemik (1914-
1920),15 Haecker was received into the Catholic Church spending the next several years 
learning Danish and translating Kierkegaard and Newman into German.16 Haecker was also 
arrested and banned from speaking at the university or on the radio because he was an 
outspoken critic of Nazism.17 On the dust jacket of the English translation of Haecker’s 
                                                
11 Malik, Receiving Søren Kierkegaard : The Early Impact and Transmission of His Thought, 390. One of these subsequent 
thinkers is Miguel de Unamuno, see Malik’s treatment (pp. 284-287). For more, see Jan E. Evans, 'Miguel De 
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12 Malik, 390. 
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Germany before 1920, see Christian Wiebe, Der Witzige, Tiefe, Leidenschaftliche Kierkegaard: Zur Kierkegaard-Rezeption 
in Der Deutschsprachigen Literatur Bis 1920, vol. 311, Beitrage Zur Neueren Literaturgeschichte (Heidelberg: 
Universitatsverlag Winter GmbH, 2012). 
14 Theodor Haecker and Søren Appendix Kierkegaard, Soren Kierkegaard Und Die Philosophie Der Innerlichkeit 
(Munchen: J. F. Schreiber, 1913). 
 
15 Theodor Haecker, Satire Und Polemik, 1914-1920. [with Four Essays on Soren Kierkegaard.] (Innsbruck: 1920). 
 
16 Theodor Haecker, Journal in the Night (London: Harvill Press, 1950), xiii.  
 
17 Haecker, Journal. Haecker’s journal documents his arrest and his critique of Germany. Also, Alexander Dru 
provides an invaluable introduction to Haecker’s work. Dru is perhaps less well known than his English 
translations of Kierkegaard, Péguy, Burckhardt, Haecker, Blondel, de Lubac, and Balthasar. Dru was introduced 
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Journal, Jacques Maritain said that Haecker was ‘a man of deep insight and rare intellectual 
integrity—a “Knight of Faith” to use Kierkegaard’s expression’. Interestingly, Tracey Rowland 
traces the influence of Haecker’s translation of John Henry Newman on Pope Benedict XVI; 
however, she fails to mention Haecker’s work on Kierkegaard.18 
As Allan Janik suggests, had Haecker not translated and rediscovered Kierkegaard’s Two 
Ages in 1914 for the German-speaking world, it is highly unlikely that Theodor Adorno, 
Martin Buber, Martin Heidegger, Ludwig Wittgenstein, or Karl Jaspers would have accessed 
the Dane’s notion of ‘idle talk’ on their own.19 That said, Haecker was not the first to translate 
Kierkegaard into German. However, Janik says that Haecker was (unlike the translations by 
the Lutheran minister Christoph Schrempf) the first to reliably translate ‘a major work of 
Kierkegaard’ in such a way that ‘set the tone for the reception of Kierkegaard’s oeuvre 
generally’.20 In a posthumous essay that received the unfortunate English title Kierkegaard the 
Cripple (1948), Haecker himself says that 
Kierkegaard’s ideas required a different climate if they were to develop harmoniously 
and fit into the eternal philosophy of being, and the theology of the infallible Church. 
As a result, they were often confined within wholly heterogeneous elements and did 
not attain the fruitfulness to which they were entitled by their real meaning and 
function.21 
                                                                                                                                              
to Kierkegaard through Haecker’s writings and in turn introduced Kierkegaard to the English-speaking world. 
For more, see George Pattison, 'Great Britain: From "Prophet of the Now" To Postmodern Ironist (and after),' 
in Kierkegaard's International Reception, ed. Jon Stewart (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009), 250. See also, John Heywood-
Thomas and Hinrich Siefken, 'Theodor Haecker and Alexander Dru: A Contribution to the Discovery of 
Kierkegaard in Britain,' Kierkegaardiana 18 (1996), 173-190. 
 
18 Tracey Rowland, Benedict Xvi : A Guide for the Perplexed (London: T & T Clark, 2010), 11-12. Rowland does 
briefly recognise Haecker’s ‘dedication’ to Kierkegaard on p. 20, but only in relation to Alexander Dru and no 
further. 
 
19 For more on Haecker’s reception of Kierkegaard and his relation to other German philosophers, see Allan 
Janik, 'Haecker, Kierkegaard and the Early Brenner: A Contribution to the History of the Reception of Two Ages 
in the German-Speaking World,' in International Kierkegaard Commentary: Two Ages, ed. Robert L. Perkins (Macon: 
Mercer University Press, 1984), 190, 220. See also, John M. Hoberman, 'Kierkegaard's 'Two Ages' and 
Heidegger's Critique of Modernity,' in International Kierkegaard Commentary: Two Ages, ed. Robert L. Perkins 
(Macon: Mercer University Press, 1984), 240-241. Supposedly, Martin Heidegger had a ‘love-hate’ relationship 
with Haecker for decades, see Theodore J. Kisiel, The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1993), 321. Also, see Markus Kleinert, 'Theodor Haecker: The Mobilization of a Total Author,' 
in Kierkegaard's Influence on Literature, Criticism and Art, ed. Jon Stewart (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013), 91-114. 
Wittgenstein felt so indebted to Haecker that he donated some of his family money to him, see Monk, Ludwig 
Wittgenstein : The Duty of Genius, 109. 
 
20 Janik, 'Haecker, Kierkegaard and the Early Brenner: A Contribution to the History of the Reception of Two 
Ages in the German-Speaking World,' 191. Schrempf was responsible for translating twelve volumes of 
Kierkegaard’s works into German by 1922. 
 
21 Theodor Haecker and C. van O. Bruyn, [Der Buckel Kierkegaards] Kierkegaard the Cripple (London: Harvill Press, 
1948), 13. 
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According to Haecker, Kierkegaard’s ‘place is to be found in Thomistic philosophy and 
theology, where it belongs, which language would have shielded him from his absurd 
philosophy of the absurd as divine truth in the light of human understanding’.22  
It has always proved my greatest disappointment and is incomprehensible to me, not 
to find in [Kierkegaard] that strong and clear, burning intellectual desire for the 
unalloyed perfection and purity of the true doctrine so impressively demonstrated in 
the letters of the apostles, the early fathers, the history of the Church and of the saints, 
and which at the same period gave Newman no rest until with sorrow he was forced 
for the sake of truth to abandon the Anglican Church, and return to the Church.23 
Haecker is right to distinguish Kierkegaard from Newman in ecclesial terms however this 
should not indicate that their commitments or intellectual targets were incongruous.24 But we 
are left with a real question as to whether the christology and ecclesiology of Kierkegaard and 
Newman can be reconciled—I will address this topic later on in chapter 5.  
However, what unites Kierkegaard, Newman, and Haecker is an emphasis upon ‘wonder’ 
and how it outshines human management—a topic that will also be addressed in the next 
chapter. On the topic of wonder, Haecker says, ‘There is one thing that has come to full 
maturity in me: the understanding that I do not understand God: the sense of the Mysterium. 
That prevents me from misunderstanding the things of this world’.25 Acknowledging this 
transposition of Kierkegaard and Newman, Alexander Dru sums up Haecker’s position thus: 
‘the ultimate mystery of existence is the safeguard of truth and knowledge, the only safeguard 
against the inadequate attempts to explain everything, and the absurd denial of meaning’.26 In 
1949, Dru was preparing translations of Haecker and published two articles27 about Haecker’s 
                                                
22 Haecker and Bruyn, Kierkegaard the Cripple, 14. 
23 Haecker and Bruyn, Kierkegaard the Cripple, 20. Haecker is not the only Catholic at this time to compare 
Kierkegaard to Newman, see Regis Jolivet and W.H. Barber, Introduction to Kierkegaard (London: Frederick Muller, 
1950), 65. ‘Kierkegaard also has a notion of development as continuity which exactly corresponds with the 
reflections Newman had just published in 1845 in his Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine. Cf. Journal, 1849 
X2 A 207 (Dru 1003): “The human race, like individuals, also needs examinations or examiners in order to 
preserve its continuity. Geniuses are really the examiners. They develop much more slowly than other men, they 
really go through all the fundamental historical forms of existence. And therein lies their significance as 
correctives. While geniuses prophetically show the future they do so in fact owing to a profounder recollection of 
what has gone before. Development is certainly not a step back but a return, and that is originality.”’ 
 
24 For a more harmonious view, see M. Jamie Ferreira, 'Leaps and Circles: Kierkegaard and Newman on Faith 
and Reason,' Religious Studies 30, no. 4 (1994). 
 
25 Haecker, Journal, 47. For more on Newman, see Gerard Loughlin, 'The Wonder of Newman's Education,' New 
Blackfriars 92, no. 1038 (2011), 224-242. 
 
26 Haecker, Journal, xli, 74. Dru mentions that the context of Newman’s sermon ‘Implicit and Explicit Reason’ is 
an attempt to articulate a similar point. See John Henry Newman, James David Earnest, and Gerard Tracey, 
Fifteen Sermons Preached before the University of Oxford, between A.D. 1826 and 1843, [New ed.]. ed. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), 251ff. 
 
27 The first article is a condensed version of what appears as the introduction to Dru’s translation of Haecker’s 
Journals, see Alexander Dru, 'Haecker's Point of View,' Downside Review 67, no. 209 (1949), 260-275; Alexander 
Dru, 'On Haecker's Metaphysik Des Gefühls,' Downside Review 68, no. 211 (1949), 35-45. 
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relation to Kierkegaard in the Downside Review which appeared alongside one of Balthasar’s first 
articles printed in English. In one article about Haecker, Dru reminds the reader that ‘What 
Kierkegaard meant by faith, which he so often and misleadingly defines as being “against” 
reason, is in line with Newman’s description of conscience’.28 
Haecker’s foundational place in the Kierkegaardian tradition within Catholicism is 
important because of his translation of the writings of Newman and Kierkegaard and his 
subsequent influence upon important figures. However, Haecker’s work on Kierkegaard is 
also important to signal because it precedes that of Karl Barth29 and Paul Tillich30—two 
figures that are often associated with introducing Kierkegaard to the world of theology. 
3.1.2 Romano Guardini 
The next prominent figure to introduce briefly is the Italo-German Catholic priest and 
philosopher Romano Guardini (1885-1968). Guardini is significant not just because of his 
impact upon influential ressourcement theologians,31 but also because of his early—albeit, not 
flawless—engagement with Kierkegaard.32 When Romano Guardini presents the thought of 
Kierkegaard, the genre that he often compares Kierkegaard with is that of mystical theology 
and Christian psychology.33 The primary theme that Guardini traces in Kierkegaard’s works is 
                                                
28 Dru, 'On Haecker's Metaphysik Des Gefühls,' 40. 
 
29 ‘The post-war Catholic recovery of the Fathers would also have been very different without Blondel - but it 
would have been different too without the immediacy of the challenge of existentialism. Barth's Anselm, Barth's 
Calvin, even Barth's St Paul, owe a lot to Barth's Kierkegaard’ in Rowan Williams, Why Study the Past? : The Quest 
for the Historical Church (London: Darton Longman & Todd, 2005), 98. Thanks to Charlie Shepherd for this 
reference. Barth’s brief exposure to Kierkegaard came in the 1920s during his revision of Der Römerbrief (2nd ed. 
1922), but his Danish muse was soon discarded by the 1930s. See Bruce L. McCormack, Karl Barth's Critically 
Realistic Dialectical Theology : Its Genesis and Development, 1909-1936 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 4 n. 10; 217; 
235ff. For more, see Sean A. Turchin, 'Introducing Christianity into Christendom: Investigating the Affinity 
between Søren Kierkegaard and the Early Thought of Karl Barth' (University of Edinburgh, 2011 [PhD thesis]). 
 
30 Tillich claims to have been exposed to Kierkegaard at university in 1905, however he would not go on to write 
about Kierkegaard until much later. For more, see Heiko Schulz’s ‘A Modest Head Start: The German Reception 
of Kierkegaard’ in Jon Stewart, ed., Kierkegaard's International Reception: Northern and Western Europe, vol. 1 
(Farnham: Ashgate, 2009), 307-420; esp. p. 342.  
 
31 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Romano Guardini: Reform from the Source (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2010). See also, 
Robert Anthony Krieg, Romano Guardini : A Precursor of Vatican Ii (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 
1997). 
 
32 For instance see, Der Ausgangspunkt der Denkbewegung Soren Kierkegaards (Kösel 1927), Vom Sinn der Schwermut 
(1928), and Unterscheidung des Christlichen (Mainz 1935). For more on Guardini and Kierkegaard, see the excellent 
essays by Peter  Šajda, ‘Isolation on Both Ends? Romano Guardini’s Double Response to the Concept of 
Contemporaneity’ in ed. N. J. Cappelørn, H. Deuser and K. B. Söderquist, Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook 2010: 
Kierkegaard's Late Writings (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2010): 201-222. Also see, Peter Šajda, 'The Choice of 
Onself: Revisiting Guardini's Critique of Kierkegaard's Concept of Selfhood,' Filozofia 66, no. 9 (2011), 868-878. 
See also, Peter  Šajda, ‘Romano Guardini: Between Actualistic Personalism, Qualitative Dialectic and Kinetic 
Logic’ in Stewart, Kierkegaard's Influence on Catholic and Jewish Theology, 45-74. Cf. Massimo Borghesi, Romano 
Guardini : Dialettica E Antropologia (Roma: Edizioni Studium, 1990). 
 
33 Romano Guardini, Pensatori Religiosi, 2nd ed. (Brescia: Morcelliana, 2001). Henceforth, PR. 
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that of melancholy or depression, and the primary texts that Guardini engages are Christoph 
Schrempf’s German translation of Sickness unto Death and My Point of View as an Author.34 
Guardini often reads Kierkegaard in a flat-footed way, taking everything that is presented as 
autobiography. However for Guardini, Kierkegaard’s fictive author Anti-Climacus provides 
‘the interpretive key’ to understanding Kierkegaard’s authorship (PR 33). Guardini supports 
his autobiographical approach to Kierkegaard’s writings by pointing to relevant passages from 
Kierkegaard’s Journals.35 Although this approach does not generate a psychologically healthy 
exemplar for Guardini, he still sees Kierkegaard’s writings as useful for Catholic readers.  
In his essay entitled Der Ausgangspunkt der Denkbewegung Søren Kierkegaards (1927), Guardini 
says that the usefulness of Kierkegaard’s writings is best seen by reading him as an exemplar 
of ‘vitalism’ who develops a theology of personhood in the condition of modernity—an 
emphasis not dissimilar to Guardini’s own interests (PR 29). In particular, Guardini highlights 
Kierkegaard’s emphasis upon selfhood as taking up a stance in relation to God and to oneself 
(PR 35). With Kierkegaard, Guardini finds a way to speak about human creatures as 
dependent upon God (PR 39). However, as a result of his autobiographical approach, 
Guardini does fall into some common interpretive traps, such as seeing Kierkegaard fully 
endorsing Romanticism (PR 54-57), or interpreting Kierkegaard’s notion of a ‘leap’ as a 
volitional endorsement of logical contradiction (PR 59), or reading Kierkegaard’s notion of 
‘indirect communication’ as referring to the ineffable (PR 68), and his notion of ‘paradox’ as 
irresponsibility embracing incomprehensibility (PR 71).  
Although Guardini’s method of reading does not allow him to fully grasp Kierkegaard’s 
point, this does not stop Guardini from using Kierkegaard to flesh out a theology of 
melancholy in his essay entitled Vom Sinn der Schwermut (1928). Here, Guardini strings together 
a list of long quotations from Kierkegaard’s Journals and Point of View in an attempt to portray 
what depression feels like. Guardini faults Kierkegaard for escaping too often into solitude, 
which perpetuates such a melancholic state (PR 102). Guardini’s treatment of Kierkegaard’s 
emphasis on silence raises an interesting question regarding the difference between inclosing 
reserve, the demonic, and learning silence from the lilies and the birds. On the face of it, a 
person would be conceivably solitary and silent in all three states. However, it seems that 
Guardini is only aware of what he calls ‘bad melancholy’ in Kierkegaard’s writings and spends 
the rest of his essay trying to sketch a theology of ‘good melancholy’. For Guardini, ‘bad 
                                                                                                                                              
 
34 In passing, Guardini will acknowledge snippets from Either/Or, Concept of Anxiety, Repetition, Philosophical 
Fragments, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, and Stages in Life’s Way.  
35 Often, Guardini only cites the first volume of Theodor Haecker’s German translation of Kierkegaard’s Journals. 
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melancholy’ leads the person away from God and toward eternal perdition; whereas ‘good 
melancholy’ leads a person toward God in faith (PR 112-114). From Kierkegaard, Guardini 
learns that for the finite human creature, melancholy lights up their relation to the Creator 
God—indeed, Guardini says that melancholy is ‘the call of God’ upon a person’s life and is 
‘the cost of eternity’s birth in the person’ (PR 111). Instead of positively endorsing depression 
as a theological virtue per se, Guardini cautions the reader to avoid melancholy because it can 
invite the double temptation of reducing one’s life to the infantile by privileging the 
immediacy of nature and the senses, or by inviting a monastic withdrawal from the world 
which privileges the immediacy of religious experience (PR 116). In the end, Guardini says 
that Kierkegaard offers a theologically informed image of human life as ‘boundary dwellers’ 
between eternity and time (PR 119). By way of conclusion, Guardini points the reader in 
search of relief from melancholy to Christ in Gethsemane, and yet Guardini does remind the 
reader that there is no solution on earth for melancholy (PR 120). There is an interesting 
connection to be made between Guardini’s account of melancholy here and his student, Hans 
Urs von Balthasar’s account of anxiety. In a later chapter, I will sketch the implications of 
what Guardini leaves unanswered in his theology of melancholy, and how it finds an explicit 
answer in Balthasar’s theology of anxiety. However, it is worth noting briefly how Guardini 
connects Kierkegaard to Blaise Pascal and places Kierkegaard into a counter-Enlightenment 
trajectory (as opposed to Alasdair MacIntyre’s unfortunate portrayal of Kierkegaard as another 
post-Kantian figure perpetuating Enlightenment ideals in After Virtue36). 
In his book on Blaise Pascal (1935)37, Guardini suggests that Pascal has solutions to 
the problems of modernity that Kierkegaard falls prey to as ‘an isolated individual, struggling 
against the Church’ (P 17). However, Guardini says that Kierkegaard 
gains a share in [guadagna quota] the capacity of an elevated form of existence; he opens 
new horizons and he is able to see higher things; a new faculty of judgment is 
awakened in him and he is able to evaluate and love at a higher level. (P 24) 
In this way, Guardini rehabilitates Kierkegaard’s notion of the decisive leap by situating it 
alongside Pascal’s Memorial (1654), which makes good on the perceived shortcomings of 
Kierkegaard’s religious stage of existence (P 25). 
                                                
36 For MacIntyre’s account, see Alasdair C. MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 3rd ed. (Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), 39-52. For the debate surrounding MacIntyre’s account of Kierkegaard, 
see John J. Davenport et al., Kierkegaard after Macintyre : Essays on Freedom, Narrative, and Virtue (Chicago: Open 
Court, 2001). See also, John Lippitt, 'Getting the Story Straight: Kierkegaard, Macintyre and Some Problems with 
Narrative,' Inquiry 50, no. 1 (2007). 
 
37 Romano Guardini, Pascal (Brescia: Morcelliana, 1992). All translations are mine. Henceforth, P. 
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Ultimately, Kierkegaard gets politely dismissed by Guardini because he detects an 
overly pessimistic and Lutheran theology (P 301). For instance, when discussing the 
hiddenness or unknowability of God, Guardini distinguishes Pascal from Kierkegaard saying 
that Pascal would know nothing of the absolute incommensurability of the holiness of God 
and sinfulness of humanity which Kierkegaard allegedly poses (P 156).38 Guardini views 
Kierkegaard’s theological anthropology as illustrating a Reformed understanding of total 
depravity which regards humanity as not just performing sinful acts but rather is sin itself (P 
207). Guardini’s initial concern about Kierkegaard’s perspectivism in the stages transforms 
into suspicious grounds for dismissal when Kierkegaard speaks theologically of the depravity 
of the human being. Even though Guardini places Kierkegaard in the Pascalian tradition of 
distinguishing the god of philosophers from the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob (P 45), 
Guardini is convinced that Kierkegaard’s god is too scandalously ‘wholly other’ and self-
subverting to preserve humanity from being shipwrecked when the individual irrationally 
relates to an unknown god (P 211-12). Guardini believes that ‘in Kierkegaard there is the 
complete resignation of every logical security’ which results in ‘the negation of every fruitful 
aspect of logic in the positive sense and culminates in the concept of the absurd’ (P 214). For 
Guardini, the positive contribution that Kierkegaard makes to Christian theology is ‘to 
delineate Christian Truth on the basis of the problem of being human’ and ‘to develop the 
complexity of that Truth according to the central theme of the stages of human existence’ (P 
281). It should be noted that although Guardini owned a number of Kierkegaard’s works, his 
reading of Kierkegaard is largely based on only three pseudonymous works: The Concept of 
Anxiety, Philosophical Fragments, and The Sickness unto Death.39 To be fair, Guardini’s evaluation of 
Kierkegaard is not entirely negative, and he is sympathetic to Kierkegaard’s discussion of 
anxiety and contemporaneity with Christ. Commenting on Guardini’s characterisation of 
Kierkegaard, Peter Šajda notes how Guardini uses Kierkegaard’s ‘Lutheran’ thought to argue 
for a Catholic ecclesiology by extending what Kierkegaard says about Christ, to apply to the 
Church after the ascension.40 
In some respects, Guardini compares Pascal to Kierkegaard as if to grasp a Catholic 
understanding of a Protestant phenomenon of a crisis of faith. In the end, Guardini 
appreciates Kierkegaard at arm’s length but ultimately holds up Pascal as the Catholic 
                                                
38 Recently, Simon Podmore has problematized this understanding of Kierkegaard’s notion of an ‘absolute 
qualitative difference’ as pivoting on sin and argues that this has more to do with grace and forgiveness; see 
Simon D. Podmore, Kierkegaard and the Self before God : Anatomy of the Abyss (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 2011). 
 
39 Peter  Šajda, ‘Romano Guardini: Between Actualistic Personalism, Qualitative Dialectic and Kinetic Logic’, 52. 
 
40 Šajda, 69. 
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exemplar par excellence. However, in a critical review of Guardini’s book, Cornelio Fabro re-
frames Guardini’s treatment of both Pascal and Kierkegaard as religious exemplars that show 
us: i) ‘the vanity of abstract reason for knowing the living and true God’; ii) ‘the necessity of 
Jesus Christ for introducing us to the knowledge of God’; and iii) ‘the knowledge of our own 
suffering in order to orient ourselves in the knowledge of God in Christ’.41 For Fabro, the 
Pascalian ‘heart’ finds expression in Kierkegaard, and Fabro argues that the emphasis upon the 
heart is ‘not the substitution of the rational sphere but rather its completion, and it hinges 
upon the Infinite. Even St. Thomas affirmed that God draws nearer to us with love rather 
than with knowledge, because love draws the beloved directly’.42 Fabro continues to explain 
that the ‘heart’ is then ‘the whole expression of the individual’s spiritual life which by now 
judges everything “before God” as Kierkegaard would say’ and is a vital resource for humanity 
which ‘has forgotten God because it has withered at the desiccated fonts of reason’.43 I will 
treat Fabro more in a later chapter, but it is important that he circumvents Guardini’s 
‘protestant’ objections in this way. 
3.1.3 Erich Przywara 
The next prominent Catholic thinker that needs to be mentioned is Erich Przywara SJ 
(1889-1972), who is probably best known for his famous dispute with Karl Barth regarding 
the notion of ‘analogy of being’.44 Indeed, Przywara is also known for presenting Kierkegaard 
as essentially an anonymous Catholic.45 Przywara wrote Das Geheimnis Kierkegaards (1929)46 
after spending some time lecturing in Davos with Paul Tillich.47 At the time, Przywara noted 
                                                
41 Cornelio Fabro, 'Il "Pascal" Di Romano Guardini,' Il Fuoco VI, no. 1 (1958), 3-6. All translations are mine. For 
more on Pascal’s theology, see William Wood, Blaise Pascal on Duplicity, Sin, and the Fall (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013). 
 
42 Ibid. 
 
43 Ibid. 
 
44 For more on this dispute, see Keith L. Johnson, Karl Barth and the Analogia Entis (London: T & T Clark, 2010). 
Also, see the relevant essays in Thomas Joseph White, The Analogy of Being : Invention of the Antichrist or the Wisdom of 
God? (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2011). For more on Przywara, see Thomas F. O'Meara, Erich Przywara, S.J. : His 
Theology and His World (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002). See also, John R. Betz, 'Beyond the 
Sublime: The Aesthetics of the Analogy of Being (Part One),' Modern Theology 21, no. 3 (2005), 367-411. John R. 
Betz, 'Beyond the Sublime: The Aesthetics of the Analogy of Being (Part Two),' Modern Theology 22, no. 1 (2006), 
1-50. Kenneth R. Oakes, 'Three Themes in Przywara's Early Theology,' The Thomist 74 (2010), 283-310. See also 
relevant essays in, Thomas Joseph White and Bruce L. McCormack, eds., Thomas Aquinas and Karl Barth : An 
Unofficial Catholic-Protestant Dialogue (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2013). 
 
45 For instance, consider Papirer I A 38; I A 138; II A 265. See also, Cornelio Fabro, 'Spunti Cattolici Nel Pensiero 
Religioso Di Søren Kierkegaard,' Doctor Communis 26, no. 4 (1973), 251-280.  
 
46 Erich Przywara, Das Geheimnis Kierkegaards (München und Berlin: Verlag von R. Oldenbourg, 1929). 
 
47 O'Meara, Erich Przywara, S.J. : His Theology and His World, 111. 
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that as he grew fonder of Kierkegaard, Tillich was more enthralled by Schelling.48 One of the 
main reasons why Przywara took an interest in Kierkegaard’s writings was because 
Kierkegaard was a modern thinker that illuminated the relationship between human beings 
and God in terms of difference and presence—something that would feature as a centrepiece 
in Pryzwara’s understanding of analogia entis.49 It should also be noted that in 1930, Karl Barth 
attended Pryzwara’s lectures on Kierkegaard in Basel.50 Przywara writes during the high point 
of the German reception of Kierkegaard, citing in his preface works by Christoph Schrempf, 
Theodor Haecker, Romano Guardini, Torsten Bohlin, and Eduard Geismar among others. 
Przywara’s book discusses the interpretive complexity of Kierkegaard’s pseudonyms, 
spirituality, and his ideas in general. Przywara also has a bit to say about Kierkegaard’s 
‘personal Mariology’51—a topic that I will return to in a later chapter on Cornelio Fabro. 
However, Christopher Barnett has provided a helpful essay that allows readers to gain a sense 
of the level of Przywara’s engagement with Kierkegaard’s writings.52  
What is perhaps less known is the extent of Barth’s indebtedness to Przywara’s 
presentation of Kierkegaard. Barth’s indebtedness to Przywara is signalled in a reference 
Walter Lowrie makes in his introduction to Kierkegaard’s ‘Attack on Christendom’. Lowrie 
implies that Przywara’s Catholic portrayal of Kierkegaard is partly responsible for Barth’s later 
rejection of Kierkegaard.53 Indeed, Barth is quoted as saying ‘If I were to follow Kierkegaard, I 
might as well go over there [the Vatican]’.54 Although it has been argued that the majority of 
Barth’s criticisms of Kierkegaard are misguided,55 what Barth says about Przywara’s influential 
portrayal of Kierkegaard remains significant. For instance, Barth’s staunch resistance to Emil 
Brunner is resourced by Przywara’s Catholic portrayal of Kierkegaard: 
                                                
48 For more, see Thomas O'Meara, 'Paul Tillich and Erich Przywara at Davos,' Gregorianum 87 (2006), 227-238. 
49 O'Meara, Erich Przywara, S.J. : His Theology and His World, 77. 
50 Ibid., p. 216 n. 24. 
51 Przywara, Geheimnis, 114. 
52 Cf. Stewart, Kierkegaard's Influence on Catholic and Jewish Theology, 131-151. 
 
53 For Barth’s rejection of Kierkegaard, see ‘A Thank you and a Bow—Kierkegaard’s Reveille’ and ‘Kierkegaard 
and the Theologians’, in Karl Barth, Fragments Grave and Gay, ed. Eric Mosbacher and Hans Martin Rumscheidt 
(London: Fontana, 1971), 95-101; 102-104. Many thanks to Philip Ziegler for this reference. It should also be 
noted that Barth had read Pryzwara’s book on Kierkegaard, see Karl Barth, Karl Barth - Eduard Thurneysen 
Briefwechsel, Band Ii: 1921-1930 (Ga V.4), ed. Eduard Thurneysen, Karl Barth Gesamtausgabe (Zürich: Theologischer 
Verlag Zürich, 1974), 668. For this reference, I am gratefully indebted to Dr. Hans-Anton Drewes at the Barth 
Archive in Basel. Also, Karl Barth famously said that ‘Kierkegaard needs occasionally to be corrected with Kant’ 
in reference to Kierkegaard’s discussion of placing the individual higher than the universal in Fear and Trembling. 
For more on Barth’s Kantian corrective, see David Clough, Ethics in Crisis : Interpreting Barth's Ethics (Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 2005), 39ff.  
 
54 Søren Kierkegaard, W. Lowrie, and H. A. Johnson, Attack Upon "Christendom", 1854-1855 (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1944), xvi. Lowrie provides no textual evidence of Barth saying this.  
 
55 For more, see an excellent article by Philip G. Ziegler, 'Barth's Criticisms of Kierkegaard – a Striking out at 
Phantoms?,' International Journal of Systematic Theology 9, no. 4 (2007), 434-451. 
 42 
 
The “No!” with which we have to oppose Brunner applies even if he should one day 
return to the form of his doctrine which follows Kierkegaard and Heidegger. There is no 
fundamental difference between that form and the one which he seems to wish to adopt 
now ... Brunner’s conception of the Roman Catholic doctrine is insufficient and not 
authoritative. If he had derived his information from the works of E. Przywara he would 
have found that this great exponent of the doctrine of analogy long ago used a phrase of 
the fourth Lateran Council and also the whole Kierkegaardian dialectic to interpret the 
ability to despair and real despair in a Roman Catholic sense.56 
What emerges from this citation is the extent to which Barth acknowledges his own 
indebtedness to Przywara’s Catholic portrayal of Kierkegaard. Moreover, what also emerges at 
this point in the European reception of Kierkegaard is how Barth plays a less constructive and 
a more reactionary role when his indebtedness to the Catholic reception of Kierkegaard is 
uncovered. Although Przywara’s book tends to be scoffed at today, the scope of its influence 
shows that it should not be so quickly dismissed.57  
3.1.4 Erik Peterson 
In stark contrast to his former Göttingen colleague Karl Barth, the German theologian 
Erik Peterson (1890-1960) claims that Kierkegaard’s ‘influence upon 19th century Protestant 
Theology was significant’.58 Despite this vast influence, Peterson says that ‘the current 
popularity of Kierkegaard still requires an interpretation’ because ‘the indirect communication 
which was central to Kierkegaard’s thought now seems to have been transformed into direct 
communication’.59 Peterson continues, ‘everyone knows how to talk about anxiety, paradox, 
and risk, but the original meaning of Kierkegaard’s thought is slowly falling from view’. Here 
Peterson shores up the problem in European Kierkegaard studies at this time: the theological 
import of Kierkegaard’s writings is actively suppressed.  
                                                
56 Emil Brunner, Karl Barth, and J. Baillie, Natural Theology : Comprising "Nature and Grace" (London: The 
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58 Erik Peterson, ‘Kierkegaard e la Teologia Protestante’ in Carlo Boyer SJ, ed., Esistenzialismo: Atti Della Settimana 
Di Studio Indetta Dall'accademia Di S. Tommaso, 8-13 Aprile 1947, vol. XIII, Acta Pont. Academiae Romanae S. Thomae 
Aq. (Torino: Casa editrice Marietti, 1947), 127-132; p. 127. All translations are mine. Compare Peterson’s claim 
with the omission of Kierkegaard in Karl Barth, Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century : Its Background & History 
(London: SCM Press, 2001). In the preface of the English translation of this book, Colin Gunton says that ‘Of 
Kierkegaard, Barth famously said that his was a school in which one must learn but neither remain nor return, in 
some contrast to his judgment of Schleiermacher. Is that why there is no chapter on him? I suspect that the 
reasons are rather complex, but centre on the fact that there is a respect in which Kierkegaard did not belong in 
the century, and certainly has little to offer to the book’s main thesis about Schleiermacher and his dominance’ 
(xv-xvi). For Peterson’s critique of Barth, see ‘What is Theology?’ in Erik Peterson, Theological Tractates, trans. 
Michael J.Hollerich, Cultural Memory in the Present (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), 1-14. It should also 
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Peterson says that we must remember that Kierkegaard himself was a Lutheran 
theologian and a son of a ‘pietist merchant’. For Peterson, Kierkegaard’s problems with 
Protestantism begin here, and his economic independence allowed him to be critical of his 
national Church.60 Moreover, Kierkegaard’s pietism stands as ‘an immanent critique of 
Protestantism itself’, which was motivated by the ‘practical consequences of Nominalism in 
orthodox Lutheran theology’. For instance, Peterson says that the doctrine of forensic 
justification ‘eliminates every human activity in regard to divine activity’ and infused grace 
becomes ‘imputed divine favour’. Indeed, for Peterson this nominalism is exemplified in 
Lutheran theological anthropology when it asserts a distinction between real existence and 
ideal existence—that is, the person is ‘a sinner on earth and yet justified before God in 
heaven’. Hence, Peterson argues that Kierkegaard’s attack on Christendom is reacting against 
a theology that has turned ‘salvation into an ideal fact, and the faith which saves into an 
intellectual act based upon a contradiction between the visible (reality of sin) and the invisible 
(decree of God)’. Peterson’s argument is that Kierkegaard critiques this theology because it 
renders human works of charity ‘devoid of any meaning before God’ because it ‘threatens the 
sola fide of the grace of Christ’.  
In short, for Peterson ‘the Pietist impulse in Kierkegaard against the orthodox 
theology of his own day, only has a real significance for those Catholics who find themselves 
before the problem of their own vocation’.61 Indeed, Peterson observes that Luther’s theology 
‘starts with Adam and only arrives at the ideal salvation of the second Adam’, but that 
Kierkegaard’s theology ‘begins with the singularity of the God-Man (second Adam), and 
subsequently asks for the singularity of his followers, bringing them necessarily to 
asceticism’.62 This is what Kierkegaard means with his phrase ‘witness to the Truth’, which 
refers to the martyrs and marks the infamous controversy between Kierkegaard and his 
bishop.63 In conclusion, Peterson says of Kierkegaard that although he himself was not a 
martyr, Kierkegaard still ‘remained within Protestantism, and became its victim’.64 For 
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62 Ibid., 130-131 n. 9. 
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Peterson, ‘the leap’ Kierkegaard had in mind was not merely ‘liberation from the immanentism 
of idealist philosophy’ but also, liberation from ‘the iron cage that the dogmatism of Luther 
had locked humanity within’, which Peterson identifies as ‘a betrayal of human existence’.65 
Peterson’s analysis here provides an important insight into the Catholic reception of 
Kierkegaard at this time, but it also emphasises the autobiographical fact that Peterson was 
received into the Catholic Church after his encounter with Kierkegaard.66  
3.1.5 Jean Daniélou 
 The prominent place Kierkegaard receives in Jean Daniélou’s (1905-1974) 
programmatic essay for ressourcement theology has been overlooked in secondary literature on la 
nouvelle théologie. 67 In fact, the return to biblical, patristic, and liturgical sources only accounts 
for the first section of Daniélou’s clarion call for liberation from ‘une théologie rationalisée qui 
traitait Dieu comme un objet quelconque de pensée’.68 Alongside a retrieval of patristic 
sources, Daniélou suggests that contemporary philosophical influences must be explored in 
order to maintain some contact with contemporary life. What was required to engage with 
contemporary issues was not merely the patristic world-picture as such, but also a critical 
gesture that could be understood in that contemporary setting. Daniélou specifically mentions 
Nietzsche, Dostoevsky, and Kierkegaard as figures whose imaginations ‘require theological 
thought to expand to their scale [à se dilater a leur mesure]’ by calling theologians to distinguish 
between ‘the garment of truth from the truth itself’. Daniélou says that just because the words 
of Christ never pass away, does not ‘persuade us to dispense with changing our ways of 
expression [nous persuaderait de nous dispenser de modifier les formes par lesquelles nous avons à 
l’exprimer]’. So, instead of viewing contemporary figures with suspicion, Daniélou says that 
Marx, Darwin, and Hegel ‘représente un élargissement de notre vision du monde extérieur’ 
and existential philosophy in particular serves as an even more profound resource with an 
emphasis on human freedom, historicity, and subjectivity.69 Importantly, Daniélou mentions 
figures like Pascal, Kierkegaard, Barth, Gabriel Marcel, and Max Scheler as examples of 
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Christian faith which he distinguishes from the atheistic existentialism of Nietzsche and 
Sartre.70 
Daniélou especially highlights Kierkegaard, rather than Nietzsche or Dostoevsky as a 
prominent philosophical resource for rehabilitating contemporary Catholic theology.71 In 
particular, Daniélou mentions Kierkegaard’s The Concept of Anxiety as a robust theological 
account of original sin, which demonstrates a major role that theology still has to contribute to 
contemporary philosophical discourse.72 According to Daniélou, Kierkegaard becomes a vital 
resource for resisting ‘une théologie qui traite Dieu en objet’ and for affirming ‘ce mystère du 
Dieu personnel, caché dans les ténèbres, où nul ne pénètre par effraction, et qui ne se révèle 
que par amour’. It is precisely here that a vista opens up regarding the extent to which 
Kierkegaard’s influence can be traced in the work of those ressourcement theologians who 
followed in Daniélou’s wake. 
3.1.6 Yves Congar 
It is often overlooked that the French Dominican theologian, Yves Congar (1904-1995) 
wrote a remarkable essay entitled Actualité de Kierkegaard (1934).73 Congar’s essay provides a 
biographical introduction to Kierkegaard that precedes Jean Wahl’s Études Kierkegaardiennes 
(1938)—indeed, Congar is dependent upon a few of Wahl’s earlier essays. However, Congar 
acknowledges the timeliness of his essay is due to the popularity of the Kierkegaard Renaissance 
through the writings of Karl Barth, Martin Heidegger, and Karl Jaspers.74 And yet Congar 
prefaces his biographical introduction to Kierkegaard by marvelling at the range of 
Kierkegaard’s ecumenical influence upon various figures like Karl Barth, a Catholic convert 
Erik Peterson, and a Russian Orthodox thinker like Nikolai Berdiaev.75  
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Whatever defects one might find in Kierkegaard’s writings, Congar makes a deplorable 
anti-ecumenical jab saying that they can be traced back to the ‘ardeur morale, sèche et brulante 
du piétisme hitlérien’ of his father. The severe childhood upbringing and the break up with 
Regine Olsen provide Congar with a psychological rationale that explains why Kierkegaard 
wrote in pseudonyms which mask ‘la personnalité profonde de Kierkegaard n’était pas dans 
une unité spirituelle totale avec l’auteur de la création littéraire’.76 Although Congar misses the 
literary and philosophical point of Kierkegaard’s fictive authors, Congar’s view of the 
pseudonyms as alibis of a disturbed psyche will unreflectively continue the biographical 
approach to Kierkegaard that privileges his Journals as a kind of direct autobiographical access 
to the thoughts of the author himself.  
Congar also observes that Kierkegaard’s work represents neither a ‘philosophie tout 
entière’ but rather ‘constitue un carrefour de problèmes vitaux, contraint à poser une question 
et engage une attitude’, which is ‘un point de vue existentiel et doit se comprendre, pour une 
grande part, comme une réaction contre le romantisme philosophique issu de Hegel’.77 With 
the methodological difference between Hegelian resolution and Kierkegaardian dilemmas in 
view,78 Congar says that the upshot of Kierkegaard’s contribution is the ‘primat de l’individuel 
sur le “général”’ which gives way to an articulation of ‘une philosophie de l’existence, mais 
d’une démission de la pensée spéculative au bénéfice d’une attitude d’obéissance devant Dieu, 
de conformité vivante à Dieu’.79 Congar rightly points out that Kierkegaard offers not merely a 
doctrinaire elaboration of an existential point of view, but rather a therapeutic and 
philosophical method ‘à être soi, à exister’, which awakens the reader’s conscience.80 Unlike Erik 
Peterson however, Congar claims that the way Kierkegaard handles the Incarnation betrays his 
indebtedness to the Lutheran ‘watch words’ [les maîtres mots] of sola fide and sola gratia, which 
reiterates Luther’s theological view of ‘sin’ and ‘faith’ as the foundation of all reality.81 
Whatever Congar finds theologically objectionable in Kierkegaard, there is no mistake that 
for Protestantism, Kierkegaard is ‘le précurseur d’un renouveau’.82 To his credit, Congar does 
not restrict Kierkegaard’s relevance to only Protestantism but also says that for Catholics 
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especially, Kierkegaard cannot be dismissed because he is ‘revealing a true Gospel [un révélateur 
du véritable Evangile]’, and he offers to Catholics ‘the path of a soul mate [le chemin d’une âme 
amie]’.83 In a prescient manner, Congar discovers in Kierkegaard the resources and language to 
make the claim that Christianity ‘is not wish fulfillment or a last resort that allows us to lead 
our lives on any other principles, but rather it is that unique demand whereby the whole of our 
lives is oriented’.84 Congar concludes his essay saying that Kierkegaard merits our attention not 
because he offers a dogmatic system but rather because Kierkegaard exhibits an edifying 
attitude that our times require in order to better understand the present cultural situation in all 
its complexity.85 In the end, Congar leaves the question open as to whether Kierkegaard’s 
Lutheran-influenced views of sin and faith remain at odds with Catholic theology. 
3.1.8 James Collins 
Moving away momentarily from Europe, I now want to highlight the work of the 
American philosopher, James D. Collins (1917-1985), who is perhaps the first Thomist to 
substantively engage the writings of Kierkegaard in English.86 The fruit of his labour is 
expressed in The Mind of Kierkegaard (1953), where Collins provides an introduction to 
Kierkegaard’s biography, his use of pseudonyms, stages of existence, his relation to Hegel, 
faith, social criticism, and his critique of Christendom.  
Commenting on the therapeutic role of Kierkegaard’s pseudonyms Collins says that they 
‘remind us that the habit of wisdom is a hard won perfection and in no way identical with the 
ability to state and defend a scholastic thesis, whether of Hegelian or Thomist origin’.87 Here, 
Collins refers the reader to a similar point that is made by Etienne Gilson in his 1948 Aquinas 
lecture.88 In reflecting on Johannes de Silentio’s emphasis upon Abraham and its relevance for 
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 48 
 
a critique of Kantian ethics, Collins says that ‘Abraham’s silence calls to mind several doctrines 
in the moral philosophy of St. Thomas ... especially those associated with the disposition of 
freedom’.89 Here Collins corrects Maritain’s critique of Kierkegaard ‘for separating universal 
law and individual conscience’ by saying that Kierkegaard does not oppose these but rather 
relates them both to ‘God’s wisdom and justice’ in a way that coincides with ‘Maritain’s own 
remarks on the need to interiorize the natural law and appropriate it as the principle of one’s 
individual conduct’ (MK 289 n. 23). 
Importantly, Collins distances Kierkegaard from being labelled an irrationalist by making 
the following three points: 1) Kierkegaard ‘admitted the rights of reason in the nonexistential 
fields of the empirical sciences and logic’; 2) Kierkegaard permitted ‘some moral and religious 
understanding of the order of existence and subjectivity’; 3) Kierkegaard ‘championed the 
omniscience of God and the correlative intelligibility of all aspects of being (which are known 
comprehensively or “systematically” by God and which will be known by us in a systematic 
way, when we pass from time to eternity)’ (MK 293 n. 21). Collins rightly says that 
Kierkegaard resisted the conflation of points 1 and 3, but criticises Kierkegaard for 
overlooking ‘the alternative of a thoroughly finite and realistic way of grasping the order of 
existence through the speculative judgment of existence’ (MK 294 n. 21). Collins identifies this 
as a weakness that invites the misdirected charge of irrationalism, but it only serves to 
emphasise the ill-equipped nature of Kierkegaard’s philosophy for a speculative turn in 
Thomism—which, Collins ends this digression by directing the reader to the work of Cornelio 
Fabro.  
Collins also draws on the work of ressourcement theologian Henri de Lubac to say that in the 
Edifying Discourses ‘Kierkegaard’s personal devotion to the thought of our absolute equality 
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89 MK 96; Collins specifies that he has in mind the passage where ‘St. Thomas emphasises that God Himself is 
the mensura suprema et excedens of all human acts and their moral worth (ST II-II, 17, I, c.)’ (MK 289 n. 22). 
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before God is comparable to Proudhon’s dedication to the idea of justice’ (MK 302 n.17).90 
Collins uses this insight to open up Kierkegaard’s ‘persistent orientation’ toward religious 
existence and to highlight what it means to become a Christian in Christendom (MK 208). 
The upshot of Kierkegaard’s understanding of religious existence is that this transformation is 
not rooted in a philosophical basis but rather in ‘the distinction between natural and revealed 
religion’ which upholds ‘its non-systematic character but also its connection with faith, as a 
paradoxical affirmation of the presence of the eternal in time’ (MK 212). 
For Collins, what is lacking in Kierkegaard ‘is any sense of the Church as a present 
actuality, as something more than an ideal to be developed later on in the concrete order, 
when circumstances are more favourable’ (MK 216). Resisting the temptation to enlist 
Kierkegaard himself as a Catholic, Collins says that Catholicism was not ‘one of the serious 
alternatives’ entertained by Kierkegaard, however Catholicism stands as a virtuous exemplar to 
Protestantism for showing ‘the communal factor in religious life’ which is needed for sharing 
‘the burden of a responsible use of freedom, in regard to an eternal outcome’ and cultivating ‘a 
genuine church, having authority and a full sacramental order’ (MK 217).  
Kierkegaard’s attack upon Protestant Christendom has led some readers to turn away 
entirely from Christianity and others to move closer toward Catholicism. He himself 
followed a much less forthright course, a course which he did not propose as a model 
for others to follow. He took his own stand on the dangerous buttress of 
Protestantism, rather than in the secure building of Catholicism. He preferred to stand 
in discrimine rerum, on the razor edge of the religious situation, pointing out the 
“normality” of the Catholic teaching on the Church, the sacraments, and religious 
authority, without inquiring more closely into its claims of truth or sharing visibly in its 
life. His own vocation was to remain a gadfly among Protestants, reminding them that 
their only justification is to provide the incorruptibly critical conscience of the 
Christian community, and that they must not try to convert the reforming principle 
itself into a counternorm and countertradition. (MK 219) 
Here, Collins portrays Kierkegaard’s critique of the Danish State Church as no more than ‘a 
department of the state’ which ‘undermines moral seriousness and the transcendence of 
Christianity’ by conflating ‘the rights and duties of temporal citizenship and being reborn in 
Christ’ (MK 218). This is a critique that will be put to use in a later chapter on Cornelio Fabro. 
3.1.9 Louis Dupré  
One final Catholic thinker who has treated Kierkegaard’s works at length is Louis 
Dupré (b. 1926). In his book Kierkegaard as Theologian (1958), Dupré explores Kierkegaard’s 
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religious upbringing, understanding of sin, grace, faith, Christology, and Ecclesiology.91 Dupré 
begins his book in the shadow of James Collins with a quote that sketches the necessity of 
investigating Kierkegaard’s religious writings in order to assess their enduring relevance to 
Christianity. Although Kierkegaard lambasted the Protestant Church, Dupré quickly puts to 
rest any attempt to convert Kierkegaard into a Catholic—although one can discover ‘the 
apparent relation of many of his ideas with Catholic doctrine’ (KT x). Dupré also observes 
that what often attracts both Protestants and Catholics to Kierkegaard is ‘his aversion to the 
idea that Christianity is simply a stabilizing factor of society, a significant ornament of Western 
civilization, or a conservative force which can save modern man from losing his identity in an 
impetuous world’ (KT x). Moreover, Kierkegaard offers an account ‘of the role which 
freedom plays in the acceptance of faith and grace’ as well as ‘the reintegration of Christian 
asceticism in the sola fide doctrine of the Reformation’ not to mention his ‘notion of authority’ 
(KT xi). Drawing on Romano Guardini’s treatment of Kierkegaard,92 Dupré says that 
Only consciousness of sin makes the relation to oneself into a conscious relation to God, 
for the consciousness of a disproportion implies that in reference to which the relation 
to oneself is disproportionate. Thus consciousness of sin, the beginning of religious 
experience, brings a new determination into the conscious living of being-a-person. 
(KT 80)  
Here, Dupré rightly uncovers Kierkegaard’s theology by emphasising the revelation of sin as 
‘the first act of the redemption’ which at once alienates us from God but also returns us to 
Him (KT 81). For Kierkegaard, consciousness of sin is not only necessary for becoming a 
Christian, but also necessary for becoming authentically human, as Dupré rightly observes 
‘God clarifies man to himself; only before God does he realize the infinite meaning of his 
existence and become fully committed to it’ (KT 81). This process of salvation for 
Kierkegaard does not just happen without resistance but is marked by suffering—which he 
views as both a gift and task—which Dupré connects to the imitatio Christi tradition (KT 
171).93 Hence, Dupré argues that Kierkegaard does not advocate any problematic notion of 
natura pura but rather  
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Foi Chez Soeren Kierkegaard,' Revue Philosophique de Louvain 54 (1956), 418-455. For more see the bibliography in 
Paul J. Levesque, Symbols of Transcendence : Religious Expression in the Thought of Louis Dupré, Louvain Theological & 
Pastoral Monographs 22 (Louvain: Peeters Press, 1997). 
92 Romano Guardini, 'Der Ausgangspunkt Der Denkbewegung S. Kierkegaards ' in Unterscheidung Des Christlichen 
(Mainz, 1935), 469-472. 
 
93 For more, see Barnett, Kierkegaard, Pietism and Holiness, 169f.  
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grace has its origin in the very humiliation of man, and not after. It is in the 
consciousness of sin itself that God’s grace comes to him. As soon, therefore, as a 
person feels profoundly guilty before God, he has already left sin behind. (KT 92)  
I will pick these themes back up in a later chapter on Balthasar and anxiety, but it is important 
to see how Dupré highlights for Kierkegaard the way the ‘consciousness of sin and forgiveness of sin 
evoke each other with the internal necessity of two dialectical moments’ which originates in 
‘God’s absolutely free and redemptive intervention’ (KT 92).94 Again, Kierkegaard is not 
advocating that nature stands outside of grace since ‘new life consists not in a rebirth to 
another nature, but in a new relationship with God, a novelty of faith’ (KT 96). Indeed, ‘faith 
is at once divine grace and the highest human activity’ (KT 97).  
Redemption is not an external gift which envelops man without affecting him 
interiorly, but a God-given task which puts his intellectual and volitional life to the 
decisive ordeal of becoming spirit ... Only a living faith in God’s redemption can 
revitalize the past in the present and recall man from fleeting time. (KT 100) 
Against the common misconceptions of Kierkegaard’s notion of faith, Dupré rightly says that 
for Kierkegaard, ‘Faith is at once act and gift’ to such an extent that it is a ‘result of freedom 
and grace together’ which is ‘induced by God’ (KT 101). This is an important point that must 
not be overlooked, and I will come back to it in the next chapter on de Lubac’s engagement 
with Kierkegaard. 
It would be wrong to confine Kierkegaard’s theology of grace ... to an appropriation 
of transcendent truth. The concept of “condition for faith” implies something much 
richer than pure understanding. Just as faith is not restricted to an act of the intellect (PF 
IV 254), but involves the whole man, so the condition on which faith depends 
transforms man in his totality. (KT 102) 
For Kierkegaard, ‘the activity of the human will in faith becomes possible only through a 
choice by God Himself: only within the limits of the datum of grace, which transcends all 
freedom, can faith be called free’ (KT 103). For Dupré, this sets Kierkegaard apart from most 
Reformation theologians because he ‘firmly maintains that each step preparatory to the 
reception of God’s grace must itself already be grace’ (KT 104). At the same time, Dupré 
disabuses the reader of any suspicion that Kierkegaard advocates any theory of predestination 
but rather establishes the ‘two real terms’ of God’s initiative and gives full weight to our active 
response (KT 107). 
In light of this, Dupré rightly connects Kierkegaard’s comments about the individual’s 
God-relation as manifesting love of neighbour. Indeed for Kierkegaard, I am not the one who 
                                                
94 For more, see Louis Dupré, 'Of Time and Eternity in Kierkegaard's Concept of Anxiety,' in The Concept of 
Anxiety, ed. Robert L. Perkins, International Kierkegaard Commentary (Macon: Mercer University Press, 1985), 111-
132. Also see how this insight relates to ‘the infinite qualitative difference’, in Podmore, Kierkegaard and the Self 
before God : Anatomy of the Abyss. 
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selects which neighbour receives my charity, but rather ‘our duty is to love those whom we see’ (WL 
153), such that ‘Whomever God places in our path becomes of himself an object of love’ (KT 
162). Thus, Dupré draws from Kierkegaard’s Works of Love noting that we are not to first ask 
‘Who is my neighbour’ but rather ‘Who is my God?’ because the ‘answer to the this question 
also defines my neighbour, for every man to whom I have a divine obligation is my neighbour’ 
(WL IX 33; KT 162). Although Dupré does not make this connection, Kierkegaard virtually 
repeats the teaching of Saint Catherine of Siena: ‘for love of me [God] and love of neighbour 
are one and the same thing. Since love of neighbour has its source in me, the more the soul 
loves me, the more she loves her neighbours’.95 This theological insight coupled with what 
Kierkegaard has said about the role of grace and works in the book of James aligns 
Kierkegaard with the Catholic teaching of participation—a theme to be picked up in a later 
chapter on Fabro. Although Dupré does not frame it in these terms, he does come close when 
quoting at length a passage from Kierkegaard’s Journals: 
Grace is generally taken to be a dead decision, made once for all; instead it must tend 
to effort, since it is ... an anticipation. But to make an effort is always so difficult that in 
Christian life the most comfortable state is, in a sense, death, because then there is no 
longer any question of effort. (X2 A 223) 
In response, Dupré says that ‘Grace truly anticipates only when there is something to follow. 
Without effort there is no grace, because grace is fulfilled only through effort. This does not 
imply justification by works, but it does imply co-operation’ (KT 165). The upshot of 
Kierkegaard’s theological position for Dupré is that ‘Grace frees man only from the worry of 
saving himself by his own effort: his salvation no longer depends on this effort, but on God’s 
mercy alone. The strain of the effort is removed—but not the effort itself’ (KT 166). In the 
end, Kierkegaard shows us that ‘freedom itself is grace’ and that the Christian ‘sees all his 
efforts as a result of God’s meeting with him in Christ’ (KT 170). 
3.2 Catholic criticisms of Kierkegaard 
It is no coincidence that a significant portion of the labour in the dissemination of 
Kierkegaard’s works is shared by Catholic scholars. In part, it may be inferred that Catholic 
thinkers were attracted to Kierkegaard’s work because of a significant theological and 
philosophical overlap in the values shared between Kierkegaard and Catholic teaching. For 
instance, the Catholic translators of Kierkegaard were interested in his contribution toward 
their own debates concerning the relation of reason and revelation, nature and grace, and the 
establishment of authority in the wake of modernity. These translators found a rich resource 
                                                
95 St. Catherine of Siena, St. Catherine of Siena: The Dialogue, The Classics of Western Spirituality (Mahwah: Paulist 
Press, 1980), 36. I am grateful for Ben Kautzer bringing this passage to my attention. 
 53 
 
in the writings of Kierkegaard, and both St. Thomas Aquinas and the Blessed John Henry 
Cardinal Newman were compared to Kierkegaard at this stage in order to assess Kierkegaard’s 
relevance. For some of these thinkers, Kierkegaard’s writings are specifically mentioned as 
contributing to their conversion to Catholicism. 
As we have seen from the eight Catholic thinkers treated above, the reception of 
Kierkegaard’s writings in the Catholic world has been sporadic and they all have struggled to 
classify Kierkegaard within already existing genres. Most have been sympathetic towards 
Kierkegaard and yet his biography, radical philosophy, and Protestantism have engendered 
somewhat antagonistic responses in some cases. Some thinkers have fully identified 
Kierkegaard with Catholicism and others with Luther. This varied response is contained in a 
small body of literature which simultaneously elicits and resists the coincidence of 
Kierkegaard’s writings with Catholicism.  
Despite the multi-faceted Catholic reception of Kierkegaard, there have been three 
general—albeit, unnecessarily polemical and insufficiently substantial—criticisms of him, 
which can go some way to explain why Kierkegaard has not featured as prominently in recent 
accounts of the development of Catholic theology in the twentieth century. The first criticism 
levelled at Kierkegaard pertains to his own story and his tenuous relationships with his father 
and his ex-fiancée. This biographical criticism is often used against Kierkegaard to account for 
the various voices found in pseudonyms as the manifestation of a psychologically unstable 
mind. Although this criticism clearly mistakes a literary strategy for madness, it does reflect the 
nature of Kierkegaard scholarship at this time in Europe. The second criticism of 
Kierkegaard’s writings is that his philosophy tends toward individualism, fideism, solipsism, 
perspectivism, etc., which is deemed untenable when compared with papal and magisterial 
documents. Although this criticism amounts to a common misconception, the rest of this 
thesis will treat emblematic Catholic figures for whom this misconception is less of a problem 
and more of a reason to engage substantially with Kierkegaard’s writings. The final criticism 
accounts for the other two alleging them to be inevitable symptoms of the Reformation—that 
is, sola fide gives way to fideism.96 Since Kierkegaard is virtually indistinguishable from Luther 
(so this criticism purports), his ecclesiology and theology of nature and grace prevent Catholic 
readers from fully appropriating his writings in a way that advances, rather than deviates from 
Catholic theology. 
                                                
96 For a contemporary objection to Catholics insinuating inevitable decline with the advent of the Reformation, 
see Mark Lilla, 'Blame It on the Reformation,' New Republic 4 October (2012). 
<http://www.newrepublic.com/article/books-and-arts/magazine/107211/wittenberg-wal-mart#>. Lilla says 
that it does not help ‘to imagine that the peak of Western civilization was reached in the decades just before the 
Reformation, or to imagine that we might rejoin The Road Not Taken’. 
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3.3 Summary 
Now in the previous chapter, I re-examined the Lutheran preconception about 
Kierkegaard’s writings to suggest that perhaps Catholic readers have been premature in their 
dismissal of Kierkegaard on such grounds. The rest of this thesis treats three representative 
Catholic thinkers for whom this Lutheran preconception was not a reason to dismiss 
Kierkegaard, but rather an invitation to take him all the more seriously. In this chapter, I have 
sketched the wider context of the early Catholic reception of Kierkegaard’s writings and the 
objections that accompany such a reception. Again, any one of these figures could merit an in-
depth thesis in itself, but what I have shown here is that there is a Catholic engagement with 
Kierkegaard’s writings that coincides with the beginnings of theological renewal in twentieth 
century Catholic theology and the dissemination and translation of Kierkegaard’s writings in 
Europe. With this wider context in view, I will go on to treat three particular figures that 
inherit this mode of early Catholic engagement, and yet develop it in an original way. I select 
Henri de Lubac and Hans Urs von Balthasar as two representative theological figures in pre- 
and post-conciliar Catholic theology that substantially engage Kierkegaard’s writings as an 
interlocutor to their own way of proceeding. I go on to treat Kierkegaard’s influence in the 
writings of Cornelio Fabro, an important Italian Thomist that provides a watershed in 
Catholic engagement with Kierkegaard’s writings in Europe. In short, it is through 
representative figures like de Lubac, Balthasar, and Fabro that these three general criticisms of 
Kierkegaard can be overturned by uncovering the Kierkegaardian tradition latent within 
Catholicism in order to invite contemporary Catholic theologians to engage Kierkegaard’s 
writings anew. 
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‘God’ is, not because our grammar is outworn; 
but that grammar lives and generates worlds 
because there is the wager on God. 
- George Steiner 1 
 
Revelation gives us the key,  
but we may not yet know how to use it;  
or perhaps we may fear  
to enter that sphere of mystery  
which it suddenly opens for us. 
- Henri de Lubac 2 
 
 
The Theologian of Inwardness: on the Kierkegaardian aspects of 
Henri de Lubac’s theology 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I argued that the influence of Kierkegaard’s writings is not 
restricted to confessional boundaries, but rather significantly shaped the writings of 
emblematic Catholic theologians in the twentieth century. I now turn from that wider Catholic 
reception to show how Henri de Lubac’s theology is distinctively shaped by Kierkegaard’s 
writings. In this chapter, I argue that by looking closer at the Kierkegaardian aspects of Henri 
de Lubac’s theology, we gain an insight into the basic aims of ressourcement. Rather than 
construing ressourcement as a purely patristic enterprise, de Lubac’s engagement with 
Kierkegaard shows how the scope of ressourcement can be extended to embrace engagement 
with contemporary philosophy and theology. To support this claim, I examine the 
Kierkegaardian aspects of de Lubac’s theology in The Drama of Atheist Humanism (1944), 
Paradoxes of Faith (1944), The Discovery of God (1945), and The Mystery of the Supernatural (1965). 
As a result, a new perspective on the Catholic receptivity of Protestant theological concerns 
before the Second Vatican Council is illuminated. 
Although the encyclical Humani Generis (1950) expressed an explicit condemnation of 
existentialism, de Lubac is able to communicate his understanding of a renewed Catholic 
theology by employing key aspects of the writings of Søren Kierkegaard. In fact, Christopher 
Barnett has pointed to Kierkegaard’s defence of the validity of religious claims in a secular age, 
                                                
1 George Steiner, Real Presences (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 4. 
 
2 Henri de Lubac, The Mystery of the Supernatural (New York: Crossroad Pub, 1998), 137. Henceforth, MS. 
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his critical rejection of an historicism that reduces divine transcendence to mere facticity, and 
his characterisation of faith as the paradoxical gift of openness before God, to make the bold 
claim that Kierkegaard ‘makes de Lubac’s intellectual enterprise possible’.3 Although there may 
be an affinity in the way both Kierkegaard and de Lubac offer critical responses to modernity, 
one still could ask whether de Lubac’s work is specifically indebted to Kierkegaard or whether 
this affinity indicates a general Christian response to the crises of the inter-war years. Thus in 
this chapter, I want to put forward the best possible case for a specific indebtedness to 
Kierkegaard’s writings. In fact, I argue that in de Lubac’s writings there are Kierkegaardian 
themes and terminology in his account of the relationship between grace and nature, human 
freedom and divine action. As I explained in an earlier chapter, Kierkegaard’s fictive author 
Johannes Climacus exposes the attempt to locate the truth of Christianity from within 
('Socratically'), rather than from without (through a non-Socratic revelation). In this chapter, I 
want to show how de Lubac critiques a stable notion of ‘pure nature’, insisting that grace is 
radically interior, yet without us being able to claim it for ourselves. One could say that both 
Climacus and de Lubac can be understood as reflecting on St Augustine’s insight that God is 
more intimate to me than I am to myself. 
Most introductions to Kierkegaard’s thought and writings4  identify how Kierkegaard, 
the Socrates of Christendom, elaborates certain themes and concepts such as: paradox, 
bearing witness to the truth, indirect communication, and the scandal and interiority of faith. 
In reading secondary literature on Kierkegaard, it does not take long to figure out that the way 
Kierkegaard communicates in his writings becomes just as important as what is being said. For 
Kierkegaard, pedagogy becomes an authorial concern to such an extent that the medium is the 
message—especially for divine pedagogy. However, the problem is that in Christendom 
everyone is presumed to already be a Christian and knows too much to learn what it means to 
become a Christian. So Kierkegaard must remove the obstacle of excess knowledge, tricking 
the reader out of what they think they already know, in order to present anew the scandal of 
the Christian faith. Now, the claim I am making here is that the pedagogical strategy that 
Kierkegaard takes up bears an affinity to the way Henri de Lubac presents his theology to his 
readers. 
                                                
3 Christopher B. Barnett, 'Henri de Lubac: Locating Kierkegaard Amid the "Drama" of Nietzschean Humanism' 
in Stewart, Kierkegaard's Influence on Catholic and Jewish Theology, 109. 
 
4 A few good introductions to Kierkegaard’s work are: George Pattison, The Philosophy of Kierkegaard (Montreal: 
McGill-Queen's University Press, 2005). See also, M. Jamie Ferreira, Kierkegaard, Blackwell Great Minds (Oxford: 
Wiley-Blackwell, 2009). 
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For instance, Kierkegaard’s presence can be detected in de Lubac’s Paradoxes of the 
Faith (1945).5 In this early work, de Lubac organises a variety of intentionally fragmentary 
quips around several topics that when viewed together, shore up important themes in 
Kierkegaard’s writings: Paradox, Christianity, Witness, Spirit, Truth, Interiority, Faith. In the 
preface of his book, de Lubac says that since ‘the expression of a thought is inevitably partial, 
in the sense that it is incomplete, its elaboration in connected discourse may sometimes 
mislead and make it appear partial in the other sense of the word’. So, de Lubac decides to 
present the material in this book in an intentionally fragmentary way so as to assume the 
misunderstanding of the reader in advance and to ‘Let the paradox be’ for the reader to 
decide. Reminiscent of Kierkegaard’s decision to write as one without authority through his 
fictive authors, commonly referred to as pseudonyms, de Lubac says that ‘the frequently 
incomplete reflections’ in this book ‘are not intended to be the discoveries of a solitary mind’. 
The last thing that de Lubac reminds his reader of in the preface is that ‘the Gospel is full of 
paradoxes, that man himself is a living paradox, and that according to the Fathers of the 
Church, the Incarnation is the supreme Paradox’. Here is an instance where de Lubac presents 
a theological claim as if it was a patristic insight, but doing so in an explicitly Kierkegaardian 
register. For both Kierkegaard and de Lubac, paradox outstrips resolution and marks ‘the 
search or wait for synthesis’ implicit within theological language: ‘the provisional expression of 
a view which remains incomplete, but whose orientation is ever towards fullness’.6 In fact, de 
Lubac wonders whether ‘all substantial spiritual doctrine must not of necessity take a 
paradoxical form’.7  
But is this Kierkegaardian language merely an ornamental feature of de Lubac’s 
theology? I want to suggest that it is not. In fact, my claim is that there is a specific affinity 
between de Lubac’s theology and Kierkegaard’s writings, which goes much deeper than 
rhetorical flourish. In order to assess further how de Lubac’s theology exhibits Kierkegaardian 
aspects, I will provide wider support by looking in particular at de Lubac’s The Drama of Atheist 
Humanism (1944), The Discovery of God (1945), and The Mystery of the Supernatural (1965). For de 
Lubac, the theological task at hand is two-fold: i) to diagnose the Church’s failure to 
communicate properly with modern culture; and ii) to defend Catholic doctrine as an answer 
to a fundamental aspiration of contemporary society.8 Indeed, de Lubac’s method for 
                                                
 
5 Henri de Lubac, Paradoxes of Faith (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1987). This English translation is a 
combination of two books by de Lubac that are separated by a decade: Henri de Lubac, Paradoxes (Paris: Editions 
de Livre, 1945). Henri de Lubac, Nouveaux Paradoxes (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1955). 
6 Lubac, Paradoxes, 9. 
 
7 Ibid., 13. 
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accomplishing this dual task is often characterised as celebrating marginal and eccentric figures 
in order to illuminate and integrate traditional forms of philosophical and theological 
understanding, thus transforming Catholic theology in his wake.9 Although the patristic 
content of de Lubac’s theology is undeniable,10 it is my claim that Kierkegaard’s writings 
provide the grammar that allows de Lubac to frame his diagnostic and apologetic task as a pre-
conciliar theologian in the modern age. I take this not to mean that de Lubac could have 
selected any modern philosopher to convey his patristic message, but rather that the way 
Kierkegaard communicates his concerns is constitutive of the way de Lubac seeks to 
communicate his understanding of Catholic renewal and the way he critiques Neo-
Scholasticism. To support this claim, I assess some of de Lubac’s most important works in 
order to demonstrate his appropriation of Kierkegaard’s writings. The upshot of my argument 
is a call for the re-examination of the non-patristic philosophical influences upon ressourcement 
theologians in general, as well as the ecumenical role of Kierkegaard’s writings in particular, 
stimulating the reform and renewal of Catholic theology during the twentieth century. To see 
this more clearly, we must now turn to de Lubac. 
4.2 Kierkegaard in The Drama of Atheist Humanism 
By the time de Lubac writes The Drama of Atheist Humanism (1944), much of the 
available Kierkegaard scholarship in France was dependent upon scholarship in Germany.11 
However, de Lubac’s treatment of Kierkegaard shows that he had read not only Philosophical 
Fragments and Concluding Unscientific Postscript, but that he was also good friends with the French 
translator of these works, Paul Petit (1893-1944).12 Now, Petit took part in the Christian 
Resistance and was killed in prison by the Nazis. However, Petit was one of the early Catholic 
readers of Kierkegaard who earnestly suggested that had Kierkegaard lived longer, he would 
                                                                                                                                              
8 Lubac, The Mystery of the Supernatural, xii.  
9 Fergus Kerr, Twentieth-Century Catholic Theologians: From Neoscholasticism to Nuptial Mysticism (Oxford: Blackwell, 
2007), 85. For more about the biographical details of de Lubac’s life and how his theology is situated against a 
Neo-Scholastic tradition, see Francesco Leopoldo Bertoldi, De Lubac: Cristianesimo E Modernità, Collana Lumen 
(Bologna: Ed. Studio domenicano, 1994), 30-62. Boersma, Nouvelle Théologie, 25-29. David Grumett, De Lubac: A 
Guide for the Perplexed (London: T & T Clark, 2007), 7-24. 
 
10 Henri de Lubac, At the Service of the Church: Henri De Lubac Reflects on the Circumstances That Occasioned His Writings 
(San Francisco: Communio Books, 1993), 317-319. ‘The timeliness of the Fathers of the Church is not a 
superficial timeliness ... Every time, in our West, that Christian renewal has flourished, in the order of thought as 
in that of life (and the two orders are always connected), it has flourished under the sign of the Fathers’. 
11 For more on the quality of French and German scholarship on Kierkegaard, see Jonathan Judaken and Robert 
Bernasconi, Situating Existentialism : Key Texts in Context (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 89-122; 
279-304. Jon Stewart, 'France: Kierkegaard as a Forerunner of Existentialism and Postructrualism,' in Kierkegaard's 
International Reception: Northern and Western Europe, ed. Jon Stewart (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009), 421-474. 
 
12 Cf. AH 102, 111. For more on Petit’s invaluable contribution to French scholarship on Kierkegaard, see 
Jacques Lafarge, 'Kierkegaard Dans La Tradition Française: Les Conditions De Sa Réception Dans Les Milieux 
Philosophiques,' in Kierkegaard Revisited, ed. Niels Jorgen Cappelorn and Jon Stewart, Kierkegaard Studies. Monograph 
Series (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1997), 274-290. 
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have become a Roman Catholic.13 Although de Lubac does not endorse this view of 
Kierkegaard himself (AH 111), he says of Petit’s work on Kierkegaard, that it was ‘not at all 
for him some literary or speculative pastime. He committed his soul to it, just as he was to 
commit his life, as a believer, as a magnificent Christian, as a seeker of God’.14  
In a similar way to Karl Löwith, de Lubac plays Kierkegaard off against Nietzsche on 
various subjects in his Drama.15 Although the structure of de Lubac’s treatment of Kierkegaard 
follows on from available assessments by world-renowned philosophers of his day, the 
content of de Lubac’s treatment of Kierkegaard differs dramatically. For instance, Jean Wahl 
fails to distinguish sufficiently Nietzsche and Kierkegaard in his broad-brush comparison, 
saying ‘we see that the ideas of existence and transcendence are conjoined in Kierkegaard and 
Nietzsche’ however it is just that ‘Kierkegaard describes the movement of transcendence as 
The Eternal whereas Nietzsche describes it as The Eternal Return’.16 Importantly, de Lubac 
can see a difference between these figures and Kierkegaard shines through as a hopeful ally 
for Catholic theologians seeking to engage with continental philosophy.  
So what does Kierkegaard offer to de Lubac’s theology in the Drama? In his own 
words, de Lubac says that Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Fragments presents ‘by way of hypothesis, 
the fact of the Incarnation, that supreme paradox of the incursion of God into history, or of 
the eternal into time’—in other words, ‘a kind of philosophy of dogma’. Whereas 
Kierkegaard’s Postscript offers ‘a philosophy of faith’ that shows ‘in what conditions the 
individual receives the mystery (Kierkegaard calls it the paradox) into himself without 
stripping it of its essentially mysterious quality’ (AH 102-103). De Lubac says that ‘the quite 
simple truth that Kierkegaard is never weary of repeating’ is that the ‘real individual is face to 
face with a real God’ (AH 103). Both Kierkegaard and de Lubac portray the act and content 
                                                
 
13 Søren Kierkegaard and Paul Petit, Post-Scriptum Aux Miettes Philosophiques (Paris: Gallimard, 1949), 8. n. 2  
‘Impartialement, il semble bien pourtant qu’elle ait été dans les dernières années de sa vie de plus en plus 
nettement orientée vers le catholicisme’. Plusieurs critiques « liber-penseurs » comme Brandès et Höffding ont 
exprimé l’avis que K., s’il était ne plus tard, aurait été catholique. D’autre part, des convertis et des catholiques 
éminents come Th. Haecker, Erick Przywara, Erik Peterson, Heidegger, R. Guardini, Peter Wust, Aloïs Dempf, 
se réclament de lui. Nous croyons que c’est à juste titre. L’œuvre de K. a en effet ce mérite de faire toucher du 
doigt l’impossibilité pour l’Enkelte (c’est-à-dire l’individu autonome, la personne qui a une conscience) de se 
passer de l’autorité de l’Eglise … Loin d’être opposée à la conception catholique de l’église, comme on le croit 
parfois, la conception kierkegaardienne de L’Enkelte en est donc complémentaire’. 
 
14 de Lubac, Service of the Church, 49f. n. 49 
 
15 Karl Löwith, Kierkegaard Und Nietzsche Oder Philosophische Und Theologische Überwindung Des Nihilismus (Frankfurt 
am Main: Klostermann, 1933). See also, Karl Löwith, Von Hegel Zu Nietzsche: Der Revolutionäre Bruch Im Denken Des 
19. Jahrhunderts (Hamburg: Meiner Verlag, 1998), 304-311; 341-349; 383-397. For a more recent comparison and 
bibliography, see Markus Kleinert’s chapter entitled ‘Kierkegaard and Nietzsche’, in John Lippitt and George 
Pattison, The Oxford Handbook of Kierkegaard (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 402-420. 
16 Cf. Jean Wahl’s Preface to Karl Jaspers, Nietzsche: Introduction À Sa Philosophie (Paris: Gallimard 1950), 4-5. 
Translation Mine. 
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of faith in the search for God as a kind of ‘autopsy’, that is an attempt to see the truth of and 
for oneself with one’s own eyes, and yet faith is very much a disorienting way of seeing in the 
face of mystery. For both Kierkegaard and de Lubac, faith is irreducibly paradoxical—not in 
the sense of a logical contradiction but rather as a real dilemma that unbelievers and believers 
inhabit together (AH 104-105). It is for this reason that de Lubac describes Kierkegaard as 
‘the philosopher of transcendence’ and the ‘theologian of inwardness’ (AH 103). In other 
words, what Kierkegaard safeguards for de Lubac’s theology is the claim that the knowledge 
of God is neither illusory nor impossible in modernity, but rather dilemmatic and wonderfully 
so (AH 106). Hence, de Lubac venerates Kierkegaard as ‘the herald of transcendence’ in an 
age ‘carried away by immanentism’ (AH 111).  
Viewing de Lubac’s treatment of Kierkegaard only in terms of the single chapter he 
devotes to him in the Drama, would leave the reader with a sense of a marginal influence (at 
best) upon de Lubac’s theology and my original claim could be dismissed as an exaggeration. 
However, if the case could be made that de Lubac continually draws upon Kierkegaard 
throughout his life then my claim gains better traction. Let us now turn to see how 
Kierkegaard’s writings feature for de Lubac at a pivotal stage in his thought, The Discovery of 
God (1945). 
4.3 Kierkegaard in The Discovery of God 
 After sketching his drama of the problem of God’s absence in modernity, de Lubac 
turns to focus on the problem of representing the unrepresentable God in The Discovery of God 
(1945). According to David Schindler, The Discovery of God represents ‘the original point of 
departure for de Lubac’s thought’ (DG ix), which was previously sketched in Catholicisme 
(1938) and Surnaturel (1946)—works that eventually led to de Lubac’s conflict with Vatican 
censors.17 Although there are fewer explicit references to Kierkegaard, there still remains an 
implicit presence throughout the structure of the book. For instance, de Lubac tells his reader 
that the kind of enquiry underway is ‘deliberately fragmentary’,18 like ‘marginal notes’ that are 
meant to ‘provoke the reader to ... find God!’ (DG 3). Here de Lubac confronts a theological 
                                                
17 For more on de Lubac’s censorship, see Joseph A. Komonchak's essay 'Humani Generis and Nouvelle 
Théologie' in Flynn and Murray, Ressourcement : A Movement for Renewal in Twentieth-Century Catholic Theology, 138-
156. See also Antonio Russo, Henri De Lubac, vol. 3, Teologi Del 20o Secolo (Milano: San Paolo, 1994), esp. ch. 7-8. 
 
18 John Milbank accounts for the fragmentary aspect of de Lubac’s work by appealing to a political motivation 
behind de Lubac’s text, whereas Reinhard Hütter disagrees and says that this fragmentary aspect occurs because 
of contradictory claims in the text that indicate de Lubac’s confusion. My argument is that the form of de Lubac’s 
text is neither political stammering nor an indication of confusion, but rather the shape of de Lubac’s theology is 
deliberately Kierkegaardian. For more on the debate between Milbank and Hütter, see Sean Larsen, 'The Politics of 
Desire: Two Readings of Henri De Lubac on Nature and Grace,' Modern Theology 29, no. 3 (2013), 279-310. 
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problem: how can God pervade human thought and language, without being a mere extension 
of it? Although de Lubac draws upon the ancient Christian tradition as a resource in his 
response to safeguard theology from the threat of anthropomorphism, my claim is that the 
shape of de Lubac’s response is an extension of the shape of the argument found in 
Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Fragments and Concluding Unscientific Postscript—books that de Lubac 
described as ‘masterpieces of the philosophical and religious literature of all time’ (AH 102). 
 In Philosophical Fragments, Kierkegaard’s fictive author Johannes Climacus puts forth a 
controversial argument: if Christianity is true, then essential truth lies beyond the limits of 
human understanding.19 The controversial aspect of this argument is that Climacus claims to 
state intelligibly a truth that we are incapable of understanding. Now, Kierkegaard’s authorship 
repeatedly returns to this issue in various ways and, as a result he draws a distinction between 
two modes of human understanding. For instance, the epitaph of The Concept of Anxiety reads: 
‘Socrates was great in “that he distinguished between what he understood and what he did not 
understand”’.20 Or consider Johannes Climacus in Philosophical Fragments:  
Presumably it could occur to a human being to poetize himself in the likeness of the 
god or the god in the likeness of himself, but not to poetize that the god poetized 
himself in the likeness of a human being, for if the god gave no indication, how could 
it occur to a man that the blessed god could need him?21 
And later in Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Climacus says: 
The person who understands the paradox (in the sense of understanding it directly) 
will, misunderstanding, forget that what he at one time in the decisive passion of faith 
grasped as the absolute paradox (not as a relative paradox, because then the 
appropriation would not be faith), that is, as that which absolutely was not his own 
thoughts, can never become his thoughts (in the direct sense) without changing faith 
to an illusion. If he does so, he will later come to see that his absolutely believing that 
it was not his own thoughts was an illusion. In faith, however, he can very well 
continue to preserve his relation to the absolute paradox. But within the sphere of 
faith there can never be the circumstance that he understands the paradox (in the 
direct sense), because, if that happens, then the whole sphere of faith drops out as a 
misunderstanding.22 
                                                
19 For this portrayal of Kierkegaard, I am gratefully indebted to an unpublished paper ‘Kierkegaard and the 
Limits of Thought’ by Dan Watts. It is interesting that David Burrell’s reading of Aquinas fits very well with this 
reading of Kierkegaard, see David B. Burrell, Aquinas : God and Action (London: Routledge, 1979), ch 2. 
 
20 Søren Kierkegaard, Reidar Thomte, and Albert Anderson, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Orienting 
Deliberation on the Dogmatic Issue of Hereditary Sin (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), 3. 
21 Søren Kierkegaard, Howard V. Hong, and Edna H. Hong, Philosophical Fragments ; Johannes Climacus (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1985), 36. 
 
22 Søren Kierkegaard, Howard V. Hong, and Edna H. Hong, Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical 
Fragments, vol. 1, Kierkegaard's Writings (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 580. 
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So, for Kierkegaard, when it comes to stating intelligibly a truth that we are incapable of 
understanding—such as the task of theology—it becomes necessary to disambiguate what he 
calls ‘aesthetic-intellectual understanding’ from ‘ethical-religious understanding’.23 Objects that 
can be grasped in the aesthetic-intellectual mode can be contemplated without bearing upon 
the way one leads one’s own life as such; whereas ethical-religious matters resist such 
disinterested contemplation, and bear directly upon the course of one’s own existence.24 Now, 
going back to the original controversial claim, it could be rephrased in this way: Christianity is 
suitably represented in an ethical-religious way as incapable of being suitably represented in an 
aesthetic-intellectual way.25 Or to put it in its classical articulation: faith is always seeking 
understanding. 
 Now, the way that de Lubac leads his reader into this disambiguated response to the 
problem of representing the unrepresentable God is through a parable entitled ‘Our 
Knowledge of God’ at the beginning of The Discovery of God. De Lubac tells a story of a boy 
that is caught mocking the preacher’s ‘abstract formulae and pious platitudes’ and is rebuked 
by the headmaster: ‘Hasn’t it ever occurred to you that it is the most difficult subject to speak 
about that you can think of?’ (DG 3). Commenting on the story—perhaps indirectly of 
himself—de Lubac says that this boy could not let go of this question and it was ‘his first 
contact with the twofold mystery, of God and man’—a mystery that we, as St. Thomas 
paradoxically says, have the capacity to understand, but cannot be understood (DG 12 n. 24).26 
As we shall see, de Lubac extends Kierkegaard’s argument and further illuminates it from 
within the Christian tradition. 
 By contrasting two modes of understanding, de Lubac attempts to explain the 
importance of marking this difference, specifically drawing upon Kierkegaard:  
That does not, strictly speaking, mean that we realize increasingly ‘the infinite distance 
between God and man’—to use Kierkegaard’s expression—as though God withdrew 
his greatness from us in proportion as the infinite grows in us, and as we come the 
better to see that the divine is not ‘simply the superlative of the human’.27  
                                                
 
23 Watts, ‘Kierkegaard and the Limits of Thought’. 
 
24 Watts, ‘Kierkegaard and the Limits of Thought’. 
 
25 Watts, ‘Kierkegaard and the Limits of Thought’. 
26 Cf. ST 1.87.1. References to the Summa Theologiae will be abbreviated as ST 1.2.4.5 for part 1, question 2, article 
4, reply to objection 5 (if needed) and will be cited from St. Thomas Aquinas and Thomas Gilby, Summa 
Theologiae : Latin Text and English Translation, Introductions, Notes, Appendices, and Glossaries (Cambridge: Blackfriars, 
1964).  
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In other words, because the Creator is absolutely distinct from creation, creation will never 
eventually attain the status of Creator given enough time and research. De Lubac draws upon 
Kierkegaard’s theology of creation here to safeguard theological grammar from eliding into 
that of anthropology. What is at stake then in contemporary debates for de Lubac is that the 
distinction between Creator and creatures can, and can continue to be made in spite of our 
‘tendency to confuse the Author of Nature with the Nature through which he reveals himself 
obscurely, whose characteristics we cannot help employing in order to think of him’—that is, 
the danger of ‘what should have been a sign becomes a screen’ (DG 22).28 That is why de 
Lubac says that  
The infinite is not a sum of finite elements, and what we understand of it is not a 
fragment torn from what remains to be understood. The intelligence does not do away 
with the mystery nor does it even begin to understand it; it in no way diminishes it, it 
does not ‘bite’ on it: it enters deeper and deeper into it and discovers it more and more 
as a mystery. (DG 117) 
So it makes sense then that following the opening parable, de Lubac has an intermezzo 
entitled Abyssus abyssum invocat (Abyss calls to abyss), which separates the first chapter from, 
and characterises the formal features of, the mystery alluded to in the opening pages. 
Interestingly, the image of an abyss remains with de Lubac, even in his later comments on 
Vatican II.29 However, a cursory reading of Kierkegaard’s writings would show that the human 
self-relation is often construed as an abyss, and the individual’s God-relation is also 
described—albeit in qualitatively distinct—abysmal terms.30 For this abyss imagery, de Lubac 
draws upon Sermon 44 by the Dominican mystic, Johannes Tauler, who is also an important 
influence on Kierkegaard (DG 7 n. 9).31 Yet, Kierkegaard and de Lubac appropriate this abyss 
imagery in such a way as to characterise the twofold mystery of the God-Human relation as an 
Abyss-abyss—introducing a doubling effect as the kind of vertigo internal to the problem of 
representing the unrepresentable God.  
                                                                                                                                              
27 DG 117-8; cf. Journals JP X1 A 135. De Lubac’s references to Kierkegaard are misleading in the English 
translation and should rather be written in the footnote as JP X1 A 48 and 679 [1849]; X2 A 320 [1850]. One of 
de Lubac’s quotes from Kierkegaard actually comes from JP X5 A 98. 
 
28 For more on analogical knowledge, see Burrell, Faith and Freedom, 64-75. 
29 See, Henri de Lubac and James R. Dunne, The Church : Paradox and Mystery (Shannon: Ecclesia Press, 1969), 1. 
 
30 The best treatment of this aspect of Kierkegaard’s theological anthropology to date is Podmore, Kierkegaard and 
the Self before God : Anatomy of the Abyss. 
  
31 For more on Tauler’s influence on Kierkegaard, see Barnett, Kierkegaard, Pietism and Holiness, 6-28, 64-95, 
passim. See also, Peter Šajda’s essay ‘A Teacher in Spiritual Dietethics: Kierkegaard’s Reception of Johannes 
Tauler’ in Jon Stewart, Kierkegaard and the Patristic and Medieval Traditions, vol. 4 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), 265-
288. 
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De Lubac frames his enquiry with the possibility of self-deception which threatens to 
subvert not only his edifying discourse, but also indict his knowledge of God as illusory: ‘Was 
Moses right, or Xenophanes? Did God make man in his image, or is it not rather man who 
has made God in his?’ (DG 5). If both the self-relation and the God-relation are characterised 
as an abyss, then how does one distinguish transcendence from immanence amid the 
vertiginous heights and depths of our reflection? How does one know that the voice Moses 
heard was not merely the iconoclastic echo chamber later described by Xenophanes? What is 
‘I am who I am’ if not this very kind of maddening reverberation? De Lubac argues that 
If the idea of God in the mind of man is real, then no fact accessible to history or 
psychology or sociology, or to any other scientific discipline, can really be its 
generating cause. No observable ‘process’ suffices to account for it. And in that sense 
it has no genesis ... it cannot be reduced to the result, itself deceptive, of some 
empirical transformation. (DG 17)32 
In other words, de Lubac draws attention to the knowledge of God presented suitably in an 
ethical-religious way which is also incapable of being suitably represented in the disinterested 
contemplation of the aesthetic-intellectual mode of understanding. Instead of pushing de 
Lubac toward an endorsement of atheism, the threat of self-subversion opens up this insight 
for de Lubac:  
Every human act, whether it is an act of knowledge or an act of the will, rests secretly 
upon God, by attributing meaning and solidity to the real upon which it is exercised. 
For God is the Absolute; and nothing can be thought without positing the Absolute in 
relating it to that Absolute; nothing can be willed without tending towards the 
Absolute, nor valued unless weighted in terms of the Absolute. (DG 36) 
To be clear, de Lubac says that the knowledge in question is not intellectual because ‘our 
affirmation of God is not the conclusion of an argument’, (DG 38) but rather existential—‘I 
bear the proof within me’ (DG 41). De Lubac explicitly says that ‘we are not dealing here with 
a natural intuition of God which would be, so to speak, right from the start, a natural or 
necessary accompaniment of the human spirit. On the contrary, even mystical and 
supernatural gifts never attain more than a partial and fleeting anticipation’ (DG 45 n. 15). For 
de Lubac, the nature of this ‘proof’ does not grant certainty but rather takes on the sense of 
probing into the depth of mystery, looking for what we do not know, much like in Anselm’s 
                                                
 
32 Later on, de Lubac says, ‘God is not “a point of origin in the past”: he is a “sufficient reason in the present” (in 
the past and future as well, and during the passage of time) ... God is not merely the principle and the term, at the 
beginning and at the end: the Good of every good, the Life of all living things, the Being of all beings, he is also 
at the heart of all things ... the Absolute at the heart of the relative’ (DG 63-5). For more on knowing the 
unknowable Creator, see Burrell, Faith and Freedom, 20-33. In explaining the formal features of God’s Simpleness 
and Eternity, Burrell finds Kierkegaard helpful on numerous occasions. Cf. David B. Burrell, Exercises in Religious 
Understanding (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1974). See also, Burrell, Knowing the Unknowable God 
: Ibn-Sina, Maimonides, Aquinas.  
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riddle-phrase ‘That-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought.33 To make this point, de 
Lubac uses a chimerical image taken from Kierkegaard’s Journals: if the knowledge of God 
could be suitably represented in an aesthetic-intellectual way, then the Knower would be ‘like 
the witch who ended by devouring her own inwards, nothing would remain but the 
unthinkable equality of nothing to nothing’ (DG 69).34 In light of the discussion above, it can 
be seen how de Lubac explicitly draws attention to the problem of self-subversion that 
permeates Kierkegaard’s writings, and does so in a Kierkegaardian way. 
It is appropriate then, with the dogma of a free creation from nothing, that de Lubac 
forcefully identifies a difference between ‘the God of Aristotle and the God of St. Thomas’ 
which, in turn allows him to resist agnosticism, since ‘the knowledge of God remains 
concealed beneath the need to criticize any representation of God’ so that if ‘God conceals 
himself, it is in his very presence’ (DG 92). For de Lubac, transcendence ‘necessarily implies 
immanence’ such that if ‘God is transcendent, then nothing is opposed to him, nothing can 
limit him nor be compared with him: he is “wholly other,” and therefore penetrates the world 
absolutely’ (DG 94). Of course, de Lubac is expertly able to connect the content of these claims 
back to Augustine, Thomas, and Maximus—but what we have been attending to here is how 
these claims are an extension of, indeed shaped by Kierkegaard. But still more needs to be said. 
In The Discovery of God, de Lubac brings the reader, through wonder and ancient worship, 
back to consider her own existence as the site of God’s presence. De Lubac’s extension of 
Kierkegaard’s argument would not be complete without a revocation to boot. In Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript, Johannes Climacus refers to the Catholic method of safeguarding Church 
teaching in his revocation (CUP 619), whereas de Lubac ushers the reader straight into the 
priest’s Eucharistic prayer just before consecrating the host—but instead of the host being 
broken into fragments, the reader is left with an ellipsis as the sign of a more promissory 
meaning yet to come. It is here that de Lubac echoes the revocation of the original and 
pseudonymous Johannes Climacus saying, ‘No mystical ladder reaches its end unless we 
renounce it’ (DG 156). This revocation in the form of a liturgical fragment directs and 
transforms de Lubac’s previous arguments regarding desire, participation, and the real 
distinction between Creator and creatures into a prayer to God. And it is with this gnomic 
revocation that de Lubac opens up the lives of the saints as the concrete moral example in 
which to ‘see’ the natural human desire for God:  
                                                
33 For more on the distinction of a riddle from a proof, see ‘Riddles and Anselm’s Riddle’ in Cora Diamond, The 
Realistic Spirit : Wittgenstein, Philosophy, and the Mind (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991), 267-289. Of Anselm’s riddle-
phrase, de Lubac later says that it ‘shows him, by its recognition of his limitations, the secret of the only way of 
surmounting them’ (DG 78). 
 
34 Cf. JP 12 A 354 [1850]. 
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Perhaps it will be enough to see a man who has seen, and to believe on his testimony. 
For that is the miracle which is endlessly repeated, generation after generation, ... [that] 
Through his testimony, through the man who has seen, I really see. (DG 158)  
Again, de Lubac extends the argument of Kierkegaard’s fictive author, Johannes Climacus. In 
Kierkegaard’s book, Climacus levels the gap between the first generation of believers and ours, 
which also levels the gap between the saint and the contemporary follower: ‘there is not and 
cannot be any question of a follower at second hand, for the believer (and only he, after all, is 
a follower) continually has the autopsy of faith; he does not see with the eyes of others and sees 
only the same as every believer sees—with the eyes of faith (PF 102). The only gap that exists 
for Climacus is the ‘enormous difference between knowing what Christianity is and being a 
Christian’—the distance between hypothesis and testimony (CUP 380). For Climacus, the 
qualitative difference between an observer and a participant ‘is repelling. It does not make it 
easy to enter into what it introduces; on the contrary, it makes it difficult’ (CUP 381). In short, 
de Lubac extends Kierkegaard’s argument by removing the aura of a neutral hypothesis and 
transforming his enquiry into a revealing testimony to the Christian faith in the modern age.  
  One last structural extension of Kierkegaard’s writings to note is de Lubac’s 
postscript to The Discovery of God. Shortly after the publication of The Drama of Atheist 
Humanism and The Discovery of God, de Lubac’s critics sought to help him detach his own 
constructive theology from ‘non-Catholic existentialists’ like Kierkegaard.35 It is significant that 
Kierkegaard’s work received critical reviews, which led him to add at the end of Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript a section entitled ‘An Understanding with the Reader’ (CUP 617). Hence, 
in later editions of The Discovery of God, de Lubac follows Kierkegaard and attaches a similar 
postscript in order to defend himself against such critics. In this later edition, de Lubac heeded 
their comments by adding detailed footnotes often at page-length as an indication of his 
sources—a practice of arguing through one’s footnotes that bears a striking resemblance to 
Kierkegaard (CUP 33-35, 73-74, 206-207, 274-277, 418-19, 514-19). Interestingly, de Lubac 
notes that this ‘supplementary explanation gave rise to new problems, so that the more one 
explained oneself the more explanation was necessary’ (DG 206). To his own defence, de 
Lubac emphasises that what has been said is drawn from the ‘double treasure’ of Scripture and 
the Church’s vast tradition (DG 205). In responding to the ‘well-intentioned and authoritative’ 
reviewers (DG 206), de Lubac says that ‘to speak of God is as dangerous as it is necessary’ and 
if you ‘wait to find words worthy of God you would never speak at all’ (DG 205). Although de 
                                                
35 For an example of Thomist critics, see David L. Greenstock, 'Thomism and the New Theology,' The Thomist 13 
(1950), 567-596. In reference to de Lubac specifically Greenstock proclaims, ‘there is no need to go outside 
Thomism to find a truly existential philosophy; on the contrary, the intellectual realism of Aquinas is the best 
antidote for the excessive voluntarism of the non-Catholic existentialists such as Kierkegaard and Sartre’ (594). 
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Lubac explicitly resources the content of his enquiry with the Catholic tradition, he does say 
that  
It is the philosophy which nourished me, and my thought continues to live in that 
climate. I should like to be able to show that it is still richer and more nourishing, that 
it has more sap and is more fertile, than even its adepts imagine ... our ambition has 
been, and still is at this moment, simply to recall some eternal truths in a language that 
is not too antiquated. (DG 207) 
We learn from de Lubac’s memoir that it was not philosophy in general, but Kierkegaard in 
particular that nourished him during his ‘dark years’ of theological exile. In 1953, de Lubac 
remembers receiving an encouraging note from a ‘faithful friend’ that was ‘discreetly 
transcribed for me, without a word of commentary’ from Kierkegaard’s Journals, which de 
Lubac says ‘helped me in the bad days to “hold on”’.36 
Even though de Lubac does make an attempt to respond to his critics in the postscript 
of The Discovery of God, it will not be until his later book The Mystery of the Supernatural that his 
critics receive a robust response. To recapitulate, there are only a few explicit references to 
Kierkegaard in The Discovery of God, however these citations highlight the wider, implicit 
Kierkegaardian structure of de Lubac’s theology. I have pointed to the central problem of 
representing the unrepresentable God in de Lubac’s favourite book by Kierkegaard, and I 
have paid special attention to these references and to the revocation and postscript that is 
repeated in de Lubac’s book. Now let us turn to that later work to see the way in which 
Kierkegaard’s writings surface. 
4.4 Kierkegaard in The Mystery of the Supernatural 
 I have been arguing that there is a distinctive Kierkegaardian shape to de Lubac’s 
theology. To support this claim, I have drawn on two of his early works and now turn to 
consider one of de Lubac’s most influential books, The Mystery of the Supernatural (1965). I have 
drawn attention to the paradoxical claim of Kierkegaard’s Fragments: if Christianity is true, then 
essential truth lies beyond the limits of human understanding. I now want to show how de 
Lubac develops this paradoxical claim in concreto with his account of our natural desire for the 
supernatural—or to use de Lubac’s own words, ‘The Christian paradox of humanity’. Here de 
Lubac provides the patristic evidence for a central aspect of Kierkegaard’s theological 
                                                
 
36 de Lubac, Service of the Church, 87. ‘Each generation prepares someone who will announce Christianity in 
earnest. The more it persecutes and mistreats him, the more too it detaches his spirit from the world, so 
completely that God alone remains. And Christianity begins to be real for this man only when he is so unhappy 
and so tormented in this world that he seems a killjoy with all his suffering’. 
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anthropology—that is, human beings are at once temporal and eternal, finite and infinite.37 
Now, the way de Lubac endorses this theological affirmation, is in stark contrast to the 
position of his critics who advocate a ‘separated theology’—that is, partitioning the world into 
a semi-detached universe with the order of grace logically and structurally separate from the 
order of nature. For de Lubac, such a separated theology places theology (and its claims) in 
dire straits.  
David Schindler has framed de Lubac’s dilemma with a separated theology in this way: 
‘On the one hand, if grace did not somehow—always already—touch the soul of every human 
being, the Christian fact would remain an essentially “private” matter of urgent concern only 
to those who were already believers’ (MS xvi). If we take one horn of this dilemma, then the 
possibility of becoming a Christian is lost since everyone is already a Christian and there is no 
such thing as a private language. If that is not suitable, then separated theology offers up the 
other horn of the dilemma: ‘if the order of grace were not essentially gratuitous—that is, did 
not really add something to nature that could not be anticipated or claimed by nature itself—
then the Christian fact would lose its newness and its proper character as divine gift’ (MS xvi). 
Either way, severing the order of grace from nature fails to satisfy two important conditions: i) 
the public witness of Christian martyrdom, and ii) the gratuity of God’s free gift of salvation. 
Readers of Kierkegaard may detect in Schindler’s presentation of de Lubac’s critique of 
separated theology an extension of Anti-Climacus’ attempt to ‘confess Christ in the midst of 
Christendom’ in Practice in Christianity (PC 220). For Anti-Climacus, once it is established that 
everyone is already a Christian by virtue of being human, then the struggle to become a 
Christian is over and we can all carry on with the next novelty as a matter of course. Anti-
Climacus calls it a ‘fallacy’ to believe that ‘we as such are all Christians. For if this is taken as 
given, a militant Church seems to be an impossibility’ because ‘wherever it is assumed that 
there is an established Christendom, there is an attempt to form a triumphant Church’ and for 
Anti-Climacus, ‘the Church militant is in the process of becoming, whereas an established 
Christendom is, is not becoming’ (PC 211).38 De Lubac’s problem with a separated theology is 
that it actually undermines Christianity in particular and religious faith in general, as Anti-
Climacus says: ‘In the Church militant, it was piety to confess Christianity; in established 
Christendom, it is piety to conceal it’ (PC 217). So, Schindler rightly says that de Lubac is left 
                                                
37 Søren Kierkegaard, Howard V. Hong, and Edna H. Hong, The Sickness Unto Death : A Christian Psychological 
Exposition for Upbuilding and Awakening (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), 13. For another instance of 
de Lubac’s use of Kierkegaard’s theological anthropology, see Henri de Lubac, Theology in History (San Francisco: 
Ignatius, 1996), 170-171. 
38 Anti-Climacus uses the medieval terminology of the militant Church—which struggles against sin and the 
principalities and powers on earth—and triumphant Church, which is in heaven after the final judgment. Today, 
the term of the militant Church is replaced with ‘the pilgrim people of God’ in Lumen Gentium.  
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with the theological problem of ‘how human persons in the natural order can be interiorly 
directed to the order of grace that fulfils them, without in the least possessing this grace in 
anticipation, and without being able at all to claim it for themselves’ (MS xvii). As we shall see, 
de Lubac’s reply to this question is to affirm the real value of the natural order of creation and 
highlight creation’s destiny for communion with God in freedom and love (MS 19). On the 
face of it, there is nothing that immediately suggests a Kierkegaardian shape to de Lubac’s 
theological problem. Moreover, a glance through the index of The Mystery of the Supernatural 
would not furnish any explicit references to Kierkegaard. However, there is a structural 
affinity between Kierkegaard’s thought-experiment in Philosophical Fragments and de Lubac’s 
book. The clue is best seen by comparing the table of contents of both books.  
In the ‘thought-project’ of the first chapter of Philosophical Fragments, Kierkegaard begins 
with the paradoxical claim about how Christianity intelligibly asserts a truth-claim that is 
incapable of being suitably represented in an aesthetic-intellectual mode of understanding. The 
other key structural affinity is with the third chapter and its appendix: ‘The Absolute Paradox’ 
and ‘Offense at the Paradox’. A similar structure emerges in de Lubac’s The Mystery of the 
Supernatural, with its opening chapters dedicated to ‘The Two Tendencies of the [Inadequate] 
Hypothesis’ and chapters six through nine regarding ‘The Christian Paradox’ and its rejection 
by common sense. Although de Lubac has come under fire from his critics and religious 
superiors for his engagement with thinkers like Kierkegaard, it seems that de Lubac has 
removed the explicit references but left the argument intact for those with eyes to see. This 
observation is borne out in remarks made by de Lubac, such as: 
If we begin by disassociating the two orders completely, in order to establish the existence 
of a natural order that could be fully and finally self-sufficient, we are all too likely to end 
up by seeing not so much a distinction as a complete divorce. And we may risk also losing 
the profound sense of their “infinite qualitative difference”. (MS 35) 
Here is an unmistakable reference to Kierkegaard that de Lubac has used earlier in his 
writings, but without naming its source. Prior to Humani Generis (1950), de Lubac would not 
hesitate to drop Kierkegaard’s name here, but afterwards, he leaves it to the reader to make 
the connection. De Lubac does this again later on: 
Between nature as it exists and the supernatural for which God destines it, the distance 
is as great, the difference as radical, as that between non-being and being: for to pass 
from one to the other is not merely to pass into “more being”, but to pass to a 
different type of being. It is a crossing, by grace, of an impassable barrier. (MS 83)  
Here de Lubac makes an explicit reference to Lessing’s problem as it is discussed in Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript: 
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the transition whereby something historical and the relation to this becomes decisive 
for an eternal happiness is a meta,basij a;llo ge,noj [shifting from one genus to 
another] ... a leap for both the contemporary and the one who comes later ... [Lessing 
made] an illusory distinction between contemporaneity and noncontemporaneity. 
(CUP 98)  
Now for de Lubac, the claim of a ‘pure nature’ in separated theology repeats the problem that 
Kierkegaard confronts in his writings. In de Lubac’s theological register, the dilemma of natura 
pura is that of having to bite the bullet for either Pelagianism or Baianism. In other words, in 
order for ‘pure nature’ to reach the moral perfection of grace, it either has to attain it actively 
(autonomy) or passively (heteronomy). De Lubac says that  
in either case, we arrive at a hypothetical creature who has no kind of relationship of 
love with God; at a ‘beatitude’ which the creature requires and which God owes him. 
In the ‘purely natural world’ where this creature lives, all idea of God’s free gift is lost. 
(MS 48) 
In both cases, de Lubac says that moral perfection is construed in terms of an extrinsic finality 
and ‘not a destiny inscribed in a man’s very nature, directing him from within, and which he 
could not ontologically escape, but a mere destination given him from outside when he was 
already in existence’ (MS 68-9). The problem with this separated theology is that it posits a 
‘purely natural’ universe from which we can obtain ‘natural’ happiness and imagines a parallel 
universe that happens to be ‘supernatural’, which equally requires us to obtain happiness. De 
Lubac rightly says that ‘Whether we add the two together or set them up against each other, 
we can hardly hope to find in them the gratuitousness we are looking for’ (MS 62). And it is 
precisely the gratuity of God’s free gift of grace that is at stake here for de Lubac. In defence 
of his own position, de Lubac charitably cites the infamous encyclical Humani Generis which 
was allegedly written in protest to his own earlier theological position, which he now claims 
was written in haste (50 n. 57). 
In this book, de Lubac extends Climacus’ paradox in terms of the scholastic tradition. 
For Climacus, the paradox was whether Christianity could be thought, and remain outside of 
thought. But de Lubac draws this somewhat abstract question into a concrete, historical 
example of the neo-scholastic interpretation of a pure nature, which, according to de Lubac, 
would be the equivalent to the undesirable horn of Climacus’ dilemma: that the truth of 
Christianity comes from within rather than without human thought. Hence, there is no such 
thing as revelation, only wish fulfilment. So when de Lubac characterises the rejection of the 
paradox of Christian revelation in terms of ‘offence’, he specifically targets Cajetan as the 
‘unfaithful Thomist’ that gives rise to the modern anthropological turn by ‘blurring the 
paradox of faith’ (MS 166). For de Lubac, the limits of nature are absolutized when Cajetan 
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says that ‘reasonable nature is a closed whole within which the active capacities and tendencies 
are in strict correspondence’ such that ‘natural desire does not extend itself beyond the faculty 
of nature’ (MS 140). For de Lubac, the offence generated by the Christian paradox is the 
starting point of the secular.  
we are dealing with an ‘understanding of faith’, which must always presuppose at its 
base, as a first and permanent condition, the gift of faith itself. We are dealing with a 
search which is constantly guided by that faith. With such a guide it cannot take a false 
turning. It never tries to get beyond it ... Faith has its own light, which can be far 
brighter in the intellect of a simple believer than in that of the finest theologian. The 
effort of ‘understanding’ cannot be directed to anything but a better reflective 
realization of the gift of faith—something not only of value in itself, but fulfilling a 
need in this. For both reasons such an effort is fully justified. But, let me say again, it 
develops wholly within that gift, and at every stage will be measured closely against it 
in its results. (MS 165) 
In light of de Lubac’s description here, it is helpful to remember that for Kierkegaard, the 
Christian mystery calls for ‘a crucifixion of the understanding’ since the understanding is 
‘continually colliding with this unknown, which certainly does exist but is also unknown and 
to that extent does not exist. The understanding does not go beyond this; yet in its 
paradoxicality the understanding cannot stop reaching it and being engaged with it’ (PF 44). 
But again, de Lubac refers to Kierkegaard’s paradox between the clashing form of two modes 
of understanding: the ‘idea of mystery is perfectly acceptable to reason once one has admitted 
the idea of a personal and transcendent God. The truth we receive from him about himself 
must exceed our grasp, simply because of its superior intelligibility: understood, it can never be 
grasped’ (MS 171). De Lubac goes on to observe that  
People frequently reason as though all the mystery were on God’s side, and there was 
nothing in man that eludes the grasp of common experience or natural reasoning. Our 
whole nature should, in theory at least, be comprehensible to us, and we have the key 
to understanding all its manifestations. But this is somewhat illusory. I do not think 
that anyone who really thought about it could maintain anything so clear-cut ... When 
we have said everything the mind can take in, everything definable that is to be said 
about ourselves, we have as yet said nothing, unless we have included in every 
statement the fact of our reference to the incomprehensible God; and that reference, 
and therefore our nature itself in the most fundamental sense, is not really understood 
at all unless we freely allow ourselves to be caught up by that incomprehensible God. 
No one must think that we can understand man otherwise than by grasping him in his 
movement towards the blessed obscurity of God. (MS 209) 
Although de Lubac is dependent on Étienne Gilson in some respects here, it is because of 
Kierkegaard’s influence that there is an important divergence between Gilson and de Lubac. 
My claim has been that the shape of de Lubac’s theology is distinctively Kierkegaardian. In 
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other words, it is because of the influence of Kierkegaard’s writings that de Lubac’s theology 
can be set off from other thinkers during this time like Gilson, who failed to distinguish 
adequately Kierkegaard from atheistic existentialism.39 The difference between Gilson and de 
Lubac can be put this way: whereas for Gilson, paradox does not feature in his Christian 
philosophy,40 for de Lubac, the Christian paradox is his ‘entire Credo’, since  
the ‘desire to see God’ cannot be permanently frustrated without an essential suffering 
... for a good and just God could hardly frustrate me, unless I, through my own fault, 
turn away from him by choice. The infinite importance of the desire implanted in me 
by my Creator is what constitutes the infinite importance of the drama of human 
existence ... this desire is not some ‘accident’ in me. It does not result from some 
peculiarity, possibly alterable, of my individual being, or from some historical 
contingency whose effects are more or less transitory. A fortiori it does not in any sense 
depend upon my deliberate will. It is in me as a result of my belonging to humanity as 
it is, that humanity which is, as we say, ‘called’. For God’s call is constitutive. My 
finality, which is expressed by this desire, is inscribed upon my very being as it has 
been put into this universe by God. And, by God’s will, I now have no other genuine 
end, no end really assigned to my nature or presented for my free acceptance under 
any guise, except that of ‘seeing God’. (MS 54-55) 
Reading de Lubac’s comments in light of Kierkegaard’s contrast between two modes of 
understanding, it can be seen how de Lubac agrees with Kierkegaard’s claim that Christianity 
                                                
39 Etienne Gilson, Thomism : The Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, ed. Armand A. Maurer and Laurence K. Shook 
(Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2002), 417. Gilson says, ‘To speak of “existential philosophy” 
today immediately brings to mind names like Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Jaspers, and others, whose philosophical 
opinions are not always the same, and to which no Thomism, conscious of its own nature, could under any 
circumstances fully align itself’. For more on Gilson’s antagonism to Kierkegaard, see Francesca Aran Murphy, 
Art and Intellect in the Philosophy of Etienne Gilson, Eric Voegelin Institute Series in Political Philosophy (Columbia: 
University of Missouri Press, 2004), 193; 215-217. 
 
40 Recall Gabriel Marcel’s criticism of Gilson: ‘I would be disposed, for my part, to think that there is Christian 
philosophy only there where this paradox, this scandal, is not only admitted or even accepted, but embraced with a 
passionate and unrestricted gratitude. From the moment on when, to the contrary, philosophy seeks by some 
procedure to attenuate this scandal, to mask the paradox, to reabsorb the revealed datum in a dialectic of pure 
reason or mind, to this precise degree it ceases to be a Christian philosophy. Along these lines, very close to us, 
the extraordinary influence exercised by Kierkegaard in reaction to Hegelian idealism is explicable. That is a key 
point to which I will soon return, once the translations currently being done have appeared, those of Sickness unto 
Death, Repetition, and The Concept of Anxiety. If I had to address a criticism to Mr. Gilson, it would perhaps be that 
of not placing this paradox at the heart of the definition he gives to Christian philosophy’ in Gregory B. Sadler, 
Reason Fulfilled by Revelation : The 1930s Christian Philosophy Debates in France (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University 
of America Press, 2011), 165. An additional point of divergence between Gilson and de Lubac is that for the 
former, Thomas is Aristotelian, but not for de Lubac: ‘Under different forms, and with accentuations varying 
from one century and school to another, Christian philosophy thus developed the concept of a human nature 
which is open to receive a supernatural gift. Such a concept was unknown, of course, in ancient philosophy. 
There is nothing Aristotelian about it—though St. Thomas Aquinas, faithful to his method of conciliation and 
without any historical scruple, sometimes finds ways to express it in Aristotelian terms. But nor is it Platonic or 
Plotinian. Though theoretically justifiable by reason, the fact remains that it was wholly shaped and developed in 
direct dependence on Christian revelation’ (MS 119). 
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is suitably represented in an ethical-religious way as incapable of being suitably represented in an 
aesthetic-intellectual way. In his own words, de Lubac says  
if I should be able to declare unequivocally that God gives himself to me, and makes 
himself to be seen by me freely, and quite independently, then that supernatural gift 
must be clearly seen to be free not merely in relation to some generic nature, abstract 
and theoretical, but actually in relation to the concrete nature in which I, here and 
now, share. (MS 61) 
De Lubac goes further in his Kierkegaardian élan: ‘I must recognize that I, as an individual, 
participate in the same nature as Socrates’ (MS 63). Hence, de Lubac offers an alternative 
position: ‘a return to the point of view of past tradition, which was far more “personalist” and 
far more “existential” (though not existentialist!) than its language always leads one to suspect’ 
(MS 63). In particular, de Lubac points to Thomas, who ‘does not reason from a 
“disexistentialized” human essence’ (MS 67). For it is Thomas, in the wake of Augustine, who 
advocates an ‘element of inwardness—which we also call transcendence—which belongs to 
the creating God “who is more interior to me than I am myself”’ (MS 78). Here I would also 
add that we cannot overlook the importance of de Lubac’s earlier remark about Kierkegaard 
as the ‘theologian of inwardness’ (AH 103). 
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has given a close reading of three important works by de Lubac in order 
to highlight the distinctive Kierkegaardian shape of de Lubac’s theology. Yet, this way of 
telling the story might appear to some scholars as misunderstanding a crucial aspect of what 
David Grumett has recently identified as the ‘classic ressourcement methodology’ which prides 
itself on ‘returning to the great sources of the Christian tradition—scripture, patristics, and the 
liturgy—and applying the Christian vision there presented to the modern era’.41 From this 
picture of ressourcement, one could begin to think that it was a two-step process of first, 
returning and then applying the ancient insights of the Fathers to a contemporary world—as if 
there was a ‘pure retrieval’ that was not already untarnished by a context-laden application. Is 
it not rather the case that in returning to the source, the excavator automatically brings with 
her how the source will be applied? The methodology of this article attempts to bridge Catholic 
theology and Kierkegaard studies to show that the task of ressourcement is not primarily a 
retrieval of an ancient world-picture which in turn is subsequently grafted on to contemporary 
debates, but rather is a mode of retrieval that is already a confrontation with contemporary 
figures and debates—in and as retrieval. Hence, Hans Urs von Balthasar rightly says, ‘Despite 
                                                
41 David Grumett, 'Henri de Lubac: Looking for Books to Read the World' in Flynn and Murray, Ressourcement : A 
Movement for Renewal in Twentieth-Century Catholic Theology, 237. Emphasis mine. 
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their historical and scholarly appearance, all Henri de Lubac’s works clearly refer to the 
present’ (AH 9). In short, ressourcement is not merely an historical retrieval and interrogation of 
the past faith tradition, but it is also retrieval and interrogation of oneself (and one’s situation) 
before God. Thus, as Kevin Hughes rightly says, ressourcement is not ‘a nostalgic retreat to 
the theological safety of premodern Christendom. Rather, it is a vital struggle for the proper 
diagnosis of our present condition’.42 
If the current literature on ressourcement tends to delineate the ‘return to the sources’ 
into two stages, first a retrieval, then application to the modern world, then against this picture 
of ressourcement, I suggest that de Lubac is not only a good example of how to do a retrieval, but 
also that the writings of Søren Kierkegaard are constitutive of de Lubac’s retrieval. Rather 
than a picture of ‘the sources’ as a whole which has since been fragmented, de Lubac offers a 
picture of ressourcement that is situated in the contemporary world, inquisitive of the Church’s 
tradition, and reflexive in regards to one’s God-relation. My claim has been that de Lubac’s 
retrieval has a distinctive shape because of Kierkegaard. Indeed, de Lubac deliberately draws on 
the basic aims of Kierkegaard’s writings as an aid to his unique diagnostic and apologetic task. 
What results is a broader understanding of the task of ressourcement that is at once able to 
negotiate the authorities of the faith and engage in speculative questions in a way that such an 
‘autopsy of faith’ is already marked by contemporary concerns. Unfortunately, Kierkegaard’s 
influence on the ressourcement movement specifically, and Catholic theology in general has been 
covered up, and it is my hope is that this will change in due course. 
 
                                                
 
42 Kevin L. Hughes, 'The Ratio Dei and the Ambiguities of History,' Modern Theology 21, no. 4 (2005), 645. 
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Creation as a whole has become a monstrance of God’s real presence.  
— Hans Urs von Balthasar 1  
He deserves to be called a theologian, however,  
who comprehends the visible and manifest things of God  
seen through suffering and the cross.  
—  Martin Luther 2 
Direct recognisability is paganism; ... if one can see it in him,  
then he is eo ipso a mythological figure. 
— Johannes Climacus 3 
 
We look not to the things that are seen  
but to the things that are unseen;  
for the things that are seen are transient,  
but the things that are unseen are eternal.  
— St. Paul (2 Cor 4:18) 
Monstrance or Monstrosity?:  
A Kierkegaardian Critique of Hans Urs von Balthasar’s 
Theological Aesthetics 
5.1 Introduction  
 In the previous chapter, I argued that Henri de Lubac’s theology is shaped by 
Kierkegaard’s writings, and that this should expand the scope of contemporary portrayals of 
ressourcement theology. After examining de Lubac’s positive evaluation of Kierkegaard, I now 
turn to his protégée, Hans Urs von Balthasar (1905-1988) for a negative evaluation.4 In this 
chapter, I argue that there is a particular christological problem in Balthasar’s theological 
treatment of anxiety and aesthetics that could be better addressed if Balthasar took 
Kierkegaard’s writings more seriously. To support this claim, I re-assess Balthasar’s negative 
evaluation of Kierkegaard’s view of anxiety and aesthetics (5.2--5.3) to argue that Balthasar’s 
refusal to see how helpful Kierkegaard’s writings can be is based upon a misconception that 
                                                
1 Hans Urs von Balthasar, J. Fessio, and J.K. Riches, Glory of the Lord: Seeing the Form vol. 1 (T. & T. Clark, 1982), 
420. Henceforth, GL 1: page number. 
 
2 Luther’s Works XXXI, 52; Heidelberg Disputation, paragraph 20. 
<http://bookofconcord.org/heidelberg.php#20>. 
 
3 Kierkegaard, Hong, and Hong, Postscript, 600. Henceforth, CUP. 
 
4 Henri de Lubac refers to Balthasar as a kind of contemporary Church Father: ‘instead of wearing himself out 
like so many others in the effort to rejuvenate the old Scholasticism for better or worse by a few borrowings 
made from philosophies of the day, or even of renouncing, again like so many others, any organized theological 
thought, von Balthasar makes a fresh start at outlining an original synthesis, of radically biblical inspiration, which 
sacrifices nothing of the elements of traditional dogmatics. His extreme sensitivity to the developments of culture 
and to the questionings of our age inspires such boldness in him. His intimate knowledge, attested to by his 
earlier works, of the Fathers of the Church, of Saint Thomas Aquinas and of the great spiritual leaders, allows 
him to attempt the venture. It is on them that he has long been nourished; he is their successor today, without 
any servility just as without any betrayal, so much has he assimilated their substance’, in Lubac, Theology in History, 
594-595. For more on the relationship between de Lubac and Balthasar, see Michael Figura, 'Das Geheimnis Des 
Übernatürlichen. Hans Urs Von Balthasar Und Henri De Lubac,' in Die Kunst Gottes Verstehen : Hans Urs Von 
Balthasars Theologische Provokationen, ed. Magnus Striet and Jan Heiner Tück (Freiburg: Herder, 2005), 349-366. 
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elicits such disagreement. I then go on to contrast Balthasar’s christology with Kierkegaard’s 
view to show how Balthasar introduces a problem of distance between the divine and human 
natures of Christ (5.4--5.5). Finally, I illuminate some general criticisms of Balthasar’s work 
through the lens of this christological problem of distance (5.6). By identifying this particular 
problem, I argue that more sense can be made of recent, general criticisms of Balthasar’s 
work—however, whether or not these wider criticisms are convincing, I leave to the reader’s 
judgment. 
5.2 Balthasar’s negative evaluation of Kierkegaard 
In the winter term of 1926-1927, long before his personal friendship with Karl Barth 
began,5 Balthasar was first introduced to Kierkegaard’s writings by Romano Guardini in 
Berlin.6 Occasionally, Balthasar praises Kierkegaard; indeed, one of his earliest books, The 
Christian and Anxiety (1951),7 is generated out of his engagement with one of Kierkegaard’s 
most significant works. However, Balthasar later reflects upon this encounter as ‘my 
misfortune’.8 Many commentators, particularly Joseph Ballan9 and John Cihak10, have provided 
a helpful index of Balthasar’s engagement and disagreement with Kierkegaard. Yet, despite the 
sizable commentary on Balthasar’s treatment of Kierkegaard,11 Balthasar’s commentators fail 
                                                
5 For more, see Stephen D. Wigley, Karl Barth and Hans Urs Von Balthasar : A Critical Engagement (London: T&T 
Clark, 2007), 1-5. See also, Benjamin Dahlke, Karl Barth, Catholic Renewal and Vatican Ii (London: T & T Clark, 
2012), 98-102; 121-127. For a wider context that predates Balthasar, see Amy Marga, Karl Barth's Dialogue with 
Catholicism in Göttingen and Münster : Its Significance for His Doctrine of God (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010), passim. 
 
6 Manfred Lochbrunner, 'Guardini Und Balthasar. Auf Der Spurensuche Einer Geistigen Wahlverwandtschaft,' 
Forum Katholische Theologie 12 (1996), 229-246. The text that they studied was Concluding Unscientific Postscript with 
specific reference to Kierkegaard’s engagement of Lessing (233 n. 15). For more on Guardini’s treatment of 
Kierkegaard, see Peter  Šajda, ‘Isolation on Both Ends? Romano Guardini’s Double Response to the Concept of 
Contemporaneity’ in Niels Jørgen Cappelørn, Hermann Deuser, and K. Brian Söderquist, Kierkegaard Studies 
Yearbook 2010: Kierkegaard's Late Writings (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2010), 201-222. See also, Peter  Šajda, 
‘Romano Guardini: Between Actualistic Personalism, Qualitative Dialectic and Kinetic Logic’ in Stewart, 
Kierkegaard's Influence on Catholic and Jewish Theology, 45-74. 
 
7 Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Christian and Anxiety (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2000). Henceforth, DCA. In 
the case of a direct quotation, the English pagination will be followed by the original in German. 
 
8 Hans Urs von Balthasar, My Work: In Retrospect (San Francisco: Ignatius, 1993), 57. 
 
9 Joseph Ballan, ‘Hans Urs von Balthasar: Persuasive Forms or Offensive Signs? Kierkegaard and the Problems 
of Theological Aesthetics’ in Stewart, Kierkegaard's Influence on Catholic and Jewish Theology, 3-24. 
 
10 John R. Cihak, Balthasar and Anxiety (London: T & T Clark, 2009), ch. 3. 
 
11 See, Edward T. Oakes, Pattern of Redemption : The Theology of Hans Urs Von Balthasar (New York: Continuum, 
1994), 52, 134. Francesc Torralba-Roselló, 'Teologia De L'angoixa: Kierkegaard I Urs Von Balthasar,' in Fe I 
Teologia En La Història: Estudis En Honor Del Prof. Dr. Evangelista Vilanova, ed. Joan Busquets and Maria Martinell 
(Barcelona: Publicacions de l'Abadia de Montserrat, 1997), 449-456. Peter Henrici, 'Hans Urs Von Balthasar: Ein 
Katholischer Kierkegaard?,' in Gott Für Die Welt: Henri De Lubac, Gustav Siewerth Und Hans Urs Von Balthasar in 
Ihren Grundlagen : Festschrift Für Walter Seidel, ed. Anton E. van Hooff and Peter Reifenberg (Mainz: Matthias-
Grünewald-Verlag, 2001), 304-314. Jörg Splett, 'Der Christ Und Seine Angst Erwogen Mit Hans Urs Von 
Balthasar,' in Gott Für Die Welt: Henri De Lubac, Gustav Siewerth Und Hans Urs Von Balthasar in Ihren Grundlagen: 
Festschrift Für Walter Seidel, ed. Anton E. van Hooff and Peter Reifenberg (Mainz: Matthias-Grünewald-Verlag, 
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to offer a critical evaluation of the undesirable theological implications of his hasty dismissal 
of Kierkegaard. Before these undesirable implications can be brought to the fore, I must 
critically assess, in the next two sections, Balthasar’s dismissal of Kierkegaard’s view of anxiety 
and aesthetics. 
5.2.1 Assessing Balthasar’s critique of Kierkegaard’s view of Anxiety 
According to Balthasar in The Christian and Anxiety, anxiety is sin that distances the 
believer from God. But for Kierkegaard, anxiety can have a positive use for faith, since anxiety 
is how freedom presents itself as a possibility and it is the threshold that demarcates the limit 
and ground of aesthetics. Although the current usage of the term ‘anxiety’ in philosophy and 
psychoanalysis is historically indebted to Kierkegaard’s account of anxiety, a comparative 
analysis with current scientific literature is beyond the remit of this chapter.12 However, it will 
be helpful to assess Balthasar’s critique of Kierkegaard by revisiting Kierkegaard’s original 
argument. 
At first, Balthasar lauds Kierkegaard’s The Concept of Anxiety (1844)13 as an unparalleled 
study in the history of theology—save that of Thomas Aquinas—that we are only now 
beginning to appreciate (DCA 31). However, Balthasar’s initial enthusiasm for Kierkegaard 
quickly fades because Balthasar thinks, unlike Kierkegaard’s pseudonym, that anxiety was not 
original to human nature, but rather a consequence of the Fall (DCA 133-136). Therefore like 
all other consequences of the Fall, Balthasar sees ‘sin-anxiety’ [Sünden-angst] as contingent to 
human nature and opposed to grace which ‘fundamentally removed’ [grundsätzlich weggenommen] 
anxiety in Christ’s work of redemption and remains forbidden to Christians (DCA 89/48). 
Since Balthasar sees anxiety as something sinful and external to human nature, he was 
troubled by the fact that Kierkegaard’s fictive author, Vigilius Haufniensis locates anxiety in 
Adam before the Fall, ‘in the state of innocence’ (CA 41). In short, Balthasar constructs his 
                                                                                                                                              
2001), 315-331. Aidan Nichols, Scattering the Seed : A Guide through Balthasar's Early Writings on Philosophy and the Arts 
(London: T & T Clark, 2006), 129ff, 145. Stefan Endriß, 'Hans Urs Von Balthasar Versus Sören Kierkegaard : 
Ein Beitrag Zur Diskussion Über Das Verhältnis Von Theologie Und Ästhetik' (Doctoral Thesis, Trier, 2006), 
333-377. Mulder, Kierkegaard and the Catholic Tradition: Conflict and Dialogue, 125ff. Anthony Cirelli, 'Facing the 
Abyss: Hans Urs Von Balthasar's Reading of Anxiety,' New Blackfriars 92, no. 1042 (2011), 705-723. 
 
12 For the historical account, see Samuel Moyn’s excellent account in Judaken and Bernasconi, Situating 
Existentialism : Key Texts in Context, 279-304. For an acknowledgement of Kierkegaard’s influence in 
psychoanalysis, see Renata Salecl, On Anxiety (London: Routledge, 2004), 32, 48, 53. However in most recent 
scientific textbooks on anxiety, Kierkegaard is not mentioned, see, Martin M. Antony and Murray B. Stein, Oxford 
Handbook of Anxiety and Related Disorders (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). Stanley Rachman, Anxiety, 2nd 
ed., Clinical Psychology, a Modular Course, (Hove: Psychology Press, 2004). Also see, David A. Clark and Aaron T. 
Beck, Cognitive Therapy of Anxiety Disorders : Science and Practice (London: Guilford, 2011). For a compelling 
theological synthesis of Kierkegaard and psychoanalysis, see Pound, Theology, Psychoanalysis, Trauma. 
 
13 Kierkegaard, Thomte, and Anderson, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Orienting Deliberation on the 
Dogmatic Issue of Hereditary Sin. Henceforth, CA. 
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entire theology of anxiety in response to and disagreement with Kierkegaard. Hence according 
to Balthasar,  
Anxiety remains for [Kierkegaard] a matter of the finite mind horrified by its own 
limitlessness, and God and Christ are rarely mentioned explicitly ... [Kierkegaard’s 
presentation of anxiety] did not free itself sufficiently from [philosophy and psychology] 
and so its ultimate fate was a twofold secularisation. (DCA 32) 
Balthasar’s charge that the insufficiently theological account of anxiety put forward by 
Haufniensis fails to acknowledge the self-imposed limit that the fictive author places on his 
investigation of a ‘psychological treatment of the concept of “anxiety,” ... [that] constantly 
keeps in mente and before its eye the dogma of hereditary sin’ (CA 14).14 In order to see why 
Balthasar’s assessment is misguided, we must briefly revisit the argument of Haufniensis. 
Haufniensis begins the first chapter of his analysis with an age-old theological 
question: Is Adam’s first sin just like everyone’s? (CA 25). If we answer this question 
negatively, then hereditary sinfulness is a result of Adam’s first sin and the precondition of 
everyone’s first sin (CA 30). While this negative answer seems quite orthodox historically, for 
Haufniensis this answer uncovers a puzzle that is not so easily solved. If Adam’s first sin is not 
like his second or Cain’s forty-third precisely because Adam’s sin was the first, then there is an 
infinite regress of causality for the human race. Adam’s first sin as the uncaused first cause 
would actually place him ‘outside the race, and the race would not have begun with him but 
would have had a beginning outside itself’ (CA 30). But perhaps we are meant to take ‘the first 
sin’ not in a sequential fashion but rather in a quantitative manner—as if Adam’s first sin is 
greater than that of his descendants. But Haufniensis says that this still does not solve the 
puzzle because this would imply that in order for Adam’s first sin to be qualitatively different 
than his descendents, a quantity must be added in the form of his offspring (CA 30). By virtue 
of that quantitative addition, a lesser quality of sin is supposed to emerge in his offspring which 
can then be contrasted against Adam’s. The result is that we first place the race and Adam on level 
ground, only to go on and then differentiate between them. Whether Adam’s first sin is taken 
sequentially or quantitatively, Haufniensis argues that differentiating the first sin of Adam 
from that of the race prevents the history of the race from ever beginning—not even if we 
were to displace the problem on to Cain, Christ, or Archbishop James Ussher (CA 33-34).  
Haufniensis’s point is that the sin of Adam’s offspring does not presuppose hereditary 
sinfulness but rather that ‘sin presupposes itself, that sin comes into the world in such a way 
                                                
14 For more on this dogma and its sources, see Pier Franco Beatrice, The Transmission of Sin : Augustine and the Pre-
Augustinian Sources (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
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that by the fact that it is, it is presupposed’ (CA 32).15 To suggest the causal link of hereditary 
sinfulness as the condition for the first sin of the race is to invent a myth about a primordial 
zero-point ‘which denies the leap and explains the circle as a straight line, and now everything 
proceeds quite naturally’ (CA 32). For Haufniensis, hereditary sinfulness names the 
generational possibility of sin whereas sin itself is the actual qualitative leap of the individual. 
There is no causal relationship between the quantitative sinfulness of the race and the 
qualitative sin of the individual. For Haufniensis, the first sin of Adam and that of his 
descendants is a ‘qualitative leap’ that is occasioned in anxiety (CA 47). The leap is situated 
between two moments: of discovering the possibility of freedom and becoming anxious for 
the actualisation of this possibility.16 Haufniensis says that ‘between these two moments lies 
the leap, which no science has explained and which no science can explain’ (CA 61). So in 
Haufniensis’s view, sin enters the world in anxiety but through the qualitative leap of freedom 
(CA 54). For Haufniensis, ‘anxiety is the dizziness of freedom, which emerges when the spirit 
wants to posit the synthesis and freedom looks down into its own possibility, laying hold of 
finiteness to support itself’ (CA 61). Hence, Haufniensis treats anxiety as the threshold of the 
aesthetic but also the religious. In other words, George Pattison says that like the aesthetic, 
angst too exists in the tension between the ideal and the real, between the unconditional 
freedom of the human subject and the phenomenal conditionedness of human life as it is 
lived. As such, angst is the condition, or state, out of which the subject must, in freedom, 
become responsible for itself, in faith or in sin, becoming or failing to become itself.17 
But Balthasar detects a secularising tendency in Haufniensis’ account of anxiety that allegedly 
reveals an inescapable reality from which God is removed and replaced by nothing (DCA 136-
138). It is true that Haufniensis says anxiety ‘signifies essentially nothing’ (CA 62), and that 
‘anxiety and nothing always correspond to each other’ constantly and reciprocally (CA 96). But 
it is not the case that anxiety removes God from the picture; rather Haufniensis makes the 
opposite claim in the final chapter, that anxiety can be ‘saving through faith’ (CA 155ff). As 
Pattison rightly says, for Kierkegaard ‘the transcendent character of freedom, and its relation, 
in this very transcendence, to nothingness, can be illuminated’ by considering ‘the task of 
becoming subjective (that is, becoming the freedom we are) as interdependent with the human 
longing for an eternal happiness’ (KAR 60-61).  
                                                
15 For more on the relation of Haufniensis’ notion of the Fall and John Milton’s, see  John S. Tanner, Anxiety in 
Eden : Kierkegaardian Reading Of "Paradise Lost" (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992). See also, Dennis Richard 
Danielson, The Cambridge Companion to Milton, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), ch. 8. 
16 Arne Grøn, The Concept of Anxiety in Søren Kierkegaard, 1st ed. (Macon: Mercer University Press, 2008), 19. 
Henceforth, CASK. 
 
17 George Pattison, Kierkegaard: The Aesthetic and the Religious : From the Magic Theatre to the Crucifixion of the Image 
(London: Macmillan, 1992), 60. Henceforth, KAR. 
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In Balthasar’s estimation, Haufniensis advocates a picture of anxiety that is necessary to 
human nature and therefore irredeemable. Alternately, Balthasar’s counter-claim is that anxiety is 
contingent to human nature and therefore redeemable in Christ. What Balthasar’s critique 
overlooks is that Haufniensis’ claim is that anxiety is necessary and redeemable through the 
theological virtue of faith. At best, anxiety calls us to something that we may or may not have 
the capability of achieving on our own. In other words, anxiety can be the condition of an 
implicit awareness of what Kierkegaard calls ‘the aesthetic sphere’ where one comes to see 
that their life has not lived up to its ethical potential. When sin and unfreedom are elements of 
one’s own self-relation, then the likelihood of becoming free is eclipsed. However, 
Haufniensis does not stop here. If unfreedom was able to close itself off entirely from the 
possibility and challenge of freedom, then anxiety would never manifest. Yet, anxiety 
manifests when we are affected by the possibility of freedom such that there still remains a 
relation to the possibility of freedom even in unfreedom. The ambiguity of anxiety is such that 
we resist this possibility and we are influenced by it at once. For Haufniensis, to say that anxiety 
is a necessary feature of human existence does not mean that anxiety is also irredeemable. 
Haufniensis says that one must ‘learn to be anxious in order that he may not perish either by 
never having been in anxiety or by succumbing in anxiety. Whoever has learned to be anxious 
in the right way has learned the ultimate’ (CA 155). But how, and from whom are we to learn 
it? For Haufniensis, how one deals with the possibility and challenge of freedom in anxiety 
‘depends simply and solely on the energy of the God-relation in him, even though the God-
relation finds an altogether wrong expression as fate’ (CA 110). Just as one’s own self-relation 
in unfreedom cannot entirely close itself off from the call to freedom, the individual’s relation 
to God cannot be entirely closed off when misunderstood as fate. 
For Haufniensis, anxiety is an important feature of one’s relation to God and can be 
saving through faith. Haufniensis positively evaluates anxiety as an instructive and iconoclastic 
mood ‘because it consumes all finite ends and discovers all their deceptiveness’ (CA 155). 
Haufniensis says that ‘whoever is educated by anxiety is educated by possibility, and only he 
who is educated by possibility is educated according to his infinitude. Therefore possibility is 
the weightiest of all categories’ (CA 156). Haufniensis’s tone is not mortifying, but edifying: 
‘possibility will discover all the finitudes, but it will idealize them in the form of infinity and in 
anxiety overwhelm the individual until he again overcomes them in the anticipation of faith’ 
(CA 157).  
It is in this way that ‘he who passes through the anxiety of the possible is educated to 
have no anxiety, not because he can escape the terrible things of life but because these always 
become weak by comparison with those of possibility’ (CA 157). George Pattison rightly 
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observes that while anxiety reveals ‘the void that undermines all finite certainties, it can serve 
to educate us up to faith. It is the vertigo of freedom but also the summons to assault the 
infinite. For faith, the nothingness of angst is the narrow gate by which faith itself comes into 
being’.18 For Haufniensis, anxiety is inherently iconoclastic: ‘Anxiety discovers fate, but just 
when the individual wants to put his trust in fate, anxiety turns around and takes fate away’ 
(CA 159). Anxiety drives the same iconoclastic question that St. Augustine asked of himself in 
Confessions: ‘What do I love when I love my God?’,19 and anxiety disrupts our attempts to 
subordinate the course of our lives to only one overarching and unchanging plot line for all 
time. Something that Augustine was also aware of when he said: ‘My life is a distension in 
several directions ... I am scattered in times whose order I do not understand ... until that day 
when, purified and molten by the fire of your love, I flow together to merge into you’.20 For 
what single object or goal could satisfy the whole of one’s life? Paradoxically, the nothingness 
of the individual’s God-relation indirectly brings the meaning of the individual’s whole life into 
view as anxiety exposes the way ‘finitude always explains in parts, never totally’ and ‘with the 
help of faith, anxiety brings up the individuality to rest in providence’ (CA 161). It is in this 
way that Haufniensis wishes to deliver the reader over to dogmatics because ‘he who in 
relation to guilt is educated by anxiety will rest only in the Atonement’ (CA 162). 
Does this positive view of anxiety imply that the devout must remain constantly 
anxious? On the contrary, Haufniensis says that anxiety is a necessary but not a sufficient 
component of faith. As such, anxiety does not immediately deliver us over to faith, but rather 
anxiety can save through faith (CASK 150). For Haufniensis, one must learn to be anxious in the 
right way—that is in such a way that leads to faith rather than misunderstanding anxiety as an 
impediment to faith. But does Haufniensis’s view imply that anxiety is annihilated in faith? 
No, Haufniensis says that faith ‘extricates itself from anxiety’s moment of death’ (CA 117). As 
Arne Grøn rightly says, faith saves us not from anxiety per se, but rather ‘from the anxiety that 
makes us unfree’ (CASK 148). So it is fitting that Kierkegaard’s other fictive author, Johannes 
de Silentio reminds us in Fear and Trembling that ‘only the one who was in anxiety finds rest’ 
(FT 27). Surprisingly, Balthasar’s antagonism toward Kierkegaard’s picture of anxiety 
overlooks this crucial feature of his argument, which could actually be used to supplement the 
basic aims of Balthasar’s theology of anxiety. In the next section, I will assess why Balthasar 
repudiates Kierkegaard when sketching the basic contours of his own theological aesthetics. 
5.2.2 Assessing Balthasar’s critique of Kierkegaard’s view of aesthetics 
                                                
18 George Pattison, Kierkegaard and the Crisis of Faith : An Introduction to His Thought (London: SPCK, 1997), 103. 
19 Augustine and Chadwick, Confessions, 183. [X, vi (8)]. 
 
20 Confessions XI, xxix (39). 
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 Balthasar begins his essay ‘Revelation and the Beautiful’ (1959),21 by making a great 
deal of his title’s ‘Both/And’ approach and chastising Kierkegaard for emphasizing 
‘unwittingly the sad omission of any possible conjunction between the two concepts of the 
title, concepts which, since Kierkegaard’s eruption into the Protestant and Catholic thought of 
our century, have dominated Christian ideology’ (ET 1:95). As George Pattison has rightly 
observed, Kierkegaard uses ‘aesthetic’ in two different ways: ‘on the one hand it relates to 
“aesthetics” in the sense of the fine arts; on the other hand it is used as an ethical term to 
describe the life which fails to live up to its ethical potential’.22 So, from Kierkegaard’s 
perspective, to give a theological account of aesthetics would be either to talk about God in 
fine art, or about God in the life which fails to live up to its ethical potential. For Kierkegaard, 
neither way of speaking about God amounts to good theology. Yet, Balthasar rejects 
Kierkegaard’s ‘austere’ interpretation of aesthetics because Balthasar thinks that Kierkegaard 
hives aesthetics off from the ethical and religious sphere (ET 1:95; cf. GL 1:50). In particular, 
Balthasar claims that Kierkegaard’s aesthetic offers a ‘much admired but incredibly false 
analysis of Mozart’ which involves ‘an antireligious cynicism’ that lacks ‘an understanding of 
what the daimon meant to Plato’ (ET 1:96).23  
In order to absolve Kierkegaard of these allegations, three brief corrections need to be 
made to Balthasar’s superficial dismissal of Kierkegaard: i) had Balthasar read Kierkegaard’s 
religious (rather than pseudonymous) writings, he would have discovered that Kierkegaard 
was neither antireligious nor a cynic; ii) had Balthasar read Kierkegaard’s dissertation on Plato, 
he would have discovered that Kierkegaard had considerable knowledge of Plato’s daimon;24 
and iii) on the issue of Kierkegaard separating the aesthetic from the other spheres at the 
expense of the unity of the transcendentals, I submit that although Kierkegaard illustrates the 
aesthetic, ethical, and religious life view with individual characters, it does not follow that 
these are individual standpoints that rival one another throughout the global population, but 
rather these life views are better construed as distinct but ultimately inseparable aspects under 
                                                
21 Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Word Made Flesh, vol. 1, Explorations in Theology (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 
1989), 95-126. Henceforth ET 1: page number.  
 
22 George Pattison, 'Kierkegaard: Aesthetics and 'the Aesthetic',' The British Journal of Aesthetics 31, no. 2 (1991), 
140. 
 
23 Some have shown that Kierkegaard’s analysis is not false, but in fact coheres with what critics have said of 
Mozart. For instance, see T. H. Croxall, 'Kierkegaard and Mozart,' Music and Letters XXVI, no. 3 (1945), 151-158. 
Others have argued more recently that Kierkegaard offers a satire of Romanticism here, rather than a 
straightforward assessment, see Shao Kai Tseng, 'Kierkegaard and Music in Paradox? Bringing Mozart's Don 
Giovanni to Terms with Kierkegaard's Religious Life-View,' Literature & Theology Advance Access (2013), 1-14. 
 
24 Søren Kierkegaard, Howard Hong, and Edna Hong, The Concept of Irony, with Continual Reference to Socrates : 
Together with Notes of Schelling's Berlin Lectures (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 157-197. 
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which the individual sees and leads her own life in seeking the good, true, and beautiful.25 
Nevertheless, despite his superficial dismissal of Kierkegaard, Balthasar does make an 
interesting observation regarding the family resemblance regarding the notion of the aesthetic 
between Kierkegaard and Maurice Blondel (ET 1:103; cf. GL 1:51).26 At this point, it should 
be clear to the reader that Balthasar both disagrees with and misunderstands Kierkegaard’s view of 
anxiety and aesthetics. In the next section, I will assess the viability of Balthasar’s constructive 
alternative. 
5.3 Assessing Balthasar’s theological aesthetics as an alternative 
In his essay entitled ‘Revelation and the Beautiful’ Balthasar sketches his own 
theological aesthetics, which has the chief aim of making beauty a foundational theological 
category rather than other categories such as truth or the good.27 In other words, by 
theological aesthetics, Balthasar intends an account of how the glory of God can be seen in 
natural and artistic beauty. In order to make his claim about the sense perception of 
uncreated-grace-in-creation plausible, Balthasar first draws upon the resources of Scripture, 
liturgy, and what he calls the Christian experience of beauty as the link between the finite and 
infinite. 
Balthasar laments the hiving off of the beautiful from the true and the good, 
construing this gap as a kind of Fall from a previous state of grace: ‘whereas previously there 
was a generally accepted metaphysics establishing a living bond between the immanent 
sciences and the transcendent Christian revelation, it has now become quite unreal and 
ineffectual and has been abandoned in favor of the immanence of the sciences’ (ET 1:96). For 
Balthasar, the tragic consequence of fragmenting the transcendental unity of Being is that a 
false dualism is created in theology ‘on the ground of scholastic ontology itself’ which divorces 
                                                
 
25 For instance, the unity of the good, true, and beautiful is precisely what is at stake for Kierkegaard in the task 
of ‘existential contemporaneity’ since the ‘true is not superior to the good and the beautiful, but the true and the 
good and the beautiful belong essentially to every human existence and are united for an existing person not in 
thinking them, but in existing’ (CUP 348). See also, Kierkegaard’s criticism of Xenophon’s view of Socrates is 
that ‘instead of the good, we have the useful, instead of the beautiful the utilitarian, instead of the true the 
established, instead of the sympathetic the lucrative, instead of harmonious unity the pedestrian’ in Kierkegaard, 
Hong, and Hong, The Concept of Irony, 25. For more, see an excellent article by Daniel Watts, 'Subjective Thinking: 
Kierkegaard on Hegel's Socrates,' The Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain 61 (2010), 23-44. 
26 Balthasar’s translator, Alexander Dru took this observation to heart in the introduction of Maurice Blondel, 
Alexander Dru, and Illtyd Trethowan, The Letter on Apologetics, and, History and Dogma, Ressourcement (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1994), esp. pp. 54, 70. Although there is no textual evidence that shows Blondel was even aware of 
Kierkegaard, it is noteworthy that only one other Catholic philosopher had made this observation before 
Balthasar, and that is in an article originally published in 1955 by Cornelio Fabro, see Cornelio Fabro, Dall'essere 
All'esistente (Brescia: Morcelliana, 1965 [1st ed. 1957]), ch. 8; esp. pp. 428, 433. 
 
27 It has been reported that Balthasar’s theological aesthetics will be the focus of contemplation for Pope 
Emeritus Benedict XVI in retirement. <http://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/benedict-xvis-first-night-as-
pope-emeritus/>. 
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the verum from the bonum separating ‘theoretical and practical reason’ and Balthasar places the 
blame, not on Adam and Eve, but Kierkegaard (ET 1:193-4; 96). Ed Oakes claims that the 
rationale for ‘starting with the transcendental of beauty’ was because ‘it was Balthasar’s 
conviction that the order in which these transcendentals are approached is utterly determinative 
for the way theology can credibly present the mysteries of the Christian religion to an 
increasingly skeptical public’.28 After lamenting the gap created by the independence of 
aesthetics from Christian revelation in the contemporary wasteland of a ‘warped and stunted 
Protestant Weltanschauung’ (ET 1:96), Balthasar tells an elaborate story to locate the source of 
the problem of scepticism between the correspondence of the form and content of worldly 
beauty, in order to overcome it with divine beauty.  
A desirable outcome of such a reordering of the foundations of metaphysics would be 
to subvert the sway of anaemic biblical critics and theologians that have excavated the content 
of Scripture for a scientifically precise ‘truth’ and discarded the form and aesthetic value of 
revelation as such.29 For Balthasar, this theological method is wrongheaded since the content 
of revelation is encountered in the person of Christ, as attested to in Scripture and Tradition, 
and perceiving the form of revelation is constitutive of seeing Christ’s suffering and death in 
the crucifixion as beautiful (ET 1:113). By adding natural and artistic beauty to his otherwise 
Barthian Christological link between uncreated grace and creation, Aidan Nichols says that for 
Balthasar, Christ’s suffering on the cross becomes ‘an open window on the transcendentals’, 
indeed ‘the supreme presentation of the aesthetic form’.30 Nichols sums up the central claim 
of Balthasar’s theological aesthetics in this way: 
                                                
28 Edward T. Oakes, ‘The Apologetics of Beauty’ in Daniel J. Treier, Mark Husbands, and Roger Lundin, The 
Beauty of God : Theology and the Arts (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2007), 212. 
29 In his own words, Balthasar’s essay is not meant to ‘dwell on the justifiable complaint that recent dogmatic 
mores are lacking in any real feeling for beauty (all too often in their style),’ but rather ‘to concentrate on the far 
greater danger menacing speculative theology, namely, the kind of paralysis induced by a biblical criticism which 
dominates the whole field and claims to have a monopoly of scientific precision in the modern sense’ (ET 1:97).  
 
30 Aidan Nichols, A Key to Balthasar : Hans Urs Von Balthasar on Beauty, Goodness and Truth (London: Darton, 
Longman & Todd, 2011), 20-21. In his essay ‘Revelation and the Beautiful’, Balthasar says, ‘The cross is the first 
aim of the incarnation, indispensable as long as the world continues, and whatever share is given in the joy of the 
resurrection it cannot replace the duty of finding redemption through the cross and of sharing deeply in the 
passion itself. For this reason, the glory inherent in God's revelation, its fulfilment beyond measure of all possible 
aesthetic ideas, must perforce remain hidden from the eyes of all, both believers and unbelievers, though in very 
various degrees ... insofar as the veil over the face of Christ's mystery is drawn aside, and insofar as the economy 
of grace allows, Christian contemplation can marvel, in the self­emptying of divine love, at the exceeding 
wisdom, truth and beauty inherent there. But it is only in this self-emptying that they can be contemplated, for it 
is the source whence the glory contemplated by the angels and the saints radiates into eternal life ... the 
paradoxical events with which God "shocks" sinful man are seen as an invitation and stimulus to overleap the 
bounds of a closed world of finite ideas and to share in God's self-manifestation and openness, something to 
which the creaturely condition itself points, though unable to attain it ... the humiliation of the servant only 
makes the concealed glory shine more resplendently, and the descent into the ordinary and commonplace brings 
out the uniqueness of him who so abased himself’ (ET 1:113-114). 
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The transcendental we call ‘the beautiful’, can help restore the integrity of a 
Christologically-given revelation of the God of all being. The significance of the 
beautiful is that it indicates how an object might be outside us, facing us, and yet at the 
same time draw us into itself. Of all the transcendentals, the beautiful is the closest to 
our senses. It is, therefore, more directly present to us than are the other 
transcendental properties of being. The beautiful is a fully objective property of being, 
but it is the nature of this property to be communicative, to communicate itself to 
observers. The beauty is reality under the aspect of form, known as such by 
imaginative intuition, just as truth is reality as best known through propositions, by the 
intelligence, and goodness is reality as best known through values, by the moral 
sense.31 
Nichols says that by putting natural and artistic beauty forward as ‘the possible vehicle of 
divine self-manifestation’ and ‘the actual revelation of God in Christ’,32 Balthasar’s theological 
aesthetics attempts to overcome the classic stalemate of analogia entis between Barth and 
Przywara.  
Balthasar blames the failure of modern aesthetics upon the attempt to hive off divine 
splendour from concrete forms of worldly beauty.33 In response, Balthasar takes a two-fold 
approach to repair the damage and put aesthetics back on its proper, theological course. First, 
Balthasar attempts to mend the modern conception of worldly beauty by reuniting the form of 
beauty with the splendour of the sublime as a counter-position to Kant’s separation of them.34 
Essentially, Balthasar wants to re-enchant the universe by recovering the purposiveness of 
worldly beauty. To counteract the problem of scepticism between the correspondence of form 
and content, Balthasar turns to J.W. von Goethe and F.W.J. Schelling to find a philosophically 
viable, yet theologically reconfigured, aesthetic alternative.35 Balthasar’s Romantic turn to 
                                                
31 Nichols, A Key to Balthasar, 25. For more, see Aidan Nichols, 'Von Balthasar's Aims in His Theological 
Aesthetics,' The Heythrop Journal 40, no. 4 (1999), 409-423. See also Mark McIntosh’s entry on Balthasar in Ian S. 
Markham, ed., The Student's Companion to the Theologians, vol. 38, Wiley Blackwell Companions to Religion (Malden: 
Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), 355-366. 
 
32 Nichols, A Key to Balthasar, 42. 
 
33 For a fuller treatment of Balthasar’s distinction between form/splendour, see D. C. Schindler, Hans Urs Von 
Balthasar and the Dramatic Structure of Truth : A Philosophical Investigation (New York: Fordham University Press, 
2004), esp. ch. 3 & 5. 
 
34 Immanuel Kant and Nicholas Walker, Critique of Judgement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), § 1-22. For 
more on Kant’s aesthetics, see Lewis White Beck, Early German Philosophy : Kant and His Predecessors (Cambridge: 
Belknap Press, 1969), 438-501. Also see, Hannah Ginsborg, Kant's Aesthetics and Teleology (Fall 2008 Edition) 
([cited 5 April 2013]); available from <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/kant-aesthetics/>. 
Also see, Andrew Ward, Kant : The Three Critiques (Cambridge: Polity, 2006), chs. 9-12. The most recent, full-
blooded re-articulation of Balthasar’s position can be found in David Bentley Hart, The Beauty of the Infinite : The 
Aesthetics of Christian Truth (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003), 1-34. ‘Perhaps the most immediately suggestive 
aspect of the huge theological trilogy of Hans Urs von Balthasar is the great reversal it effects—simply in its 
sequence—of Kant’ (139 n. 141). And yet, Balthasar’s notion of the sublime can also be used to support a 
position contrary to Hart’s, see Clayton Crockett, A Theology of the Sublime (London: Routledge, 2001), 32. 
 
 86 
 
Weimar Classicism is not unprecedented for German-speaking Catholic intellectuals.36 In fact, 
Balthasar’s theological aesthetics can be viewed as an attempt to recover the rich Catholic 
tradition indebted to Schelling that precedes Balthasar by three generations but which had 
fallen out of favour in the wake of the Leonine revival of Neo-Scholasticism.37  
In his first volume on theological aesthetics entitled The Glory of the Lord, Balthasar 
starts with beauty in the abstract as inexhaustible and indefinable in order to offer an alternative 
account to Kant’s portrayal of beauty as a particular phenomenon reducible to personal taste 
that is resistant to logical deduction and commands universal assent at once.38 The closest 
Balthasar comes to explaining the meaning of his distinction between worldly and divine 
beauty is with a pseudo-Heideggerian argument from the Latin etymology of the word 
‘beautiful’ (formosus) as the result of the combination of ‘aspect’ (species) and ‘attractive’ 
(speciosa), which also introduces Balthasar’s distinction between beauty as the form (Gestalt) and 
splendour of God’s glory (Herrlichkeit) in creation (GL 1:20). For Balthasar, beauty is displayed 
in the form, and that which shines forth from ‘the form’s interior’ (GL 1:151).  
After his proposal to mend the modern conception of worldly beauty, Balthasar’s 
second move is to reattach the determinate content of worldly beauty to the flowering of 
divine beauty as a transcendental category. From Balthasar’s perspective, Kant has lopped the 
budding flower of divine beauty in exchange for the stem of worldly beauty. To make his 
point, Balthasar says that the ‘form as it appears to us is beautiful only because the delight that 
it arouses in us is founded upon the fact that, in it, the truth and goodness of the depths of reality itself 
are manifested and bestowed ’ (GL 1:118; emphasis mine). Balthasar says that ‘we “behold” the form; 
but, if we really behold it, it is not as a detached form, rather in its unity with the depths that 
make their appearance in it. We see form as the splendour, as the glory of Being’ (GL 1:119). 
                                                                                                                                              
35 For more, see Balthasar’s interview ‘Geist und Feuer,’ in Herder-Korrespondenz 30 (1976): 76, cited in W. T. 
Dickens, Hans Urs Von Balthasar's Theological Aesthetics : A Model for Post-Critical Biblical Interpretation (Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 2003), 252-253. n. 51. For more on the development and debates in German 
Idealism, see Frederick C. Beiser, German Idealism : The Struggle against Subjectivism, 1781-1801 (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2002). See also, Gary J. Dorrien, Kantian Reason and Hegelian Spirit : The Idealistic Logic of Modern 
Theology (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012). 
 
36 For more on Weimar Classicism, see Simon Richter, The Literature of Weimar Classicism, vol. 7, Camden House 
History of German Literature Series (Suffolk: Boydell & Brewer, 2005). See also, Roger H. Stephenson, Studies in 
Weimar Classicism: Writing as Symbolic Form (Bern: Peter Lang, 2010), ch. 2. For Balthasar’s relationship to this 
movement, see Kevin Taylor, 'Hans Urs Von Balthasar and Christ the Tragic Hero,' in Christian Theology and 
Tragedy : Theologians, Tragic Literature, and Tragic Theory, ed. Kevin Taylor and Giles Waller (Surrey: Ashgate, 2011), 
133-148. 
 
37 For more, see Thomas F. O'Meara, Romantic Idealism and Roman Catholicism : Schelling and the Theologians (Notre 
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1982), 188-191. The best treatment of Balthasar’s engagement with 
Schelling is by Stephan van Erp, The Art of Theology : Hans Urs Von Balthasar's Theological Aesthetics and the 
Foundations of Faith (Leuven: Peeters, 2004), esp. ch. 7. 
 
38 Balthasar, Fessio, and Riches, Glory of the Lord: Seeing the Form 18. 
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In other words, as Francesca Murphy has aptly put the matter, for Balthasar, ‘reality is 
intrinsically aesthetic, and analogical’.39 
Rather than endorsing personal taste as an external source of judgment about beauty, 
Balthasar insinuates an ‘interiority’ into the surface itself. Since beauty always refers to a 
particular form-artefact, then, for Balthasar, we only ‘really behold’ it when we judge that the 
shining-artefact refers back to the ‘light’ of the transcendental categories of ‘unity, truth, 
goodness and beauty, a light at one with the light of philosophy, [which] can only shine if it is 
undivided’ (ET 1:107). For Balthasar, the interiority of the surface indicates ‘its incorporation 
into the structure of essences, of subjects and objects and their intertwining’—something that 
Balthasar thinks is jeopardised in Kant’s aesthetics. However, detecting the depth of a surface 
is tricky business, as Balthasar himself admits, 
the event of the beautiful is not to be held utterly transcendent, as if it derived solely 
from outside and above. To ascribe such an event to “being” while detaching it from 
the “coming to be” would be to annul metaphysics by the very act which seeks to 
establish it. Admittedly it is very difficult to retain the two dimensions simultaneously, 
that of the transcendent event impinging from above and that of an immanent object 
bound up with a certain structure ... it also points to the task of theology. (ET 1:107-8) 
Balthasar admits that discerning the difference-and-connection between worldly and divine 
beauty is the difficult task of theological aesthetics, but what appears to be less difficult for 
Balthasar is how that same theological task positively evaluates the ugliness of human 
suffering as beautiful. It will be this undesirable aspect of Balthasar’s theological position that 
I will shore up in the next section. 
 
5.4 Contrasting Balthasar and Kierkegaard on the direct recognisability of Christ 
                                                
39 Francesca Aran Murphy, Christ the Form of Beauty : A Study in Theology and Literature (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 
1995), 132. By uncovering the depth and unity of beauty’s form, Balthasar acknowledges his debt to Goethe’s 
Faust (GL 1:18). Indeed, Balthasar’s debt to The Metamorphosis of Plants is evident later in this work when Balthasar 
calls Christ ‘the mother-plant’ (GL 1:224) and speaks of the importance of seeing the life-principle of the plant as 
an argument for the immortality of the soul (GL 1:391; 442). For more on Balthasar’s debt to Goethe, see Ulrich 
Simon’s essay, ‘Balthasar On Goethe’, in The Analogy of Beauty : The Theology of Hans Urs Von Balthasar, ed. John 
Riches (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1986), 60-76. Far from a passing reference, Balthasar’s description of beauty as 
comprised of form and splendour uses Goethe’s logic of polarity—which identifies the interaction of two 
inseparable but distinct poles without dissolution—to underscore his notion of beauty in such a way that does 
not sever it from teleology; a subtlety that provides Balthasar an opportunity to endorse the causality of the 
concept of beauty with the corresponding object. For more on Goethe’s disagreement with Kant, see Jennifer 
Mensch, 'Intuition and Nature in Kant and Goethe,' European Journal of Philosophy 19, no. 3 (2011), 431-453. See 
also Kenneth Westphal’s essay ‘Kant, Hegel, and the Fate of “the” Intuitive Intellect’ in Sally S. Sedgwick, The 
Reception of Kant's Critical Philosophy : Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 283-
305. Balthasar cannot bring himself endorse Goethe’s pantheism. For instance, Balthasar explicitly says, ‘the 
living God is neither an “existent” (subordinate to Being) nor “Being” itself, as it manifests and reveals itself 
essentially in everything that makes its appearance in form’ (GL 1:119). For more on Goethe’s religious and 
philosophical perspective, see H.B. Nisbet’s ‘Religion and Philosophy’ in Lesley Sharpe, The Cambridge Companion 
to Goethe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 219-231. 
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To make the general claim about the link between divine self-manifestation and beauty 
more specifically christological, Balthasar offers an account of the Incarnation as the 
hypostatic union of beautiful form and divine content. Although he provides no textual 
evidence, Balthasar claims that Kierkegaard reduces an encounter with Christ to interpreting 
merely a sign rather than being enraptured by the evidential and persuasive depth-dimension of 
the ‘genuine “legible” form’ (GL 1:153). Here it seems that Balthasar has attributed a claim by 
Nietzsche to Kierkegaard—a common conflation that reflects European scholarship at this 
time.40 However, the issue for Balthasar is the actual recognisability of Christ as the God-Man: 
‘Christ is recognized in his form only when his form has been seen and understood to be the 
form of the God-man, and this, of course, at once demands and already supposes faith in his 
divinity’ (GL 1:153). To support this claim, Balthasar reaches for his Goethean register:  
just as a natural form—a flower, for instance—can be seen for what it is only when it is 
perceived and “received” as the appearance of a certain depth of life, so, too, Jesus’ form 
can be seen for what it is only when it is grasped and accepted as the appearance of a 
divine depth transcending all worldly nature. (GL 1:153-154) 
Now, Balthasar reads Kierkegaard as denying the recognisability of Christ as the God-man.41 
Presumably, Balthasar’s comments here refer to a small passage by Kierkegaard’s fictive 
author, Anti-Climacus in Practice in Christianity (1850).42 Just as Balthasar makes his claim about 
the recognisability of Christ on the grounds of requiring and presupposing faith, so Anti-
Climacus makes his claim about Christ’s unrecognisability on such grounds. The context in 
which Anti-Climacus writes is one in which the Christian faith is taken for granted and his 
concern is that ‘people delude themselves into thinking that all Christianity is nothing but direct 
communication’ nothing more than ‘the professor’s profound dictations’ and have forsaken 
the teacher for the teaching (PC 123).  
If Balthasar encourages us to see the cross as an open window on the transcendental 
properties of being, then Kierkegaard says that this is a mistake because ‘if temporality were 
the uniform transparency of the eternal, then every eternal willing in a person and every willing of 
the eternal would be directly recognisable’.43 But Kierkegaard points to the fact that when 
                                                
40 Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols: And Other Writings, ed. A. Ridley 
and J. Norman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 29-30. [Christ] ‘spoke only about what was inside 
him most deeply: “life” or “truth” or “light” are his words for the innermost,--he saw everything else, the whole 
of reality, the whole of nature, language itself, as having value only as a sign, a parable’.  
 
41 Balthasar makes this point again about Kierkegaard in Hans Urs von Balthasar and Joseph Ratzinger, Two Say 
Why (London: Search Press, 1973), 31-36. 
 
42 Søren Kierkegaard, Howard V. Hong, and Edna H. Hong, Practice in Christianity (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1991). Henceforth, PC. 
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God’s son ‘was revealed in human form, was crucified, rejected by temporality; in the eternal 
sense, he certainly willed the eternal, and yet he became recognizable in temporality by being 
rejected and thus he accomplished but little’. And yet, Kierkegaard concludes: 
No cause has ever been lost in the way the cause of Christianity was lost when Christ 
was crucified; and no one has ever, in the sense of the moment, accomplished as little 
by a life solely committed to sacrifice as did Jesus Christ. Yet, in the eternal sense, at 
that same moment he had accomplished everything, because he did not foolishly judge 
by the result, which was not yet there either, or rather (for here is the conflict and the 
battlefield for the two views on what it means to accomplish something) the result was 
indeed there. (UDVS 91)  
For my purposes here, I could state the contrast this way: Anti-Climacus presents the problem 
of doing theology after Balthasar. In other words, Anti-Climacus’s concern is the opposite of 
Balthasar’s worry—that is, in misrelating the divine content of worldly beauty, the content is 
taken for granted as self-evident and the form discarded. Ironically, the inattention to form is 
the result that Balthasar despised about historical criticism. To be more precise than Balthasar, 
Anti-Climacus does not claim that Christ is merely a sign, but rather, to use a fond phrase of 
Pope John Paul II, that Christ is ‘a sign of contradiction’ (PC 124; cf. Lk 2:34).44 This is a 
crucial distinction for Anti-Climacus. On one hand, a sign does not coincide with that to 
which it refers and its non-coincidence points away from itself generating a search for a 
meaning which is not self-evident (PC 124). On the other hand, a sign of contradiction ‘draws 
attention to itself and, once attention is directed to it, shows itself to contain a contradiction’ 
(PC 125).  
Anti-Climacus says that a sign of contradiction ‘stands in contrast to what one 
immediately is’ so in terms of Christ as the God-man, ‘immediately, he is an individual human 
being, just like others, a lowly unimpressive human being, but now comes the contradiction—
that he is God’ (PC 126). For Anti-Climacus, as the sign of contradiction, Christ ‘discloses the 
thoughts of hearts’ (PC 126). Anti-Climacus argues that one sees Christ as the God-man, not 
in the way that one looks upon a flower, but rather as ‘one sees in a mirror, one comes to see 
oneself, or he who is the sign of contradiction looks straight into one’s heart while one is 
staring into the contradiction’ (PC 127).45 The contradiction that is generated in the encounter 
‘is a riddle’ that as one ‘is guessing the riddle, what dwells within him is disclosed by the way 
                                                                                                                                              
43 Kierkegaard, Hong, and Hong, Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, 89. Henceforth, UDVS. Instead of 
viewing temporality as the uniform transparency of the eternal, Kierkegaard suggests that they are related as echo 
to sound, hence temporality is ‘the refraction of the eternal’ (UDVS 90).  
44 See, Pope John Paul II, Sign of Contradiction (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1979).  
 
45 Kierkegaard’s distinction between faith and sense perception bears a striking similarity to the distinction St. 
Thomas uses when he says of the Eucharist that ‘Christ’s true body and blood in this sacrament cannot be 
detected by sense, nor understanding, but by faith alone which rests upon Divine authority’ (ST. IIIa. q.75. a1).  
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he guesses’—the ‘contradiction confronts him with a choice, and as he is choosing, together 
with what he chooses, he himself is disclosed’ (PC 127). The problem with the ‘majority of 
people living in Christendom today’ Anti-Climacus says, is that they ‘no doubt live in the 
illusion that if they had been contemporary with Christ they would have recognized him 
immediately despite his unrecognizability’ (PC 128). For Anti-Climacus, they ‘utterly fail to see 
how they betray that they do not know themselves; it totally escapes them’ (PC 128). Anti-
Climacus puts it this way: ‘he was true God, and therefore to such a degree God that he was 
unrecognizable—thus it was not flesh and blood but the opposite of flesh and blood that 
inspired Peter to recognize him’ (PC 128). In short, Anti-Climacus is concerned that when 
theologians ramp up the self-evidential power of Christ, they make Christ into a cliché. In 
hastily dismissing Kierkegaard, Balthasar puts in jeopardy that which he works so hard to 
defend: seeing the form of Christ in and through faith. 
 Although Kierkegaard’s view of the aesthetic shares the same target as Balthasar’s view 
—the transcendental idealism of Kant, and its radicalised version in Fichte46—George 
Pattison says that for Kierkegaard (like Balthasar), art receives ‘a privileged position within 
consciousness, since it is able to create and communicate a sense of unity’; however, unlike 
Balthasar, this unity does not belong to the domain of ‘natural science, existential experience 
and theology’ since these ‘can only postulate [unity] as a desideratum’ (KAR 46). Also unlike 
Balthasar, Pattison says that for Kierkegaard the ‘privilege of art is precisely its limitation. The 
unity which art offers quite simply does not resolve the question of unity in other spheres of 
life, and so the wholeness which poetry and art achieve cannot be looked for in the world’ 
(KAR 46). Hence, Kierkegaard often describes aesthetic experience in terms of daydreaming.  
Joseph Ballan correctly identifies the ‘fundamental opposition’ between Kierkegaard 
and Balthasar: ‘Balthasar’s Christology, while by no means downplaying Christ’s suffering 
humanity, nonetheless incorporates that aspect of Christ’s existence into a higher, glorious 
unity’; whereas Kierkegaard ‘does not take this speculative step, preferring to tarry with the 
Ungestalt, dwelling upon the form of Christ’s deformity, the suffering of God in humanity, 
                                                
46 For more, see Pattison, Kierkegaard: The Aesthetic and the Religious : From the Magic Theatre to the Crucifixion of the 
Image, 1-34. Pattison rightly observes that Kierkegaard, like Hegel (and we could easily insert Balthasar), ‘seeks to 
show how, in Romanticism, the dialectics of art point beyond themselves, requiring a shift into another sphere or 
dimension of consciousness; like Hegel he sees the fate of art as being circumscribed by a historical development 
in which the dynamics of interiorization, the Christ-event and the overcoming of the ‘unhappy consciousness’ of 
the Middle Ages (and, also, of Early Romanticism) played major roles. But whereas Hegel looked in the direction 
of an objectively valid system of knowledge, recapitulating in a logically rigorous form the inner meaning of art, 
Kierkegaard looked instead to what Hegel called ‘subjective Spirit’, that is, psychology. For Kierkegaard it was in 
the crises and exigencies of individual, personal life that the religious decision chiefly came into play, setting a 
definitive barrier to the claims of art and aesthetics’ (43). See also, Pattison, 'Kierkegaard: Aesthetics and 'the 
Aesthetic',' 140-151. Eric J. Ziolkowski, 'Kierkegaard's Concept of the Aesthetic: A Semantic Leap from 
Baumgarten,' Literature and Theology 6, no. 1 (1992), 33-46. 
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without sublating that deformity in a higher unity’.47 In other words, Balthasar considers the 
Incarnation as requiring and presupposing the sense-perception of the unified form of divinity 
and humanity, whereas Kierkegaard sees the Incarnation as requiring but actively precluding 
such sense-perception.  
In the end, Balthasar fails to pay attention to Kierkegaard’s critique of Romanticism 
which, as George Pattison rightly says, was ‘unable to achieve a definitive affirmation of 
meaning or truth; conscious of the dark flux of time, it has an evil premonition, an anxiety, 
coiled in its heart, and in this anxiety it intuits its ultimate succumbing to guilt and despair’ 
(KAR 53). Indeed, like the author of Qoheleth, Balthasar fails to observe that Kierkegaard is a 
humorist and ‘an observer of the human situation’ who ‘has lived through and seen through 
the nullity of the unhappy consciousness of Romanticism which is also the unhappy 
consciousness implicit in all forms of aesthetic experience and expression’ (KAR 55). 
According to Pattison, Kierkegaard believes that ‘the aesthetic consciousness itself prepares 
the way for its own downfall, especially in the way in which Romanticism gives voice to 
feelings of melancholy, premonition and anxiety’ (KAR 56). As Pattison rightly observes, for 
Kierkegaard ‘art is not merely the sublimation of suffering in beautiful images’ because the 
artist is ‘an unconscious sacrifice, who does not understand and therefore cannot escape from his 
situation of suffering and alienation’ and the artist’s ‘addiction to beauty reinforces and 
perpetuates his inability to see that split between ideality and reality which gives his images 
their peculiarly intense allure’ (KAR 57). The fortunate consequence for Kierkegaard is that 
the inability to detect a gap between ideality and reality is not immune from anxiety. Pattison 
says that for Kierkegaard, anxiety is ‘the absolute frontier between the aesthetic and the 
religious’; it is ‘the moment of choice, a moment towards which the aesthetic points, though 
not able to encompass it itself’ (KAR 60). As I discussed above, Kierkegaard’s positive 
evaluation of anxiety is, as Pattison observes, ‘an implicit acknowledgement of the unanswered 
claims made by reality on the poetic consciousness’ (KAR 59). In other words, for 
Kierkegaard, anxiety is ‘both the ground and limit of the aesthetic consciousness’ (KAR 63). 
But as I will point out in the next section, Balthasar’s theological aesthetics has no room for 
such aberration.  
 
5.5 Identifying the theological malfunction in Balthasar’s theological aesthetics 
                                                
 
47 Ballan, 21. For more on the orthodoxy of Kierkegaard’s Christology, see David Law’s essay in Cappelørn, 
Deuser, and Söderquist, Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook 2010: Kierkegaard's Late Writings, 129-151. 
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In Balthasar’s own words, the task of theology is to see the formlessness of Christ on 
the cross as ‘a mode of his glory’ because it is ‘a mode of his “love to the end”, to discover in 
his deformity (Ungestalt) the mystery of his transcendental form (Übergestalt)’ (GL 1:460). It 
seems that Balthasar acknowledges the difficulty of the first task, but not the second task of 
objectively demonstrating beauty-in-deformity. Moreover, Balthasar explicitly holds out the 
apologetic promise of making such a positive evaluation of human suffering: ‘How could we, 
however, understand the “beauty” of the Cross without the abysmal darkness into which the 
Crucified plunges?’ (GL 1:117). Yet, Balthasar goes so far to claim that in seeing the Christ-
form, one sees the whole, and is persuaded, indeed enraptured by the sight: ‘the figure which 
Christ forms has in itself an interior rightness and evidential power such as we find—in 
another, wholly worldly realm—in a work of art or in a mathematical principle’ and ‘this 
rightness, which resides within the reality of the thing itself, also possesses the power to 
illumine the perceiving person by its own radiant light, and this is not simply intellectually but 
in a manner which transforms man’s existence’ (GL 1:465-466). For Balthasar, everything 
hangs on the ability to discern the difference between worldly and divine beauty and to 
experience that difference as painfully beautiful.  
God's grace in fact is bestowed on the world so that, filled with divine power, it may—
groaningly and in pain—struggle through into the light of eternity. The beautiful, then, 
will only return to us if the power of the Christian heart intervenes so strongly 
between the other world salvation of theology and the present world lost in positivism 
as to experience the cosmos as the revelation of an infinity of grace and love—not 
merely to believe but to experience it. (ET 1:109, emphasis mine) 
A valid question might be raised here: what if one is not persuaded by ‘seeing the form’? 
However, Balthasar has already anticipated this question, ‘God’s art in the midst of history is 
irreproachable, and any criticism of his masterpiece immediately rebounds on the fault-finder’ 
(GL 1:172), indeed, should one not be persuaded or ‘if such a mistake is suspected, it will at 
once be shown to have been because of a defect in one’s own vision’ (GL 1:486). There is an 
important shift taking place here. Before, aesthetic judgement was thought to be a universal 
human capacity and the sublime is a pre-theological category. But with Balthasar’s revision, 
aesthetic judgement becomes a limited capacity available only to Christians and the sublime 
becomes very much a theological category for those with eyes to see it as such.  
According to Nicholas Lash, there are two kinds of Christian theologians: ‘those who 
not only affirm that the world has meaning and purpose, but who also affirm that this 
meaning and purpose may be more or less straightforwardly discerned, grasped, “read off” our 
individual or group experience’ and those who affirm ‘that the world has meaning and 
purpose, [but] deny that this meaning and purpose may—whether in respect of particular 
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events or of large-scale patterns in human history—be straightforwardly discerned, grasped, or 
“read off” our individual or group experience’.48 Using Lash’s distinction, I would like to 
suggest that this characterises the difference between Balthasar and Kierkegaard. Thus far, I 
have outlined Balthasar’s criticism of Kierkegaard’s view of anxiety, aesthetics, and 
christology. I have also clarified the difference between their respective positions. However, a 
critical reader may be resistant to, and suspicious of Balthasar’s account of beauty’s (natural 
and artistic) transparency to the source of being and Christian revelation. Indeed, a critical 
reader may object that Balthasar’s analogy of beauty actually separates more than it unifies. In 
the next section, I will uncover a christological problem that arises out of Balthasar’s 
disagreement with Kierkegaard. 
5.5.1 Anxiety as distance: the clue to Balthasar’s christological problem 
As we saw above, for Balthasar the core feature of anxiety is ‘the distance of the sinner 
from God’ [die Distanz des Sünders von Gott] (DCA 133/80). Of course Balthasar does not think 
that God created humans inclusive of this feature. On the contrary, humans were created in 
the image of God for union with Him. Any distance that currently exists between humans and 
God must be a result of a significant shift from God’s creative intention. Of course Balthasar 
naturally views the Fall as such a shift, and it is not a stretch to view the Fall as both anxiety 
inducing and as a kind of distancing. In this way, Balthasar views anxiety as primarily sinful 
because it ‘throws a person back upon himself, closes him off, constricts him, and makes him 
unproductive and unfit’ (DCA 89). This inward-looking and stagnating state serves to 
maintain a person’s distance from God, keeping her in sin. Balthasar sees the Hebrew 
Scriptures as a constant struggle to work out this sinful anxiety. Yet Balthasar thinks that 
ultimately the Law could never resolve that distance, but could only function as a constant 
reminder of it (DCA 71). 
In the New Testament, Balthasar’s view of anxiety as an expression of a human 
being’s distance from God creates something of a puzzle concerning Christ’s nature. If anxiety 
is distance from God, and if Christ is both fully God and fully human, then it looks as though 
there is no distance for him to experience. Yet as anxiety is deeply connected to the human 
condition, Balthasar wants to allow that Christ experienced anxiety—indeed, liberates 
Christians from ever experiencing it. Balthasar’s resolution of this difficulty is to speak of 
Christ as having an epistemic limitation in his human nature. In other words, objectively the 
fully human nature was not distant from his divine nature as God, but as fully human, he 
could not know that relation to its fullest extent in order to be free from anxiety.49 In this way, 
                                                
48 Lash, Theology on Dover Beach, 161-162. 
49 For this point, I am indebted to a conversation with Jeff Byrnes. 
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Christ shares our anxiety and ultimately redeems it. Indeed, according to Balthasar, God 
became human so that ‘anxiety is drained to the dregs upon the Cross in the actual 
abandonment of the Son by the Father’ (DCA 75). In Balthasar’s view, Christ’s redemption of 
anxiety does not give humans a new nature but rather an opportunity to return to that 
primordial unified nature which was anxiety-free. 
Now, if anxiety is primarily sinful, then Christ’s experience reveals a second type of 
anxiety. Thus, anxiety loses its exclusively sinful status when it is experienced by the sinless 
Christ (Lk 3:38; Heb 4:15). This new Christian-anxiety arises because, in Christ’s experience of 
anxiety it did not cause him to turn away from, or to increase distance from God, but rather 
caused him to draw closer to God. In Christ, anxiety finds its limit; it falls away in union with 
God. However for Balthasar, the primary example of this is Christ’s struggle in Gethsemane. 
According to Balthasar, in Gethsemane Christ experiences 
a final, precipitous plunge into the abyss of anxiety that immediately breaks over him: 
vicariously, for every sinner and every sin, he suffers the anxiety of facing the God of 
absolute righteousness. All that the Old and New Covenants know of anxiety is here 
gathered together and infinitely surpassed, because the person who in this human nature is 
frightened is the infinite God himself ... It is, furthermore, the vicarious suffering of this 
Pure One for all the impure, that is, experiencing that anxiety which every sinner by right 
would have to go through before the judgment seat of God and in being rejected by him. 
(DCA 74-75)50 
As descendants of Adam and Eve, anxiety becomes a constant challenge for us. As 
Balthasar sees it, there are two choices available to us: either Christians are faced with sinful 
anxiety which distances them from God and is to be avoided; or Christians are offered a new 
kind of anxiety which is venerated as a mystical participation in Christ’s passion. Once we 
have opted for one or the other, Balthasar claims that the Church can remove ‘sin-anxiety’ and 
can provide anxiety-free access to God (DCA 96-97). And yet, there still remains a possibility 
for true believers to attain the mystical experience of Christ’s anxiety (DCA 105-106). In both 
scenarios, anxiety can be seen as human suffering—which is ignored in the first type and 
positively evaluated in the second type. It is precisely here that Balthasar’s disagreement with 
                                                
50 Because Balthasar’s soteriology makes Christ absorb mental anxiety in this way, Balthasar’s description of 
vicariousness exhibits here a striking resemblance to a core Mormon doctrine of atonement. For more see, 
Douglas James Davies, An Introduction to Mormonism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 148ff. 
Douglas James Davies, Joseph Smith, Jesus, and Satanic Opposition : Atonement, Evil and the Mormon Vision (Farnham: 
Ashgate, 2010), 133-151; 163-174. For an attempt to portray Balthasar’s positive evaluation of human suffering in 
a more ‘orthodox’ manner, see Mark A. McIntosh, Christology from Within : Spirituality and the Incarnation in Hans Urs 
Von Balthasar (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1996), ch. 6.  
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Kierkegaard and his alternative theology of anxiety shows itself to be detrimental to human 
flourishing by failing to account properly for the phenomenon of anxiety.51  
No figure has generated a more theological interpretation of the phenomenon of anxiety 
in human experience than Kierkegaard. Balthasar knew this, and thought Kierkegaard was 
wrong because Kierkegaard’s view was in keeping with the ‘Old Testament’ view of sin-
anxiety which did not sufficiently address Christ. For all of Balthasar’s merit, it is clear that he 
believes there is a difference between the anxiety faced by Christians and non-Christians 
(DCA 90-91). Yet modern philosophers have seen parallels in figures like Job and Abraham 
with their own interests with anxiety. These figures in the Hebrew Scriptures are engaged in 
struggles with God that they recognise as determining their salvation. As Kierkegaard reminds 
us in Fear and Trembling, the author of Hebrews treats Abraham’s actions as the fountainhead 
of faith itself (Heb 11:8-12). I think this is sufficient reason for us to have doubts about clearly 
distinguishing ‘Old Testament’ anxiety as sinful and ‘New Testament’ anxiety as praiseworthy. 
If the phenomenon of anxiety manifests across covenants and faiths, then we might have 
reason to think that it is not really contingent to human existence and we should not expect to 
find anxiety-free access to God.52  
To recapitulate, there is a correlation between the way Balthasar equates the failure of 
aesthetic judgment in perceiving Christ with non-Christians, and the way he equates anxiety 
with sin. My claim is that this correlation occurs in the course of disagreeing with 
Kierkegaard’s view of anxiety and aesthetics, and had Balthasar taken Kierkegaard’s writings 
more seriously, he may have dodged the christological problem I have identified above. 
Therefore, any suggestion, like Balthasar’s, that human suffering should be positively 
evaluated as beautiful is flatly rejected by Kierkegaard.53 Ironically, this rejection can be found 
in the book that Balthasar detests, Kierkegaard’s Either/Or, which recalls the story of Phalaris 
the tyrant of Akragas who tortured his enemies over an open flame and turned their screams 
into beautiful music.54 By presupposing unity in the form of the God-man’s direct 
                                                
51 This is a point that Cihak uncritically makes of Balthasar, see Cihak, Balthasar and Anxiety, 268.  
 
52 Perhaps it is a good thing that after nearly forty years of praying to be protected from all anxiety, the 2011 
edition of the Roman Missal substitutes the use of ‘anxiety’ for ‘distress’? The Archdiocese of New York issued a 
brief statement explaining that anxiety had taken on a too specifically psychological meaning, while distress was ‘a 
more comprehensive description of human fear and pain of body and mind’. For the statement, see 
<http://www.archny.org/media/yearformass/25%20BI-
YFM%20Taught%20by%20Our%20Saviors%20Command%20-%20The%20Lords%20Prayer.pdf>. 
 
53 The important nuance Kierkegaard brings to this issue is that ‘If a person is to will the good in truth, he must will to 
suffer everything for the good’ (UDVS 99). This is not the same as positively evaluating suffering as beautiful tout court. 
The difference is that ‘a person may have suffered a whole lifetime without its being possible in any way to say 
truthfully of him that he has willed to suffer all for the good’. 
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recognisability, Balthasar leads the reader toward the grotesque—appraising human suffering as if 
it was an artistic representation to be contemplated;55 whereas Kierkegaard wants to lead the 
reader away from making such a categorical error since ‘direct recognisability is paganism’ 
because ‘if one can see it in him, then he is eo ipso a mythological figure’.56 My observation here 
is not new: Karl Rahner’s charge of paganism, or more precisely, Nestorianism is something 
that has haunted Balthasar’s legacy for some time.57 
5.5.2 Balthasar’s paradox: beauty as distance 
For all of Balthasar’s criticism of Kierkegaard, it appears that Balthasar has not escaped his 
own paradox en route to making his claim about the harmony of worldly and divine beauty. In 
describing natural and artistic beauty as the link between the finite and infinite, and affirming a 
qualitative distinction between Creator and creation, Balthasar is constrained to speak of 
worldly beauty in terms of its ‘form’ and divine beauty in terms of an indefinable ‘super-form’ 
(Übergestalt). Balthasar’s incongruity here is in affirming both a quantitative and qualitative 
understanding of the relation between God and creation. When affirming beauty’s link between 
the finite and infinite, Balthasar uses a quantitative (degrees of more or less) understanding of 
beauty’s participation in the source of all being. But when he affirms an absolute distinction 
between the source of being and a property of being, Balthasar employs a qualitative register. 
How can ‘beauty’ name and distinguish both the epiphany and the phenomenon in a way that 
prevents idolatry? 
Balthasar’s deployment of the ‘Christ-form’ is his attempt to iron out the paradoxical 
(qualitative and quantitative) relation between worldly beauty (form) and divine beauty (Super-
form). With the icon of the ‘Christ-form’, Balthasar claims that beauty is at once the 
characteristic and origin of being. 
If a concept that is fundamental to the Bible has no kind of analogy in the general 
intellectual sphere, and awoke no familiar echo in the heart of man, it would remain 
absolutely incomprehensible and thereby a matter of indifference. It is only when 
there is an analogy (be it only distant) between the human sense of the divine and 
                                                                                                                                              
54 ‘What is a poet? An unhappy man who in his heart harbors a deep anguish, but whose lips are so fashioned 
that the moans and cries which pass over them are transformed into ravishing music. His fate is like that of the 
unfortunate victims whom the tyrant Phalaris imprisoned in a brazen bull, and slowly tortured over a steady fire; 
their cries could not reach the tyrant’s ears so as to strike terror into his heart; when they reached his ears they 
sounded like sweet music’ (Swensen/Johnson EO 19). Cf. Lucian, Phalaris, I, 11. 
 
55 Balthasar refers to God as ‘O You who heal us by wounding us!’ in Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Grain of Wheat 
: Aphorisms (San Francisco: Ignatius, 1995), 116. 
 
56 Kierkegaard, Hong, and Hong, Postscript, 600. 
 
57 Karl Rahner et al., Karl Rahner in Dialogue : Conversations and Interviews, 1965-1982 (New York: Crossroad, 1986), 
124-127. 
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divine revelation that the height, the difference and the distance [der Abstand, die Ferne] 
of that which the revelation discloses may be measured in God’s grace. (GL 4:14) 
From the above quote, we might frame Balthasar’s dilemma as: either the analogy of divine 
revelation is unintelligible or it is intelligible. If, on the one hand, Balthasar emphasises the 
qualitative aspect of absolute difference between Creator and creation, then there is no 
analogy of divine revelation because that absolute difference [Abstand] between the source and 
characteristic of being becomes unintelligible (if ‘what’ is created, then ‘what’ is uncreated?). 
However, on the other hand, if Balthasar emphasises the quantitative aspect of remote 
distance [Ferne] between Creator and creation, then the source of being risks becoming 
intelligible but indistinguishable from another characteristic of being—indeed, humanly 
speaking, just another ‘what’ in the universe.  
So, it becomes very important that Balthasar’s ‘Christ-form’ ensures that the analogy 
of divine revelation is intelligible, revelatory of an absolute difference between Creator and creation, 
and yet sheds light on beauty as naming the uncreated source (however distant) and property 
of creation. Thus, Nichols says that for Balthasar, the ‘Christ-form’ is like ‘an artistic 
masterpiece’ because it ‘knows no external necessity in either divine or human reality, yet once 
we apprehend it we see that it “must” be as it is’.58 In short, for Balthasar the Christ-form 
concretises the analogia entis,59 carrying its own verification on its face, and in being directly 
recognisable, provides the structural guarantee required for perceiving the form of, and 
responding to divine revelation.60 But has Balthasar’s theological aesthetics provided the 
reader with a monstrance or monstrosity?  
5.5.3 Summary 
I have briefly surveyed the basic aims of Balthasar’s theological aesthetics with special 
attention to some of Balthasar’s incongruous claims. Rather than developing his theory of 
beauty from sources external to Christian revelation, Balthasar attempts to offer a theology 
that ‘develops its theory of beauty from the data of revelation itself with genuinely theological 
methods’, which allows theology to retain aesthetics as ‘a good part—if not the best part—of 
itself’ (GL 1: 117). Balthasar claims that ‘the real locus of beauty’ is ‘the apprehension of an 
expressive form in the thing’ that already possesses a ‘depth-dimension between its ground 
and its manifestation’ which in turn ‘opens up the ontological locus of the truth of being’ (GL 
1:152). For Balthasar, there is a difference between worldly beauty and divine beauty, and yet 
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59 Hans Urs von Balthasar, A Theology of History (London: Sheed & Ward, 1964), 74. 
 
60 Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Theology of Karl Barth : Exposition and Interpretation (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 
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beauty stretches across both realms in such a way that even human suffering can be positively 
evaluated as beautiful. Since Balthasar singles out Kierkegaard as the primary villain in his 
aesthetic saga, it was important to evaluate the accuracy of Balthasar’s judgment. I have shown 
how Balthasar fails to properly understand Kierkegaard’s view of anxiety and aesthetics, and 
could have learnt from him to avoid the christological problem of distance I identified. Some 
of Balthasar’s readers have also wondered whether Balthasar’s theological aesthetics is actually 
much less helpful to theologians hoping to engage the realm of contemporary aesthetics. In 
the next section, I will make sense of wider criticisms of Balthasar by illuminating them 
through the problem of distance in Balthasar’s christology.  
5.6 Illuminating general criticisms of Balthasar’s theological aesthetics 
There have been many criticisms levelled at Balthasar in general, but in this section I 
will make sense of those that can be illuminated in light of his engagement with Kierkegaard. 
Again, whether or not these criticisms are convincing, I leave to the reader’s judgment. All I 
set out to do in this section is to illuminate these wider criticisms through my particular 
criticism of Balthasar.  
The first set of criticisms is theological in nature, raised by prominent Catholic 
theologians. For instance, Fergus Kerr has suggested that Balthasar’s theological aesthetic is 
indebted to Karl Barth’s theology of glory.61 By making such an observation, Kerr is right to 
underscore the irony that for Balthasar, ‘metaphysics seems to be absorbed into theology, in 
just the way that an opponent of nouvelle théologie would anticipate’ since there is no doubt that 
‘neo-Thomists were mistaken to speak of a “pure nature without grace”, but it is equally 
mistaken to allow the discourse of the economy of grace to dictate and even replace the open-
ended investigations of philosophy’, hence it is ‘not only survivors from the neo-scholastic era 
who would regard this as short-circuiting matters of importance—of importance also for 
theology’.62 As Kerr makes clear, Balthasar’s inability to navigate successfully between the pitfalls 
of rationalism and occasionalism leaves Balthasar with a theology hermetically sealed off from 
serious philosophical engagement. In case this judgment seems misguided, Balthasar himself 
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supplies the theological rationale for such a desired outcome: ‘Our concern is not to retain and 
transmit the old imagery of the gods but to regain the power which enabled men to embody 
the revelation of reality in the various myths’ (ET 1:109). Of course, regaining the power to 
see the difference between ‘the old imagery of the gods’ and ‘the revelation of reality’ requires 
a greater light by which one is enabled to see.  
Balthasar attempts to harness this greater light by likening his theology of aesthetic 
judgment to gazing indirectly at the sun, since ‘the only true beauty is of a religious order and 
the shock which induces us to turn aside from the seeming beauty of the world is precisely 
some glimpse of the only true beauty’ (ET 1:104). Balthasar contrasts ‘true’ against ‘seeming’ 
beauty and claims that the theologian, like the Christian artist, can make the former visible 
using the latter since ‘grace has accorded this vision’ to see the difference. Balthasar is careful 
to ensure that ‘true’ beauty does not eclipse the ‘concrete kinds of beauty immanent in the 
world’ but rather it is the ‘very richness [of concrete kinds of beauty immanent in the world, 
which] is a proof of the transcendental origin of the beautiful, but only when the impact from 
above is truly felt’. So, for Balthasar, one must perceive the form of true beauty by grace.  
Whether in fact this is transmitted to the receiver depends on the occasion, whether he 
has eyes, ears or heart for it, whether his hour has come, whether he is open and receptive 
to the beauty in question, whether the times are propitious for the manifestation of the 
beauty in things (not to be exposed in museums to the gaping crowds like captured 
beasts). (ET 1:104) 
It is clear that Balthasar holds open the possibility that the ‘form of the object may convey this 
impact, may even contain it as a special grace’. Yet, it is unclear how Balthasar maintains a 
perspective that can adjudicate between simultaneously distinguishing and connecting worldly 
and divine beauty.63 All that Balthasar admits is that ‘One must credit Christians with this 
power, and them alone, for the world which otherwise has no Godward tendency ... has for 
the Christian something of eternity’ (ET 1:109).   
 Recently, Karen Kilby has astutely identified the problem of Balthasar’s perspective as 
a contradiction between the form and content of Balthasar’s assertion that all of history and 
                                                
63 Balthasar says ‘In the luminous form of the beautiful the being of the existent becomes perceivable as nowhere 
else, and this is why an aesthetic element must be associated with all spiritual perception as with all spiritual 
striving. The quality of “being-in-itself” which belongs to the beautiful, the demand the beautiful itself makes to 
be allowed to be what it is, the demand, therefore, that we renounce our attempts to control and manipulate it, in 
order truly to be able to be happy by enjoying it: all of this is, in the natural realm, the foundation and 
foreshadowing of what in the realm of revelation and grace will be the attitude of faith’ (GL 1:153).  
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the life of God is a dramatic play.64 How does one get access to the “outside” of the play in 
order to see it as a whole? Kilby says that the way Balthasar  
uses the aesthetic image, with his emphasis on the wholeness of the form, and with the 
tendency to make very clear, sharp contrasts between those who can perceive it and 
those who cannot, seems to lead to a theology which allows little room for argument, 
little space for a reader to question and disagree. In fact it leads to a situation in which 
it is hard to know how one might distinguish between being unpersuaded by Balthasar 
and lacking “the eyes to see” — how differing from Balthasar, in other words, is 
different from the absence of faith. (BVCI 65)  
Here Kilby raises two problems with Balthasar: i) that of aspect blindness when it comes to 
distinguishing non-persuasion and non-faith; and ii) that of getting a perspective on the whole 
and Balthasar’s claim to have such a perspective. Kilby uncovers how Balthasar masks these 
two problems with his methodological pattern of fulfilment. In other words, whilst reading 
Balthasar, ‘a range of possibilities is surveyed, each of them determined to be inadequate, and 
a single solution offered which is presented, not only as succeeding where the others fail (or 
being fully adequate where the others are only partially so) but also as taking up and 
integrating into itself all that is positive in the others’ (BVCI 71). Kilby goes on to show how 
Balthasar’s favourite explanatory image of a radiating circle allows him to feign a privileged 
perspective ‘in his very affirmation of the fragmentariness, the perspectival nature, of all 
theology, Balthasar frequently positions himself above it’ (BVCI 91). In other words, through 
such an image of a radiating circle  
Balthasar seems to be telling us that there is no definitive overview, no single 
privileged perspective, that no theological vision can ever be more than a ray from the 
center, and yet on the other hand, in his very ability to tell us this, to present us with 
this multiplicity as a series of rays converging on a single mysterious center, he in fact 
presumes an overview of a whole range of perspectives and of their relationship to the 
core. (BVCI 91)  
Kilby rightly observes that the problem of perspective is not just limited to a few of 
Balthasar’s works, but actually characterises his stance to theology as a whole. 
Balthasar’s whole writing, editing, and publishing career, is conceived as an act of 
bringing together the most different of sources into a universal (“Catholic”) and 
beautiful symphony, of taking many and varied pieces both within the tradition and 
outside it and making something whole. But the one who coordinates, who brings 
together and accomplishes the symphony, in this version, is not God, but Balthasar. 
(BVCI 152)  
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In light of these criticisms, Kilby concludes that first, ‘the attention [Balthasar] has been given 
has indeed been justified, but second, that the notion that he might be a great guide, 
something like a Church Father for our age, is not’ (BVCI 167). So far, I have highlighted 
theological criticisms of Balthasar’s theological aesthetics levelled by Catholic theologians. I 
will now briefly turn to philosophical critiques of Balthasar coincidentally raised by two 
Kierkegaard scholars. 
In his essay, ‘Von Balthasar and Protestant Aesthetics’, Lee Barrett confirms 
Balthasar’s criticism of Protestant dismissals of aesthetics, but charges Balthasar with 
restricting aesthetic judgment in carrying out such a critique. Barrett claims that Balthasar, in 
‘one-sidedly emphasizing the beauty of Christ’s self-sacrificial love as the clue to all beauty’, 
advocates that we should privilege ‘one experience (even if it is the experience of the beauty of 
Christ) and make it bear the whole weight of Christianity’.65 Barrett is right to identify the 
difficulty of such a thematization in Balthasar’s aesthetic, since beauty and art exhibit ‘no 
common denominator’ that can be ‘synthesized in a grand meta-theory’ (TAAVB 105).  
Barrett’s critical observation is developed into a full-fledged philosophical critique by 
George Pattison, who is more sceptical of Balthasar’s theology of beauty insofar as it is 
‘motivated by the desire to rescue the heritage of Goethe and Schiller’ which places theology 
into ‘strange service’ (TAAVB 108). Pattison claims that rather than placing theology into 
conversation with art, Balthasar instead, by making beauty the chief ideal, frustrates the 
possibility of theological engagement with art, since art does not always adhere to this ideal 
and often detaches itself from it. Pattison wonders whether art has ever managed to endorse 
Balthasar’s theological claim that ‘God’s incarnation perfects the whole ontology and 
aesthetics of created Being’ (GL 1:28). For Pattison, this observation draws attention to an 
important tension between aesthetics, and what Balthasar would deem a ‘properly theological 
aesthetics’ that seeks to ‘halt’ what he calls ‘this-worldly aesthetics’ when it fails to ‘fit 
revelation’s transcendent form’ (GL 1:37) which, Pattison identifies as ‘a necessary preliminary 
to’ or ‘an integral moment of theological aesthetics’ for Balthasar (TAAVB 109). The tension 
arises for Pattison when Balthasar calls a halt to this-worldly beauty when it fails to match 
divine revelation but does not go on to negate the analogical capacity for this-worldly beauty still 
to refer to revelation, since human experiences of beauty are pre-theological—that is, worldly 
beauty appeals to self-formation rather than being ‘indwelt by a higher spirit’ (GL 1:35). In 
short, there is, and is not, a link between worldly beauty and divine revelation. For Pattison, 
this ambiguity begs the question of the possibility, scope, and viability of the analogy of Being 
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itself (TAAVB 109). Since Balthasar ramps up the persuasive power of the analogy of worldly 
and divine beauty, Pattison charges him with endorsing ‘the legitimation of each and every 
presumed relation between non-theological and theological domains of experience and 
discourse’ (TAAVB 109). For Pattison, it is perfectly legitimate for someone to ‘allow the 
possibility of an analogy of Being without that analogy resulting’ in such universal applicability. 
Pattison says that  
Even within the framework of a Thomist view of life, there are many areas where few 
would want to be too specific as to just what the divine analogue of a given domain of 
human experience might be, and the doctrine itself builds such caution into its own 
formulation, resisting the temptation to deny a continuing element of equivocation 
even in what analogously unites the divine and human levels of discourse. (TAAVB 
109)66  
Pattison claims that Balthasar’s position commits itself to accepting i) ‘not simply that our 
(humanly) inspired experiences of Beauty resonate analogously with the divine Beauty (or, 
more precisely, that they are always already shaped by the resonance within them of the divine 
Beauty of the Incarnation)’ but also ii) ‘that there is a further analogy between our critical and 
scholarly reflections on these human experiences and the way in which we should be reflecting 
theologically on the divine Beauty’ (TAAVB 109-110). In other words, Pattison says that 
Balthasar is not just committed to an analogy ‘between created and uncreated Beauty’ but is 
committed to a mistaken view of analogy that ‘is stretched to embrace the ways in which we 
discourse upon these analogously unified Beauties (that are, of course, finally one Beauty)’ 
(TAAVB 110).  
The logic of Pattison’s reasoning is that if one’s experience of beauty is ‘often fragile, 
provisional, and contestable’, then scholarly discourse upon human experience of beauty 
would reflect this as well, in such a way that making the confident connection between 
Balthasar’s analogy of Beauty and the history of aesthetics becomes a rather difficult, if not an 
irreducibly frustrating endeavour (TAAVB 110). Much of Balthasar’s argument for his 
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theology of beauty hinges upon his retelling of ‘the history of human reflection on beauty and 
how that history models how we might think of the divine glory’ (TAAVB 110). Pattison is 
right to question whether ‘a distinct theological discipline is required to deal with the 
dimension of Beauty in—or dancing around—the divine Being’ (TAAVB 110). Pattison 
correctly identifies the problem with Balthasar: he hermetically seals theology off from 
aesthetics with his distinction between worldly and divine beauty, but still requires a 
prominent role for aesthetics (TAAVB 110). Pattison restates the problem this way: ‘if 
aesthetics, as we understand it, is not adequate to the task of understanding and interpreting all 
human analogues of Beauty, how confident can we be that it is adequate as a basis of theological 
understanding and interpretation?’ or to restate it with particular reference to Balthasar, it is 
not clear how ‘the aesthetics of the Goethean culture that is so central to von Balthasar’s 
world-view—has (as yet) given anything like an adequate interpretation’ of beauty (TAAVB 
112). Pattison’s rejoinder to Balthasar is that  
the canons and discourses of Beauty, Form and culture do not themselves adequately 
address all of that towards which they point. Beauty—the experience of Beauty and its 
representation in art—is only a preliminary sign of what is neither itself beautiful, nor 
even super-essentially beautiful, but that nevertheless makes possible the opening up a 
world within which beauty might be experienced. (TAAVB 113) 
Like Kilby’s criticism that non-persuasion is indistinguishable from non-faith for Balthasar, 
Pattison wonders whether Balthasar is ‘correct to interpret the entirety of modernity’s 
dissatisfaction with the ideal of Beauty in terms of negativity and rebellion’, since ‘some 
exponents of modern art’ do ‘attempt to find a way to something more elemental than Beauty, 
an appearing that is not itself beautiful, or not yet beautiful, but is the raw, rough material of 
any future renewal of humanity’s experience of Beauty’ (TAAVB 113). Instead, Pattison 
advocates not the ‘pitting of timeless truths or abstract definitions against each other, but of 
searching for the most adequate words and symbols in which to communicate the concrete 
form of truth in our time’ (TAAVB 114). In the end, Pattison is right to say that Balthasar 
‘offers us too much too soon’ and to ask whether ‘the time is yet right for a theological 
aesthetics’. Pattison leaves the reader of Balthasar with an important question: 
Is there not more to be found, more (perhaps) to be revealed, and more to be said 
about the elemental experiences out of which any future donations of Beauty will be 
formed—before we rush on to claiming for ourselves a gnosis concerning divine Beauty? 
(TAAVB 114; GL 1:53)  
Pattison finishes his critical essay by saying that de Lubac is probably right in calling Balthasar 
‘the most cultured man in Europe’ but that it is ‘precisely the problematic nature of culture in 
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our time that obstructs a genuinely fundamental reckoning with the possibility of renewing 
our experiences of Beauty and our practice of beautiful art’ (TAAVB 114). 
Finally, in order to reinforce my criticism of the problematic nature of construing 
anxiety as distance from God, it would be helpful to mention briefly how this issue of distance 
surfaces in some recent criticisms of Balthasar’s theology of the Atonement and the Trinity. 
For instance, Tina Beattie has thoroughly investigated the violent upshot of Balthasar’s 
theology and says that ‘the more vulnerable Christ becomes in the passivity of his dying, the 
more distant from God he becomes, and the more masculine qualities of power, violence, 
wrath and retribution must be asserted within the fatherhood of God’.67 From a different 
perspective, Lyra Pitstick has argued that Balthasar often splits the hypostatic nature of Christ 
in such a way that amounts to ‘the destruction of Chalcedon’.68 Finally, Karen Kilby has 
rightly observed that the constant invocation of distance features as a problem, not just for 
Balthasar’s view of the Atonement, but also his understanding of the Trinity: 
In addition to reading the cross as a drama of God’s abandonment by God, the 
Father’s rejection of the Son, the second thing one must do to arrive at the notion of 
distance in the Trinity is to suppose that this abandonment on the cross (and during 
Holy Saturday) is possible only if the eternal trinitarian relations are characterized by 
infinite, “absolute” distance, radical otherness, separation.69 
It is significant that the above general criticisms are illuminated by the fact that Balthasar’s 
portrait of anxiety as distance from God is not an isolated incident, but rather permeates the 
whole of his theology. For instance, even a relatively uncritical commentator such as John 
Cihak argues that it is out of The Christian and Anxiety (1951) in particular, that Balthasar 
‘delineates and develops in [his] subsequent works his theological anthropology, Trinitarian 
theology, Christology, soteriology and ecclesiology’.70  
On the face of it, Balthasar’s repudiation of Kierkegaard reiterates Heidegger’s earlier 
dismissal: despite Kierkegaard’s ‘penetrating’ psychological analysis, he ultimately comes up 
short on providing an adequate ontology.71 Interestingly, Balthasar agrees with Heidegger 
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about affirming Kierkegaard as a psychologist—the best since St Thomas (DCA 31)—indeed, 
Balthasar even agrees with Heidegger about dropping the theological implications of 
Kierkegaard’s ‘penetrating’ analysis of anxiety (DCA 32). Instead of rehabilitating 
Kierkegaard’s psychology against Heidegger’s secularization of it, Balthasar interprets 
Heidegger as hatching the egg that Kierkegaard laid. Even though Balthasar and Heidegger 
may come to differing conclusions regarding a proper account of what the world is like, it 
would seem that Kierkegaard still provides much of the terminological map for both figures. 
Yet, in the end Kierkegaard offers little to the completion of either of their projects. In this 
chapter, I have shown the places where Balthasar’s attempt to fill out his fundamental ontology 
with Beauty as the proper name for Being runs into problems for his christology and 
anthropology—precisely because of his divergence from Kierkegaard. But this may be where 
readers of Balthasar turn to Kierkegaard for help, because what I have argued in this chapter is 
that Balthasar could have avoided some undesirable theological positions by taking 
Kierkegaard’s writings more seriously.  
5.7 Conclusion: what benefit is Kierkegaard to readers of Balthasar? 
 To close, I would like to relate the foregoing assessment of Kierkegaard’s relevance to 
Balthasar and his readers to the wider aims of ressourcement in contemporary Catholic theology. 
It remains to be seen what Kierkegaard’s writings could possibly offer to readers of Balthasar 
in search of a rehabilitated religious—rather than secular—fundamental ontology. Indeed, in 
contemporary Catholic theology, it would seem that something like a fundamental ontology is 
on offer to readers of Balthasar. For instance, Matthew Eggemeier says that ‘Balthasar’s 
restoration of aesthetics to a place of primacy in Christian theology represents an important 
attempt to describe [an] alternative ontology—a Christian sacramental ontology’.72  
Moreover, it is a ‘sacramental ontology’ that Hans Boersma offers as the interpretive 
key to the ‘essence’ of ressourcement theology.73 Although Boersma admits that ressourcement 
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theologians ‘did not set out to establish a particular theological system or school’,74 what 
united them was their view that ‘all of existence—nature and the supernatural—was 
connected by way of an overall sacramental ontology’.75 In defining this neologism, Boersma 
says that it is ‘the conviction that historical realities of the created order served as divinely 
ordained, sacramental means leading to eternal divine mysteries’.76 In other words, it is an 
interpretation of history that views ‘external, temporal appearances [as] contain[ing] the 
spiritual, eternal realities which they represented and to which they dynamically pointed 
forward’.77  
Now, Boersma says that ‘sacramental ontology’ is a response to secularisation, a 
process that he calls ‘the desacramentalizing of the West’.78 For Boersma, the object of 
recovery for all ressourcement theologians is a sacramental ontology against ‘the agnosticism, 
immanentism, and relativism of Modernism’, and the ‘intellectualism of neo-Thomism’ both 
of which teeming with ‘confidence in the ability of discursive reason to access and possess 
theological truth’.79 By reading these nouveaux theologians through the lens of ‘a sacramental 
ontology’, Boersma says, it ‘allows us to take seriously their disavowals of the Modernist 
theology of the turn of the twentieth century’.80 For Boersma, a ‘sacramental ontology’ is not 
just the ‘essence’ and ‘key’ to understanding the movement, but it also affords him a kind of 
rhetorical and hermeneutical buffer around each ressourcement figure steering them away from 
any potential ‘modernist’ pitfall.81 And yet, regarding all of this, Boersma himself raises an 
important question: 
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circumvent the ambiguous historical relationship between the ressourcement movement and its inheritance of 
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Should Christians really concern themselves with ontology? Isn’t the danger of looking 
at the world through an ontological lens that we may lose sight of the particularities of 
the Christian faith: God’s creation of the world, the Incarnation, the Crucifixion, the 
outpouring of the Holy Spirit, the particular ecclesial community, and Scripture itself? 
I understand these fears, and I appreciate the word of caution as an important one. 
Nonetheless, the objections do not make me abandon the search for an ontology that 
is compatible with the Christian faith.82 
What I would like to suggest is that the benefit that Kierkegaard’s writings offer to readers of 
Balthasar is another opportunity to take that ‘word of caution’ seriously. In other words, the 
benefit that I am referring to would be a healthy suspicion regarding the claims of 
theologians—even those as grandiose as Balthasar’s—to have fleshed out an ontology that is 
compatible with the Christian faith. 
With such claims, Balthasar undesirably sets up contemporary Catholic theologians to 
fall prey to what Charles Taylor has called ‘the view from Dover Beach’, which claims that 
contemporary culture has fallen away from an earlier state of innocence that comprises the 
‘withdrawing roar’ of a moral horizon of ‘traditional beliefs and allegiances’.83 Whether this 
view is put forward in a negative or positive light, this assumption about how ‘old views and 
loyalties are eroded’ enables the plausibility of an account of our contemporary ‘loss of 
belief’—whether that is seen as ‘shedding harmful myths or losing touch with crucial spiritual 
realities’.84 Taylor says that  
What this view reads out of the picture is the possibility that Western modernity might 
be powered by its own positive visions of the good, that is, by one constellation of 
such visions among available others, rather than by the only viable set left after the old 
myths and legends have been exploded. It screens out whatever there might be of a 
specific moral direction to Western modernity, beyond what is dictated by the general 
form of human life itself, once old error is shown up (or old truth forgotten).85 
Under the sway of ‘the view from Dover Beach’, the task of theology is reduced to displaying 
moral certainty amid culture wars fuelled by a preoccupation with the boundary-rhetoric of 
‘continuity and discontinuity’ in identifying the contours of Church teaching. This dual task 
inadvertently pushes theologians to adopt either a tendency toward relativism, or toward a 
ghetto mentality toward wider culture. 
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Following George Pattison, I want to claim that it is unclear whether a project (such as 
Balthasar’s) that uses ‘phenomenology to uncover the deep ontological structures shaping 
human life and/or the human God-relationship is at all conceivable or possible’.86 So perhaps 
the upshot for contemporary Catholic theology is that readers of Kierkegaard will be 
encouraged ‘to go on’ with leading their life before God, disabused of the need to deliberate 
first about fundamental ontology. Perhaps this is why Kierkegaard chooses to treat something 
as elusive and pronounced as anxiety, which tends not to submit to a pre-reflective account of 
its determinate content. The manifestation of anxiety and beauty resists our subsequent 
attempt to retrieve, clarify, and classify its source—thus, revealing a limit to our capacity to 
properly account for the way the world is as it is primordially encountered.  
Perhaps what Kierkegaard’s writings can offer to readers of Balthasar is something 
closer to what David Burrell and Elena Malits have described as the post-conciliar move away 
from the ‘earlier preoccupation with an “ontology” of the sacraments—what is happening and 
how it is being effected’ to an approach that focuses upon the ‘uses of ritual patterns as a prism 
for displaying the human dimensions of sacramental action’. In this way, by ‘focusing on sign, 
questions of “causality” are transposed into a properly sacramental key’ as ‘human activities 
carried out in a believing community, with the goal of enhancing its unity by relating that 
community to the Lord and its members to one another’.87 
To recapitulate, my argument in this chapter was that Balthasar’s negative evaluation 
of Kierkegaard’s view of aesthetics and anxiety lead him to take up undesirable theological 
positions that could have been avoided if Balthasar took Kierkegaard more seriously. To 
support this claim, I investigated Balthasar’s critique of Kierkegaard’s view of anxiety and 
aesthetics (5.2) and assessed the viability of Balthasar’s alternative (5.3). After contrasting the 
theological positions of Balthasar and Kierkegaard (5.4), I identified a christological problem 
in Balthasar’s theological aesthetics (5.5). Using this particular issue as a lens, I illuminated 
wider critiques of Balthasar’s theology (5.6) and suggested ways in which Kierkegaard’s 
writings could be beneficial to readers of Balthasar (5.7). 
My overall claim for this thesis is that Kierkegaard has, and should continue to 
stimulate reform and renewal in Catholic theology. In the next chapter, my study turns to the 
Italian Thomist, Cornelio Fabro in order to supplement de Lubac and Balthasar’s engagement 
with Kierkegaard. Fabro is a genuine student of Kierkegaard who substantially engages and 
negotiates Kierkegaard’s contributions from within the Catholic tradition. With Fabro’s bridge 
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building between the writings of Thomas Aquinas and Kierkegaard in view, my argument will 
gain cumulative force. 
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Philosophy must keep up its guard against the desire to be edifying. 
- G.W.F. Hegel  1 
 
As philosophy of the act of being,  
Thomism is not another existential philosophy,  
it is the only one.  
– Etienne Gilson 2  
 
On the Kierkegaardian Thomism of Cornelio Fabro 
 
6.1 Introduction 
To some readers, Kierkegaard and St. Thomas Aquinas are antithetical thinkers. In 
defence of such a preconception, these readers point to a deep Thomist suspicion of 
Kierkegaard’s so-called ‘irrationalism’ like that portrayed by Alasdair MacIntyre.3 And yet, 
many Kierkegaard scholars have debunked this portrayal as a common misconception.4 
However, it is rare to find someone who would identify themselves as both a Kierkegaardian 
and a Thomist. In fact, to the English-speaking world, Cornelio Fabro (1911-1995) is not 
much more than an obscure footnote in the history of Thomism. This footnote often signals 
Fabro’s ground-breaking recovery of the Neoplatonic concept of participation in Thomas’ 
metaphysics.5 However, such treatment risks reducing Fabro’s legacy to his doctoral thesis and 
fails to convey the breadth and depth of the rest of his life’s work: such as advising the 
Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith and the preparatory meetings of the Second Vatican 
                                                
1 Section 9 of the Preface to Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit unpublished translation by Terry Pinkard, 2008. 
 
2 Etienne Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St Thomas Aquinas (London: Gollancz, 1957), 368. 
 
3 MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 39-56.  
 
4 For instance see, Davenport et al., Kierkegaard after Macintyre : Essays on Freedom, Narrative, and Virtue. Lippitt, 
'Getting the Story Straight: Kierkegaard, Macintyre and Some Problems with Narrative,' 34-69. John J. 
Davenport, Narrative Identity and Autonomy : From Frankfurt and Macintyre to Kierkegaard (London: Routledge, 2012). 
Anthony Rudd, Self, Value, and Narrative : A Kierkegaardian Approach (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
 
5 Cornelio Fabro, La Nozione Metafisica Di Partecipazione Secondo San Tommaso D'aquino (Roma: EDIVI, 2005). 
Fabro finished his dissertation in 1937 and published it in 1939. For more, see Alain Contat, 'L’étant, L’esse Et La 
Participation Selon Cornelio Fabro,' Revue Thomiste 111, no. 3 (2011), 357-403. See also, Alain Contat, 'Le Figure 
Della Differenza Ontologica Nel Tomismo Del Novecento (Prima Parte),' Alpha Omega 11, no. 1 (2008), 77-129. 
Alain Contat, 'Le Figure Della Differenza Ontologica Nel Tomismo Del Novecento (Seconda Parte),' Alpha 
Omega 11, no. 2 (2008), 213-250. Also, see the excellent collection of essays edited by Ariberto Acerbi, Crisi E 
Destino Della Filosofia: Studi Su Cornelio Fabro (Roma: Edizioni Università della Santa Croce, 2012). Gabriele De 
Anna, Verità E Libertà : Saggi Sul Pensiero Di Cornelio Fabro (Napoli: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 2012). Perhaps 
the only chapter-length treatment of Fabro in English is in Helen James John, The Thomist Spectrum (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 1966), 87-107. 
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Council on which he served as peritus,6 or translating the writings of Søren Kierkegaard into 
Italian and appropriating his insights for Catholic theology. Indeed, Fabro goes so far as to 
claim that Kierkegaard’s writings arrive not infrequently at the threshold of Catholicism, or to 
be more precise, Thomism.7 In this chapter, I argue that although Fabro is virtually unknown in 
the English-speaking world, his versatility with continental philosophy and Thomism is a 
desirable asset for contemporary Catholic theology. In particular, by uncovering the 
theological affinities of Kierkegaard and Thomas, Fabro’s writings offer a fruitful pathway for 
re-framing theology in the post-conciliar Church especially after the encyclical Fides et Ratio 
(1998)—a document that gives a remarkable endorsement of Kierkegaard.8 
With the exception of seventeen journal articles, virtually all of Fabro’s writings remain 
untranslated into English. God in Exile (1968)9 is the only book that was published in English 
and it did not focus on Thomas or his metaphysics, but rather, modern atheism. My claim in 
this chapter is that Fabro’s discovery of Kierkegaard’s theology beneath his atheistic 
commentators (such as Heidegger and Sartre), is just as revolutionary and necessary as his discovery 
of Thomas beneath his Neo-Scholastic commentators. Indeed, Kierkegaard is just as 
influential on Fabro as Thomas10 and much of Fabro’s work introduces the Catholic 
                                                
6 Fabro was nominated as a member of the preparatory commission and peritus for the Second Vatican Council in 
1960. He contributed a study on atheistic existentialism to the schema for the Constitution De deposito fidei pure 
custodiendo, which, in the end, did not make it past the chief censor: Prof. Joseph Ratzinger. See, Giuseppe 
Alberigo and Joseph A. Komonchak, History of Vatican Ii: Announcing and Preparing Vatican Council Ii, vol. 1 
(Maryknoll: Orbis, 1995), 241, 410-429. See also, Jared Wicks, 'Six Texts by Prof. Joseph Ratzinger as Peritus 
before and During Vatican Council Ii,' Gregorianum 89, no. 2 (2008), 233-311. 
 
7 Rosa Goglia, Cornelio Fabro: Profilo Biografico, Cronologico, Tematico Da Inediti, Note Di Archivio, Testimonianze (Roma: 
EDIVI, 2010), 190. See also, Cornelio Fabro, 'Kierkegaard E San Tommaso,' Sapienza IX (1956), 292-308. See 
also, Fabro’s article ‘Faith and Reason in Kierkegaard’s Dialectic’ in Howard A. Johnson and Niels Thulstrup, A 
Kierkegaard Critique: An International Selection of Essays Interpreting Kierkegaard (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1962), 
156-206. Rather than rehearsing Fabro’s arguments in these two essays, this chapter will take Fabro’s view for 
granted and develop further avenues of interest. 
 
8 John Paul II says that Kierkegaard shows us how ‘faith liberates reason from presumption, the typical 
temptation of the philosopher’ (n. 76). 
<http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_15101998_fides-et-
ratio_en.html>. For more, see Wayne J. Hankey, 'Practical Considerations About Teaching Philosophy and 
Theology Now,' in Restoring Faith in Reason : With a New Translation of the Encyclical Letter Faith and Reason of Pope 
John Paul Ii : Together with a Commentary and Discussion, ed. Laurence Paul Hemming and Susan Frank Parsons 
(London: SCM Press, 2002), 199-205. Robert Sokolowski, 'The Autonomy of Philosophy in Fides Et Ratio,' in 
Restoring Faith in Reason : With a New Translation of the Encyclical Letter Faith and Reason of Pope John Paul Ii : Together 
with a Commentary and Discussion, ed. Laurence Paul Hemming and Susan Frank Parsons (London: SCM Press, 
2002), 277-291. 
 
9 Cornelio Fabro, God in Exile: Modern Atheism, trans. Arthur Gibson (Westminster: Paulist Newman, 1968). For 
more, see Andrea Robiglio, ' La Logica Dell'ateismo: Il Principio Di Non Contraddizione Secondo C. Fabro,' 
Divus Thomas 102, no. 1 (1999), 120-143. See also, Andrea Robiglio, 'Aspetti Di Introduzione All'ateismo Moderno Di 
Cornelio Fabro,' Divus Thomas 100, no. 3 (1997), 139-164. 
 
10 Cornelio Fabro, Rosa Goglia, and Elvio Celestino Fontana, Appunti Di Un Itinerario : Versione Integrale Delle Tre 
Stesure Con Parti Inedite (Roma: EDIVI, 2011), 85. In Fabro’s personal library, there are 312 Kierkegaard-related 
titles and only 185 titles related to St. Thomas, see Goglia, Fabro: Profilo Biografico, 162. Fabro had always wanted 
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inheritance of Kierkegaard’s thought to those already familiar with Thomas, and re-introduces 
the originality of Kierkegaard’s writings to those for whom his theological significance has 
been overlooked in continental philosophy.  
Prior to Fabro’s groundbreaking work, it was difficult for some Catholic readers of 
Kierkegaard to see his compatibility with Catholicism due to the misperception that 
Kierkegaard was a representative of atheistic existentialism and irrationalism.11 Fabro’s work 
corrects this misunderstanding by reading Kierkegaard closer to the Aristotle of St. Thomas, 
and by showing that Kierkegaard’s Lutheran critique of the State Church did not amount to an 
anti-ecclesiology but rather a very fruitful resource for ecumenism. In this chapter, I will 
introduce and explore the ‘Kierkegaardian’ features of Fabro’s Thomism in order to discern 
Fabro’s contemporary relevance since his prodigious corpus remains tragically unexplored in 
English. To demonstrate Fabro’s contemporary relevance, I must now briefly situate Fabro in 
his Leonine context and within the emergence of the European reception of Kierkegaard in 
order to then underscore how Fabro’s work seeks to overturn the influence of Neo-
Scholasticism and modern atheism.  
 
6.2 Fabro’s Context: the Leonine Revival and the Kierkegaard Renaissance 
The distinctiveness of Fabro’s project begins to come into focus by reading his works 
in comparison with several works of the Thomist revival after Pope Leo XIII’s Encyclical 
Aeterni Patris (1879).12 Wayne Hankey has described Aeterni Patris as ‘the courageous war plan 
of an embattled church’ that engendered a movement that fatefully mirrors the very 
philosophical context which it endeavoured to supplant.13 Pope Leo XIII set out two aims for 
his theologians and philosophers: use St. Thomas to separate philosophy from and 
subordinate it to theology. As Hankey persuasively argues, separating theology from 
philosophy required an emphasis on ‘the Aristotelian aspects of Thomas’ thought’ and ‘its 
                                                                                                                                              
to write an introduction to Kierkegaard but never did, even though he continued to write about Kierkegaard until 
the end of his life (cf. Goglia 2010: 60). 
 
11 To see the paradigm shift that Fabro caused, compare the reviews of Fabro’s work in Pietro Parente, 'Il Vero 
Volto Di Kierkegaard,' L'Osservatore Romano 11, no. 3 (1952), 3. And the 1998 review of Ettore Rocca’s translation 
of Kierkegaard’s Il Giglio nel Campo e l’Uccello nel Cielo in L’Osservatore Romano. 
 
12 For more on the background of Neo-Scholasticism and Pope Leo XIII’s relation to that movement, see Gerald 
A. McCool, Nineteenth-Century Scholasticism : The Serach for a Unitary Method (New York: Fordham University Press, 
1989), 17-36; 226-228. See also, Gerald A. McCool, From Unity to Pluralism : The Internal Evolution of Thomism 
(Fordham University Press, 1989), 5-35. Gerald A. McCool, The Neo-Thomists (Milwaukee: Marquette University 
Press, 1994), 25-40. For an assessment of Fabro’s distinctive contribution to these debates, see Parts I and II of 
George Lindbeck, 'Participation and Existence in the Interpretation of St. Thomas Aquinas,' Franciscan Studies 17 
(1957), 1-22; 107-125. 
 
13 Wayne Hankey, 'Making Theology Practical: Thomas Aquinas and the Nineteenth Century Religious Revival,' 
Dionysius 9 (1985), 90. 
 113 
 
Platonic elements played down’ in order to make the sciences independent from each other. 
Whilst subordinating philosophy to theology required that once ‘the ground of theology in a 
revelation to faith was stressed and the dependence of theology on philosophy diminished, the 
sciences were easily subordinated to ecclesiastical theology’.14 As a result, the desired 
opportunity for genuine dialogue with the modern world became more difficult, if not 
impossible. Pope Leo’s dilemma generated various genres of Thomism that internalised the 
dilemma all the way down.15 However, it is not until Fabro’s project that the Neoplatonic 
metaphysics of participation in Thomas comes to the fore in an engagement with continental 
philosophy, which receives a distinctively Kierkegaardian, rather than Kantian, shape.16 
Indeed, it was precisely Kierkegaard’s critique of rationalism that was desirable to Fabro in a 
time when Neo-Scholasticism could not manage such critical distance.17 
After Kierkegaard’s death in 1855, it took about seventy years for his writings to 
emerge in translation outside of Denmark.18 By 1922, only twelve volumes (out of fifty-five)19 
were translated into German.20 In Europe, this reception was known as the Kierkegaard 
                                                
14 Hankey, 93. 
 
15 Recently the unintended consequence of various Thomism(s) has been deftly examined, see Kerr, After Aquinas 
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Thomism in English-Speaking North America,' Dionysius 14 (1998), 157-188. Hankey sees Fabro’s work as a 
genuine advance in twentieth century Thomist thought. Others have criticised Fabro’s interpretation of 
participation, see Rudi A. te Velde, Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aguinas (Leiden: Brill, 1995), 147, 151, 
158 n. 155, 170 n. 118, 184-146, 222. However, recently some Thomists have come to the defence of Fabro 
against Rudi te Velde’s judgment, see Gregory T. Doolan, Aquinas on the Divine Ideas as Exemplar Causes 
(Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2008), 237-243. See also, Jason A. Mitchell, Being and 
Participation: The Method and Structure of Metaphysical Reflection According to Cornelio Fabro, 2 vols. (Roma: Ateneo 
Pontificio Regina Apostolorum, 2012), 485-492. For more on Kant’s influence on Neo-Scholasticism and Neo-
Thomism, see Norbert Fischer, Kant Und Der Katholizismus : Stationen Einer Wechselhaften Geschichte (Freiburg: 
Herder, 2005), 485-496; 515-552. For the Scholastic inheritance of Kant’s own thought, see Cornelio Fabro, 'Il 
Trascendentale Moderno E Il Trascendentale Tomistico,' Angelicum 60 (1983), 534-558. For a more recent 
account, see Christopher J. Insole, Kant and the Creation of Freedom: A Theological Problem (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013). 
 
17 For more on Neo-Scholasticism, see Ulrich Gottfried Leinsle, Introduction to Scholastic Theology (Washington, 
D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2010), ch. 7. 
 
18 Malik, Receiving Søren Kierkegaard : The Early Impact and Transmission of His Thought, xvii. 
 
19 This number is based on the latest Danish edition published by the Søren Kierkegaard Research Centre in 
Copenhagen. <http://www.sk.ku.dk/eng.asp>. 
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Renaissance and it characterised Kierkegaard as either a Romantic literary figure or as the 
Hegelian forerunner of existentialism, occluding the theological import of Kierkegaard’s 
writings—especially in the work of Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Karl Jaspers. Prior 
to 1948, Italian Kierkegaard scholars struggled to distinguish themselves from the interpretive 
strategies of their French and German predecessors which were constructed upon mere 
fragments of a small percentage of Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous writings. It was not until 
Fabro’s introduction and translation of Kierkegaard’s Journals and Papers (1948-65) that the 
theological aspects of Kierkegaard’s writings came into focus for many Catholic readers.21 
According to Andrea Scaramuccia, Fabro’s translation of the Journals ‘was at the time the most 
extensive edition in translation, surpassing those of Haecker in German, Dru in English, and 
Tisseau in French. Even today it is second only to the collection by the Hongs’.22  
6.2.1 Uncovering Kierkegaard 
In his account of his own intellectual development, Fabro recalls his first encounter 
with Kierkegaard as ‘partly a disgrace’ [una mezza disgrazia] due to Christoph Schrempf’s 
‘unintelligible jargon’ in the German translation of The Concept of Anxiety, which Fabro read in 
the National Library of Rome in 1940—a year after publishing his dissertation on Thomas’ 
metaphysics of participation.23 Fabro was drawn to this book because it was ‘in vogue’, and 
since the ‘Kierkegaard’ he first encountered was through second hand knowledge, it led him to 
see how Kierkegaard was being ‘exploited to negate philosophy and deviate from theology, in 
order to give a free pass to the latest forms of French and German immanentism and various 
dialectical theologies’.24 Fabro identifies two obstacles that prevented Kierkegaard’s writings 
from taking on a more prominent role in Italy:  
On one hand, the obstacle of secularisation—whether socialist or liberal—which 
cannot receive the Christian message of Kierkegaard and continues to overwhelm the 
                                                                                                                                              
20 Søren Kierkegaard, Gesammelte Werke, ed. Christoph Schrempf, vol. 12 (Jena: E. Diederichs, 1922). 
 
21 Franca Castagnino, Gli Studi Italiani Su Kierkegaard, 1906-1966, Collana Del Centro Di Ricerche Di Storia Della 
Storiografia Filosofica 2 (Roma: Edizioni dell'Ateneo, 1972), 5-29. See also, Cornelio Fabro, Problemi 
Dell'esistenzialismo (Editrice del Verbo Incarnato, 2009). For more, see ch. 1 of the recent PhD thesis by Marco 
Strona, 'Verità Dell'essere E Metafisica Della Libertà: Cornelio Fabro Interprete Di Kierkegaard' (Pontifical 
Atheneum of St. Anselm, 2013), 17-54. See also, Ingrid Basso, 'Cento Anni Di Studi Kierkegaardiani in Italia: 
1904-2004,' in L'edificante in Kierkegaard, ed. Isabella Adinolfi and Virgilio Melchiorre (Genova: Il Melangolo, 
2005), 305-326. 
 
22 Scaramuccia, 'The Italian Reception of Kierkegaard's Journals and Papers,' 367. Fabro worked from the more 
complete and accurate second edition of Kierkegaard’s Samlede Værker (Ibsen-Himmelstrup 1920-1936), which 
contained a glossary and index. Fabro also used the 1869 Reitzel, as well as Thulstrup’s 1968 edition of Papier, see 
Goglia, Fabro: Profilo Biografico, 163. 
 
23 Fabro, Goglia, and Fontana, Appunti, 83. 
 
24 Ibid. 
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culture of Italy, already guided by [Benedetto] Croce or [Giovanni] Gentile at the time 
of fascism and now continued especially by cultural centres and social-communist 
publishing houses. On the other hand, there is the obstacle of the deafness of the 
Catholic environment.25 
Contrary to the fragmentary presentation of Kierkegaard by Italian existentialists like Nicola 
Abbagnano, Enzo Paci, and Enrico Castelli, Fabro discovered that Kierkegaard had in fact ‘an 
original speculative genius and a profound religious consciousness’ that fuelled ‘the persuasive 
force of [Kierkegaard’s] critique of the Hegelian dialectic’.26 In Fabro’s view, this insight was 
often overlooked because of the state of European Kierkegaard studies, which was indebted 
to Jean Wahl’s Etudes Kierkegaardiennes (1938). Fabro comments that  
[Wahl] hastily portrayed speculative problems and presented superficial 
approximations of theological themes primarily based upon German translations. 
Kierkegaard’s blazing success in all of Europe, in the first half of this century was 
largely based upon this equivocation.27 
It was Fabro’s newfound commitment to reading Kierkegaard in Danish, and to recovering a 
more theological reading of Kierkegaard that enabled Fabro ‘more than anything else, to 
endure the enormous hardship of the war’.28 But most of all, it was his  
friendship with Prof. [Erich] Peterson that matured during the war, which was the 
decisive stimulus for knowing the authentic Kierkegaard as theologian and 
philosopher, essayist and polemicist. It was [Peterson] that recommended to me the 
itinerary of Papirer as the first and only hermeneutical guide, which made me read in 
the German translation the celebrated essayist, writer and theologian Theodor 
Haecker, his personal friend who also, like him, was received into Catholicism under 
the decisive influence of the great Dane.29 
Through such a connection to both Erich Peterson and Theodor Haecker, Fabro comes 
closer to the circle of influential friendships connected to ressourcement figures like Henri de 
Lubac, Hans Urs von Balthasar, and Joseph Ratzinger. Importantly, Fabro sees himself as 
inheriting the earlier Kierkegaardian Catholic tradition of Theodor Haecker, Erik Przywara, 
Romano Guardini, and Erich Peterson.30 It is a tradition that Fabro says 
                                                
25 For Fabro’s own account, see Cornelio Fabro, 'Kierkegaard in Italia,' Il Veltro 25, no. 1-3 (1981), 89. 
 
26 Fabro, Goglia, and Fontana, Appunti, 83. 
 
27 Fabro, Goglia, and Fontana, Appunti, 84. 
 
28 Fabro, Goglia, and Fontana, Appunti, 85. 
 
29 Ibid. 
 
30 Fabro has in mind the translations and essays of Theodor Haecker, Erik Przywara’s essay comparing Newman 
and Kierkegaard (1948), Erik Peterson’s essay on Existentialism and Protestant Theology (1947), and Romano 
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vigorously stimulated the German soil for a renewal in Catholic thought from a 
Kierkegaardian perspective but ... after the war, the influence of Kierkegaard on 
Catholic theology was suffocated by the invasion of the anti-metaphysical ontology ... 
[of] Heidegger, [by] more boisterous [chiassoso] and influential representatives like Karl 
Rahner.31 
Hence, Fabro emphatically states that his ‘encounter with Kierkegaard has been no less 
decisive than that of St. Thomas’.32 Fabro goes on to say that  
just as the metaphysics of Thomas forever liberated me from the formalism and 
emptiness of scholastic controversies, so Kierkegaard’s Christian existentialism 
liberated me from an inferiority complex toward thought; or to be more precise, 
toward the babble of the continuous stream of systems in modern and contemporary 
philosophy, revealing to me their anti-human and anti-Christian background.33 
Fabro is drawn to Kierkegaard’s work because ‘it is realist, without falling into dogmatism; it is 
dialectical, without falling into scepticism; it is phenomenological with an exceptional 
intuition, without falling into nihilism’.34 Fabro attributes these desirable aspects to the fact 
that Kierkegaard sat at the feet of the Greeks and Fabro sees Kierkegaard as explicitly 
‘reclaiming the classic realism’ of Plato and Aristotle.35 It is for this reason that Fabro detects a 
conceptual affinity between Kierkegaard and Thomas.36 Thus, Fabro claims that Kierkegaard’s 
writings rise ‘above the arid confines of the Reformation’ and offers  
                                                                                                                                              
Guardini’s essay on the origin of Kierkegaard’s thought (1927). For more, see Theodor Haecker and Alexander 
Dru, Søren Kierkegaard (London: Oxford University Press, 1937), 33, 39, 58. Haecker and Bruyn, Kierkegaard the 
Cripple, 20. Haecker, Journal, 140, 170-171. See also, Dru, 'Haecker's Point of View,' 267. Dru, 'On Haecker's 
Metaphysik Des Gefühls,' 39-41. For more on the importance of Haecker and Dru, see Heywood-Thomas and 
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31 Cornelio Fabro, Soren Kierkegaard: Opere (Firenze: Sansoni, 1972), lxi. Fabro’s first problem with Rahner is that 
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Welt,' Zeitschrift für Katholische Theologie 63 (1939), 371-379. Cf. Rowan Williams and Mike Higton, Wrestling with 
Angels : Conversations in Modern Theology (London: SCM Press, 2007), 92-93. 
 
32 Fabro, Goglia, and Fontana, Appunti, 85. 
 
33 Ibid. For more on scholastic controversies, see Leinsle, Introduction to Scholastic Theology, ch. 4. 
 
34 Fabro, Goglia, and Fontana, Appunti, 86. 
 
35 Ibid. For a more recent argument along these lines, see Rudd, Self, Value, and Narrative : A Kierkegaardian 
Approach, chs. 2 & 6. 
 
36 For more, see Fabro, 'Kierkegaard E San Tommaso,' 292-308. See also, Cornelio Fabro, 'L'esistenzialismo 
Kierkegaardiano,' in Storia Della Filosofia Vol. 2, ed. Cornelio Fabro (Roma: Colletti, 1959), 839-867. 
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to the Catholic theologian precious resources for the preparation of a phenomenology 
of theological problems, in particular those related to faith: it could therefore lead to a 
renewal of traditional theology and offer to the modern person an integral theology 
cordis et mentis.37 
Fabro writes during a time when the emergence of existentialist thought in Italy carried on 
despite Pope Pio X’s previous condemnation of modernism in Pascendi Dominici Gregis (1907). 
But Fabro seeks to uphold the fundamental principles of Thomism as well as engage the 
pressing issues of contemporary modernity in dialogue between these two worlds.  
In short, Fabro’s re-discovery of Kierkegaard and Thomas reveals four 
‘Kierkegaardian’ features of Fabro’s contribution to twentieth century Catholic theology: first, 
Fabro vindicates the religious instances of Kierkegaard’s thought;38 second, Kierkegaard 
provides Fabro with a positive alternative to materialist notions of history in Marxism;39 third, 
Fabro disassociates Kierkegaard’s theological and philosophical positions from Hegel;40 and 
finally, Fabro combines Kierkegaard’s thought with Aristotelian realism.41 
6.2.2 Uncovering Thomas  
Fabro portrays the trajectory of his lifework as recovering Thomistic metaphysics in light 
of the crisis of modern atheism and the theological import of Kierkegaard’s writings. Fabro 
identifies three emphases in his own writings in terms of two inseparable moments of 
‘breaking with’ and ‘openness toward’: 
1. A break with the Greek-Scholastic tradition that interpreted ‘being’ in two ways: upon 
the axis of ‘possible/real’ and the axis of ‘essence/existence’. And an openness toward 
Thomas’s understanding of ens as the real concrete substance composed of real 
essence and esse /actus essendi. Here Fabro advocates the primacy of the onto-
metaphysic of esse as ‘acting’ upon the ‘form’ in both a realist and idealist sense.42  
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42 Fabro’s distinction here refers to human creatures, and he explains elsewhere that for St. Thomas, ‘the real 
distinction in creatures between essence and the act of existing [atto di essere] is affirmed in the early works with a 
terminological dependence upon Avicenna (cf. In I Sent., dist. 8, q. 5, a. 1: the article summarises Avicenna, 
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2. A break with the modern subjectivism of immanence which makes consciousness the 
origin of ‘being’ and universalizes the essence of freedom. And an openness toward the 
real presence of the entity which gives itself to consciousness in the reality of nature as 
object to be verified as either true or false, and gives itself in the responsibility of the 
concrete person as subject to be judged as either right or wrong. Here Fabro advocates 
the primacy of ... [pursuing] the truth in knowing and of the good in acting.  
3. A break with the ethical empiricism of left-wing existentialism (and Marxism) that 
reduces humanity to an historical fact. And an openness toward understanding 
existentialism in terms of the emergence of the single existing individual as a person 
before God and before Christ, so that the responsibility of acting recalls the 
responsibility of thinking and one flows from the other through the “leap” of the 
decision. Here Fabro upholds the existential primacy of human freedom as the 
spiritual subject’s radical independence from the finite, which begins with freedom in 
and with itself.43 
Fabro says that this contrary movement of ‘breaking-with’ and ‘openness towards’ is an 
attempt to resist being closed within a system or reduced to a single paradigm because it 
orients his thinking toward understanding ‘being’ in service of the truth and bearing witness to 
human freedom.44  
By seeking a deeper understanding of the significance of participation for Thomas, 
Fabro says that the Thomas who emerges ‘does not yield to the prior Scholastic temptation of 
Platonizing Christianity’, nor does he fall prey to the contemporary temptation ‘of the 
Aristotelian Averroists who separate reason and faith’, rather Thomas ‘radicalises the notion 
of being (esse, actus essendi) in culmination with action’.45 The upshot of Fabro’s discovery is 
that Thomas’ grammatical enquiry finally becomes detached from ‘the rationalistic tradition 
delivered in the traditional Scholastic manuals (Roselli, Zigliara, Remer, Gredt) and from 
addressing historical, sociological, and apologetic concerns (Gilson, Maritain, Olgiati)’.46 
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Instead, the Thomas who emerges from Fabro’s work is one who ‘draws upon the culture of 
his time and signals its movements, but above all who commits himself to the generative 
inspiration of the Greek, Roman, and Patristic sources to reach a way of thinking that is 
released from unilateral qualms and capable of universal openness’.47  
So far, I have situated Fabro in his historical context by showing how he confronted 
the impoverished state of both Thomistic and Kierkegaard studies in Europe. I have indicated 
how the distinctive contribution of Fabro’s re-discovery of both Thomas and Kierkegaard 
allowed him to confront his own intellectual targets, which can be briefly summarised as: i) 
The Neo-Scholastic conception of esse [act of existing] as an empirical fact that is synonymous 
with ‘essence’, which fails to distinguish Creator from creature and lacks the metaphysical 
basis of freedom; ii) The Cartesian cogito of modern thought and its relation to radical atheism 
and Spinoza’s idealism; iii) Dialectical Materialism which negates personal responsibility and 
morality in exchange for biological determinism.48 These intellectual targets led Fabro to make 
the following commitments to: i) the development of Thomas’ metaphysical notion of 
participation between Creator and creation; the phenomenological method and the relation of 
science and philosophy; iii) the recuperation of classical and Christian realism in the 
metaphysical existentialism of Kierkegaard.49 By now, the reader must be asking herself, what 
is ‘Kierkegaardian’ about Thomism? In the next part of this chapter, I will take up this 
question in order to highlight the constructive aspects of Fabro’s work.  
6.2.3 Distinctive Features of Fabro’s Kierkegaardian Thomism  
The difference that Fabro’s reading of Thomas makes can be seen in his article 
entitled, ‘The Absolute in Thomism and Existentialism’ (1951) where he builds a bridge 
between Pope Leo XIII’s world and that of continental philosophy. Fabro identifies a tension 
in Pope Pius XII’s encyclical Humani Generis (1950), which he sees as an extension of the 
Leonine project that attempts to balance on the one hand, 
the search for the evidence of each and every object through all possible routes that 
autonomous human consciousness has at its disposal; and on the other hand, the 
foundations of faith which transcend the particular conditions of a given cultural 
                                                                                                                                              
46 Ibid. For more, see Andrea Robiglio, 'Phénoménologie Et Ontologie: Cornelio Fabro Et L’université De 
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47 Ibid. 
 
48 Goglia, Fabro: Profilo Biografico, 232-233. 
 
49 Goglia, Fabro: Profilo Biografico, 227. 
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epoch and place humanity before the meaning and goal of its destiny on earth in the 
plan of divine Providence.50 
Now, Fabro rightly says that this conflicted requirement indicates a path for theologians and 
philosophers to follow without specifying how to concretely fulfil such a task once for all. The 
warnings against philosophy in this encyclical ironically reminds Fabro of the first half of the 
13th century when it was prohibited to read Aristotle. Yet Fabro argues that it was precisely 
through the beneficial use of philosophy in theology that the Church preserved ‘the most 
substantial interpretation of Being that Greek civilization had obtained, and enabled the faith 
to amplify the horizon of human universality’.51  
Aware of the new errors that could potentially arise from a devout Catholic scholar’s 
attempt to empirically justify the foundations of faith, Fabro attempts to clarify what 
encyclicals like Pascendi Dominici Gregis (1907) and Humani Generis (1950) precisely condemn. 
Fabro identifies two explicit condemnations and two explicit invitations that characterise the 
Leonine tradition: i) a condemnation of the hypothesis of universal progress asserted by various 
forms of communism, dialectical materialism, and atheism; ii) a condemnation of historicism 
and atheistic existentialism which repudiates immutable essences in exchange for the sole 
‘existence’ of the single individual and negates the value of reasoning in metaphysical matters; 
iii) an invitation—the first of its kind in Fabro’s view—for Catholic scholars to engage 
seriously modern thought in order to discern its contemporary significance and value; iv) an 
invitation for future priests to be instructed in the methods, teachings, and principles of St. 
Thomas d’Aquino.52  
 Now, Fabro sees his own work as attempting to make good on such a requirement by 
determining the precise significance of existentialism, and studying the relationship between 
existentialism and Thomism. Fabro says that the contemporary Catholic scholar ‘can no 
longer remain indifferent to these two issues by dismissing them with general affirmations 
because contemporary philosophy has a structure of its own which includes, but is not 
reducible to any familiar schema of subjectivism, rationalism, or irrationalism’.53 After treating 
various concepts in the existential thought of Jean-Paul Sartre, Karl Jaspers, and Martin 
Heidegger,54 Fabro presents Kierkegaard to the reader as a prime candidate for building a 
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bridge between continental philosophy and Catholic theology. Fabro notes how these thinkers 
are indebted to Kierkegaard, and yet all of them suppress the theological import of his work in 
order to carry out their own projects. Alternately, Fabro identifies three aspects of 
Kierkegaard’s writings that would be attractive and beneficial to contemporary students of 
Thomas: i) a critique of idealism that defends the principle of non-contradiction which comes 
close to defending an Aristotelian notion of ‘essence’; ii) an ethical defence of individual 
human freedom which is available to all; and iii) a critique of the religious compromise of the 
Enlightenment and liberal Protestant theology.55 For Fabro, these desirable aspects stem from 
Kierkegaard’s notion of the act of existing ‘before God’ which undergirds Kierkegaard’s 
‘positive dialectic of the finite and infinite, time and eternity, freedom and grace, God and the 
individual’.56 
To close this section, I would like to note briefly the ways in which Fabro’s version of 
Thomism is influenced by Kierkegaard’s writings. For Fabro, the human intellect is 
characterised in terms of pure potentiality in respect to its object, such that human 
consciousness is ‘essentially open’ to the being of the ens. Moreover, since the object reveals 
that human consciousness is ‘being-in-the-world’, then universal and necessary first principles 
are not deduced abstractions, but rather present themselves as internal to the existential 
structures of the single existing individual. In this way, the ens returns to Being as its ground 
and activity, and yet Being is concealed in mystery and truth presents itself as the 
‘unconcealedness of being’.57 Thus, on Fabro’s reading of Thomas, ‘being can never be fully 
resolved in concepts and there is not an exhaustive concept of being’.58 Fabro distinguishes 
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Thomas from Heidegger when Fabro argues that for Thomas ‘human freedom founds itself 
on reason but does not derive from it’, and that for both Kierkegaard and Thomas ‘the act of 
faith is the supreme accomplishment of human freedom which gives itself to God, inserting 
time into eternity’.59  
 In short, what Fabro’s Thomism learns from Kierkegaard is a metaphysical sense of 
the act of human existing which preserves rather than threatens human freedom. Stated 
positively, Fabro incorporates Kierkegaard’s understanding of human existence before God to 
illuminate his earlier insight about Thomas’ picture of participation of creature in Creator, 
which David Burrell has described as a sharing in ‘God’s creative activity, so that the creature 
itself is a relation’.60 In other words, Guido Mazzotta has rightly observed that for Fabro ‘the 
participated esse of the entity [ens] radically distinguishes itself from an essence, which is 
altogether limited’; alternately, Fabro argues that ‘only the participated esse of the ens is able to 
transcendentally relate the finite and infinite’.61 
In this way, Fabro’s Thomism gains a deepened sense of the metaphysical structure of 
the finite that exists through time, such that theology does not reduce itself to accumulating 
proofs that demonstrate either the rationality of the act of faith, or the supernatural 
transcendence of that same act of faith.62 Fabro emphasises that ‘the “overcoming of 
metaphysics” does not put metaphysics completely aside’.63 Hence, Fabro claims that ‘the 
theological shape of ontology does not rest upon the fact that Greek metaphysics has been 
assumed by the ecclesiastical theology of Christianity and elaborated from this’ but rather it 
‘rests upon the way in which it has, from the beginning, uncovered the ens as ens’.64 The 
Kierkegaardian insight here has been recently stated succinctly by George Pattison: 
Kierkegaard never denies that human beings are creatures, but he does not define this 
creatureliness in terms of some ontological essence: the human being is not an 
individual substance of a rational essence but a being in dynamic and temporally 
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charged ecstatic and open dependence on God and this dependence first becomes 
actual in the individual’s concern for the good. It is neither solely nor primarily in 
terms of our ontological status but in terms of our hyper-ontological freedom ... that 
we become capax dei, open to the possibility of the God-relationship.65  
Although Pattison moves to relate this Kierkegaardian stance to Rahner, it is actually Fabro 
that fleshes this position out more explicitly. So far, I have shown how Fabro incorporates 
some of Kierkegaard’s insights in his version of Thomism, but what is it about Kierkegaard’s 
writings that lends itself to such appropriation? 
6.2.4 Summary 
  In the first part of this chapter, I focused on how Fabro brings both Thomas and 
Kierkegaard together making a genuine contribution to Thomism in the twentieth century. In 
this second part, I want to turn the question around by exploring what aspects Fabro sees in 
Kierkegaard’s writings that reveal a distinctive Catholic sensibility. It has long been suggested 
by some Catholic readers of Kierkegaard that had he lived longer, he would have become a 
Roman Catholic. Fabro takes this suggestion as a humorous joke; and instead of speculating 
about Kierkegaard himself, Fabro takes very seriously the intelligibility of the joke by 
interrogating a Catholic sensibility in Kierkegaard’s writings.66 To support this claim, I will 
spend the rest of this chapter looking at three brief examples of Fabro’s emphasis on 
Kierkegaard’s theological anthropology, Mariology, and ecclesiology. 
6.3 Natural desire for God as human freedom 
 Fabro tends to speak of humanity’s natural desire for God in terms of human 
freedom. In his lectures on ‘the theological self’ at the University of Perugia, Fabro channels 
the opening passage of Kierkegaard’s The Sickness unto Death: 
Only the person that relates to the Absolute and bends back upon herself to listen to 
herself (in the ultimate sense of life and death) is able to understand the basis of 
freedom, which grounds the capacity to choose, as at once the extremely fragile and 
forceful tension: the fragility comes from the relation to the finite, and the force from 
the relation to the infinite. Only at this level is freedom of conscience justified and 
grounded for Kierkegaard, the freedom of faith. In fact, humanity is free in so far as it 
is spirit. But what is spirit? The spirit is the self. And the self, what is that? It is a 
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relationship that relates to itself, or it is, in the relating, the relating to itself that the 
relationship relates to itself; the self is not the relation, but the relating itself to itself.67  
As I mentioned in an earlier chapter, de Lubac focuses on this same passage from Kierkegaard 
in order to flesh out his understanding of the natural desire for God. It is pertinent that Fabro 
does so as well, but extends this argument further into the realm of human freedom as that 
which manifests our natural desire for God. Indeed, for Fabro  
Freedom is the basis for truth, and in this, in the choice and decision of one’s own 
purpose [proprio scopo] and in the qualification of one’s own being [proprio essere], there is 
no difference between human freedom and that of God. For this reason, in the 
annunciation to Mary, God waited to hear her response ... But Mary also waited to 
respond, in order to respond as she should with the freedom that is ordered toward 
the good ... Since freedom is, and can only be, the primordial origin by which the 
infinite issues itself in living and knowing, it is the inexhaustible source that nourishes 
the disquiet and unquenchable yearning of love and it is the extreme longing, by which 
freedom identifies itself, the arrival far beyond the river of time.68  
Here Fabro latches on to human freedom, which is one of the key themes in Kierkegaard’s 
theological anthropology, and connects it with the human desire for love.69 Significantly, 
Fabro illustrates this point with the first disciple of Jesus: Mary, his mother. For Fabro, this is 
not a passing illustration that grafts a Catholic sensibility on to Kierkegaard’s writings. On the 
contrary, Fabro draws this illustration from Kierkegaard. For those who read Kierkegaard 
through Karl Barth, it may be alarming that a ‘hyper-protestant’ like Kierkegaard would have 
anything good to say about the veneration of the Virgin Mary and the Saints.70 But here is 
another distinctive contribution that Fabro makes, to which I will now turn. 
6.4 The Virgin Mary and all the Saints 
Tucked away in the appendix of Walter Lowrie’s translation of Kierkegaard’s Fear and 
Trembling, Lowrie observes that ‘It would be interesting and edifying to make an anthology of 
the passages in which Søren Kierkegaard speaks of the Blessed Virgin’, because, Lowrie 
continues, ‘surely no Protestant was ever so much engrossed in this theme, and perhaps no 
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Catholic has appreciated more profoundly the unique position of Mary’.71 Now, much has 
been written on Kierkegaard’s theology of the Incarnation,72 but Fabro’s scholarship directly 
responds to Lowrie’s clarion call for Italian Catholics to reinvigorate the Catholic world with 
Kierkegaard’s thought.73 So, the distinctive theological feature that Fabro identifies in his 
reading of Kierkegaard is not just the Incarnation, but also the Annunciation. Fabro says that 
the Gospel writer portrays the Virgin Mary as receiving ‘a request from Above that was both a 
consensus but also a supreme risk of freedom for both of them, as the Christian tradition has 
clearly seen, and which has found a profound echo again in Kierkegaard’, whom Fabro calls, 
‘the poet and theologian of the Annunciation’.74 For Fabro, Kierkegaard writes in the stance 
of expectancy, which, after Mary’s ‘Yes’, becomes a constitutive feature of Christian 
discipleship.75 Fabro’s observation here is valid today in Kierkegaard studies, as the prominent 
place of Mary continues to be overlooked.76 
In response to Lowrie’s request, Fabro catalogues how Kierkegaard constantly refers 
to Mary in his Journals as ‘full of Grace’, ‘the pure Virgin’, the ‘faithful Virgin’, the ‘Madonna’, 
and the ‘Mother of God’.77 Yet it is not just the use of the Catholic titles that Fabro is 
interested in, but rather Fabro observes how Kierkegaard focuses on the ‘existential situation’ 
of ‘the divine maternity of Mary’.78 For instance in Fear and Trembling, Kierkegaard’s fictive 
author Johannes de Silentio contrasts the distinctive faith of Abraham and Mary against the 
tragic sacrifices for the nation by Agamemnon and Jephthah (FT 58). 
‘Who was as great in the world as that favoured woman, the mother of God, the 
Virgin Mary? ... To be sure, Mary bore the child wondrously, but she nevertheless did 
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it “after the manner of women” [Gen 18:11 KJV], and such a time is one of anxiety, 
distress, and paradox. The angel was indeed a ministering spirit, but he was not a 
meddlesome spirit who went to other young maidens in Israel and said: Do not scorn 
Mary, the extraordinary is happening to her. The angel went only to Mary, and no one 
could understand her ... When, despite this, she said: Behold, I am the handmaid of 
the Lord—then she is great, and I believe it should not be difficult to explain why she 
became the mother of God. She needs worldly admiration as little as Abraham needs 
tears, for she was no heroine and he was no hero, but both of them became greater 
than these, not by being exempted in any way from the distress and the agony and the 
paradox, but became greater by means of these’ (FT 64-65). 
Commenting on de Silentio’s comparison between the existential situation of the maternal 
faith of Abraham and Mary, Stephen Mulhall wonders whether Abraham’s  
title ‘father of faith’ has a less honorific and more productive (or rather, reproductive) 
sense—that to call him a father of faith means not so much that he is exemplary of 
faith as that true faith is something that he fathered, something represented not so 
much in him as in his offspring (both immediate and ultimate)?79  
Later, Mulhall says that the upshot of de Silentio’s comparison is that Abraham’s ‘fatherhood 
is dependent upon another’s acceptance of motherhood’, which confirms Kierkegaard’s earlier 
point in the book that ‘the maturity of faith is reached in identification with femaleness rather 
than maleness’.80 Fabro is alive to this theological point and says that by holding Mount 
Moriah and the Annunciation together, Kierkegaard presents his reader with ‘two decisive 
points in the story of humanity that indicate the extreme limit of dedication to which the 
creature, supported by Grace, may never traverse’.81 Fabro concludes that for Kierkegaard, 
Mary is  
the “prototype” of the “Extraordinary”, and her fiat, which the same God awaits for 
the fulfilment of the Incarnation and salvation of humanity, is a completely voluntary 
and free fiat in the acceptance of divine maternity, that makes Mary the model for 
every Christian in the acceptance of the divine will. With this, Kierkegaard renounces 
and denounces the central nucleus of the Protestant theology of grace and accepts, 
perhaps inadvertently, the essence of the Catholic doctrine of the imitation of Christ.82  
Fabro’s point here is borne out in a passage in Kierkegaard’s Book on Adler: 
Let us mention the highest instance, from which we believers ought to learn. When 
the angel had announced to Mary that by the Spirit she should give birth to a child - 
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no, this whole thing was a miracle, why then did this child need nine months like other 
children? O what a test for faith and humility! That this is the divine will, to need the 
slowness of time! Behold, this was the cross. But Mary was the humble believer; by 
faith and humility she came to herself, although everything was miraculous. She 
remained the same quiet, humble woman - she believed.83 
And again, Fabro points to Kierkegaard’s emphasis upon Mary as the one who enables the 
believer to hear the Word of God, which read in a Lutheran context seems odd.  
That a woman is presented as a teacher, as a prototype of piety, cannot amaze anyone 
who knows that piety or godliness is fundamentally womanliness ... From a woman, 
therefore, you also learn the humble faith in relation to the extraordinary, the humble 
faith that does not incredulously, doubtingly ask, “Why? What for? How is this 
possible?”—but as Mary humbly believes and says, “Behold, I am the handmaid of the 
Lord” [Lk 1:38]. She says this, but note that to say this is actually to be silent. From a 
woman you learn the proper hearing of the Word, from Mary, who although she “did 
not understand the words that were spoken” yet “kept them in her heart” [Lk 2:19]. 
Thus she did not first demand to understand, but silent she hid the word in the right 
place, since it is, of course, the right place when the Word, the good seed, “is kept in a 
devout and beautiful heart” [Lk 8:15]. From a woman you learn the quiet, deep, God-
fearing sorrow that is silent before God, from Mary; it indeed happened, as was 
prophesied, that a sword did pierce her heart [Lk 2:35], but she did not despair—either 
over the prophesy or when it was fulfilled.84 
It is important that in Kierkegaard’s works, both Mary and Abraham here, and Adam—in The 
Concept of Anxiety85—do not understand the words spoken to them, but must act in faith; 
surrendering, rather than demanding understanding. Kierkegaard’s emphasis upon silence is 
often misunderstood, and it is important to be clear that by silence he implies non-
communication rather than unintelligibility. Jamie Ferreira says that Abraham’s faith is ‘not 
found in a negative distancing from actuality, from the finite world. Faith is not a matter of 
other-worldliness; it is not acosmic, but rather receives the world back again once one has 
been willing to give it up’.86 Moreover, as Stephen Mulhall says, for Kierkegaard  
faith’s ability to establish and maintain itself in human existence does depend upon its 
capacity to make itself manifest in discourse—in sacred texts, in rituals, in communal 
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memory ... [which is] like a maternal function, a matter of incarnating the father’s spirit 
or better nature in words (incarnating the Word?). In this sense, there can be no 
ultimate discontinuity or alienation between faith and language, and so no essential 
hiddenness in Abraham.87 
It is this aspect of the interaction of human and divine freedom that Fabro draws upon in 
Kierkegaard’s work in order to illuminate Thomas: because in both Thomas and Kierkegaard, 
‘the freedom of acting is the moment of decision towards the Absolute and for the Absolute’.88 On the 
face of it, faith is indistinguishable from Socratic ignorance: the means by which the wise 
person sets out to disprove the oracle’s decree.89 And it is precisely this concrete example of 
humility that Kierkegaard is after in his attempt to help his readers understand what it means 
to imitate Christ. Kierkegaard knows that his reader needs such concrete examples, and this is 
why he turns to not only Mary, but also to the saints for moral guidance on how to lead one’s 
own life as a Christian. 
Fabro says that he is drawn to the ‘Socrates of the North’ because Kierkegaard’s own 
library betrayed the fact that ‘Kierkegaard was nourished by reading Fathers of the Church’ 
such as the writings of St. Athanasius, Johannes Tauler, St. Alphonsus Maria de Liguori, St. 
Teresa, St. Alphonsus Rodriguez, and the oratory of Abraham a Sancta Clara.90 For Fabro, 
Kierkegaard’s critique of modern philosophy is iconoclastic since these philosophers want ‘to 
preserve a god that is no longer God’, and in turn, Fabro says that Kierkegaard’s critique of a 
modern theology follows in the same vein because of its tendency ‘to preserve a Christianity 
which is not really Christianity but something more mundane, something that is no longer for 
human beings the Absolute of existence’.91 Kierkegaard’s critique of modern philosophy and 
theology led Fabro to compare Kierkegaard’s writings with those of John Henry Newman. 
The British historian, Bernard Reardon says that Newman is ‘the outstanding religious figure 
of his century, with the sole exception of Kierkegaard, a man of whom he himself had 
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probably never heard’.92 To see how and why Fabro held these seemingly disparate figures 
together, we must now turn to the ecclesiology of Newman and Kierkegaard. 
6.5 The Ecclesiology of Newman and Kierkegaard 
After the Second Vatican Council, Fabro saw some of his fellow theologians (like 
Hans Küng and Karl Rahner) falling prey to a non-explicit faith that Fabro understood as 
inadvertently endorsing the dissolution of dogmatic faith and the elimination of the Church.93 
In his 1976 article, ‘The Problem of the Church in Newman and Kierkegaard’, Fabro argues 
that the problem facing the Catholic Church is not a rejection of this or that particular dogma, 
but rather the overcoming of the need for faith itself.94 Thus, Fabro draws on the shared 
commitments of Søren Kierkegaard and John Henry Newman in order to find the resources 
necessary to confront what he sees as the secularising tendencies at work in post-conciliar 
Catholic theology.  
However, comparing Newman and Kierkegaard may seem counter-intuitive: since 
Newman was eventually received into Roman Catholicism and Kierkegaard remained outside 
the Church as a critic. Yet, Fabro describes their resemblance in terms of their shared critique 
of the established Church as perpetuating the process of secularisation, which he sees 
extending into late 20th century post-conciliar theology through the writings of Hegel and 
Heidegger. In doing so, Fabro seeks to recover Newman and Kierkegaard’s emphasis upon 
the Church Militant—that is, the Church that struggles against sin and the principalities and 
powers on earth, as opposed to the Church triumphant in heaven. Although Fabro uses this 
medieval terminology to make sense of the ecclesiology of Newman and Kierkegaard, the 
term can be better understood by what Lumen Gentium describes as the ‘pilgrim people of 
God’.95 
Now, Fabro characterises Newman’s response to secularisation with Pascal’s 
existential dilemma: either atheism or the Roman Catholic Church.96 Moreover, Fabro says 
that for Newman, both the existence of God and the unity of the spiritual life are connected 
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in an existential commitment.97 This is evident in the opening of Newman’s book on the 
Church Fathers: 
The Church is ever militant; sometimes she gains, sometimes she loses; and more 
often she is at once gaining and losing in different parts of her territory. What is 
ecclesiastical history but a record of the ever-doubtful fortune of the battle, though its 
issue is not doubtful? Scarcely are we singing Te Deum, when we have to turn to our 
Misereres: scarcely are we in peace, when we are in persecution: scarcely have we gained 
a triumph, when we are visited by a scandal. Nay, we make progress by means of 
reverses; our griefs are our consolations; we lose Stephen, to gain Paul, and Matthias 
replaces the traitor Judas.98  
Here Newman offers us an understanding of the Church militant as moonlit—sometimes in 
full view, other times not visible.99 Newman wants to emphasise that this sporadic appearing 
represents failures to be what the Church claims to be in this world, which is always about 
anticipatory living out of what is already but not fully yet. What Newman offers the 
contemporary Church is a view of Christian existence in the modes of appearing, showing, 
discerning, witnessing to that which is real. Thomas J. Norris sums up Newman’s position in this 
way:  
Faith is by its very constitution an effect of God speaking and communicating: it is not 
primarily the result of our own thinking: “we do not see, we cannot prove”. Faith, in 
other words, is not immanently generated knowledge, truth gained “by sight or by 
reason”. Faith rather is knowledge generated in believers by the action of grace and 
the gift of the Holy Spirit. Faith has two qualities or “peculiarities: it is most certain, 
decided, positive, immovable in its assent; and it gives this assent not because it sees 
with eye, or sees with the reason, but because it receives the tidings from one who 
comes from God” ... The key question in the ancient Church, as in all subsequent 
centuries, was, has God spoken? And if he has spoken, who are the appointed hearers 
of his Word, his spokespersons? That means that the Apostles “were nothing in them-
selves, [but] they were all things, they were an infallible authority, as coming from 
God’.100 
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In support of this view, Fabro points to the back story of Newman’s conversion in 
Apologia Pro Vita Sua101 and his letter to the Duke of Norfolk in defence of papal infallibility as 
two indications of Newman’s ecclesiological commitment to remain inside the Church. Based 
on these texts, Fabro mentions three fundamental principles that Newman upheld: 1) The 
primacy of Revelation and Dogma against construing faith as weak reason or prejudice; 2) An 
emphasis on the Church militant with its sacraments and rites as conduits of grace; 3) A 
Critique of the established Church through a retrieval of the faith of the Fathers.102 For John 
Macquarrie, the parallel between Kierkegaard and Newman can best be seen in their writings 
on the problem of ‘faith and reason and defending the autonomy of faith against the 
encroachments of those rationalists who claimed an omni-competence for reason’.103 Likewise, 
Fabro portrays Kierkegaard’s response to the elimination of the Church as a dilemma between 
‘either the Church militant or paganism’, which is not entirely unrelated to Fabro’s portrayal of 
Newman’s dilemma of ‘either Roman Catholicism or atheism’.  
However, George Pattison has recently framed the shared theological question between 
Kierkegaard (in Philosophical Fragments) and Newman (in University Sermons) as primarily 
‘Christological: how might human beings living under the sway of sin come to recognize and 
receive the revelation of a sinless human life in Christ?’. Only subsequently does their question 
become ecclesiological: ‘how might that revelation be communicated to others by those who 
first received it?’.104 To answer the ecclesiological question, both Kierkegaard and Newman 
point to the concrete moral example of the martyrs—the witnesses to the Truth—as the 
means of transmission.105 Yet, the answer to the Christological question is inferred from the 
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ecclesiological problem for Newman, but for Kierkegaard, the original transmission of faith to 
the saints cannot be wholly self-evident, that is, ‘derived from a purely empirical or a posteriori 
knowledge of the Church’s history’. Pattison says that for Kierkegaard, ‘the individual’s 
relation to the revelation of God in Jesus Christ must have a basis other than the mere fact of 
participation in the life of the Church’.106  
Now, this is not to say that Kierkegaard lacks or even shuns sacramental theology—a 
cursory reading of his Communion Discourses would dispel such a hasty conclusion. Rather, 
returning to Fabro’s interpretation, Kierkegaard emphasises the Church Militant, rather than 
the Church Triumphant. In other words, Kierkegaard anticipates the view stated in Lumen 
Gentium: ‘the life of the Church is hidden with Christ in God until it appears in glory with its 
Spouse’ (n.49). It is this hiddenness of the Church in Christ that prevents Kierkegaard from 
prematurely privileging Newman’s claim of historical continuity. The theological upshot of 
Kierkegaard’s epistemic humility is not to approach life in resentment, but gratitude. Or to 
say, with George Pattison, since ‘there can be no inerrant historical transmission of 
Christianity that acquires its validity from anything other than the commitment of each 
individual Christian’, then we must, ‘receiv[e] our lives—as do the lilies and the birds—direct 
from God’s hand as a good and perfect gift, a gift of love’.107 Although some may construe 
this divergence between Newman and Kierkegaard as irreconcilable, Fabro attempts to show 
how it can be construed as a difference in emphasis. 
In this light, Fabro observes that both Kierkegaard and Newman level their critique of 
Christendom from the standpoint of the Church militant as described in the New Testament 
(for Kierkegaard) and Tradition (for Newman).108 Rather, Fabro points to Practice in Christianity, 
where Kierkegaard’s fictive author, Anti-Climacus opposes the State to the Church to say that 
the Church militant is not the Church triumphant.109 Moreover, Kierkegaard says that since 
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Christ is the way, the truth, and the life (Jn 14:6), this implies that ‘the truth does not naturally 
consist in knowing the truth, but in being the truth’ which is not ‘a product or result of 
history’.110 So even though Pilate can claim historical continuity with Christ, even to physically 
see Christ, but despite being in full possession of historical continuity, Pilate still fails to directly 
recognise the truth (PC 214). For Anti-Climacus, truth is not a result that is already achieved like 
the invention of gun powder—with a predecessor who spends twenty years inventing it and a 
successor that spends much less time improving that invention. Rather for Anti-Climacus, 
truth is the way:  
only the person who has travelled the way can triumphally celebrate; but he is no longer in 
this world, he is now on high, as Christ was indeed also the way when he ascended to 
heaven ... [so] a Church triumphant in this world is an illusion, that in this world we can 
truthfully speak only of a militant Church. But the Church militant is related, feels itself 
drawn, to Christ in lowliness ... [thus] a Church triumphant is always understood [as] a 
Church that wants to be the Church triumphant here in this world. (PC 209) 
Anti-Climacus does not jettison the theological category of the Church triumphant all 
together, but rather places it in its proper context, saying ‘a Church triumphant in eternity is 
entirely in order, corresponding to Christ’s being raised on high’ (PC 209). The problem for 
Anti-Climacus is that once it is established that truth is a result that has already been achieved, 
then i) faith becomes a mode of social morality, and ii) everyone is already a Christian by 
virtue of being human, hence the struggle is over and we can all carry on with the next novelty 
as a matter of course. Anti-Climacus’ problem is that this triumphalistic attitude actually 
undermines Christianity in particular and religious faith in general: ‘In the Church militant, it 
was piety to confess Christianity; in established Christendom, it is piety to conceal it’ (PC 217). 
Now Fabro detects here a ‘a very precise Catholic demand for the Church’ as described in 
the New Testament, which is that the Church militant empowers the single existing individual 
to imitate Christ in the world.111 Fabro also says that Kierkegaard’s ‘rupture with established 
Christendom’ is not provoked by Kierkegaard’s despair, but rather an acute critical gesture 
that is bound up with his understanding of the Church militant as the Church of the martyrs 
who bore witness to Christ.112 By comparing Newman and Kierkegaard, Fabro overturns one 
of the more prevalent misconceptions of Kierkegaard which has deterred Catholic theologians 
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from serious engagement—that is, his negative view of the Church.113 However, Fabro’s claim 
is that both Newman and Kierkegaard are ‘without a doubt prophetic thinkers for us today’ 
who both offer a critique of Christendom that should be read in light of ‘the continuity of 
thought and life between the contemporary Church and the ancient Church’.114  
After Henri de Lubac opened up the possibility of a critical and theological engagement 
with modern atheism in Drama of Atheist Humanism (1944)—an approach that Pope Pius XII 
subsequently condemned in Humani Generis (1950)—Fabro’s work brings the much needed 
proficiency with the history of atheism to re-frame the terms of debate for Catholic 
engagement with the contemporary world. In 1959, Fabro’s work on atheism led him to 
establish the European Institute of the History of Atheism at the Pontifical Urbaniana 
University. Fabro’s God in Exile (1968)115 began as a set of lectures that Fabro gave as a visiting 
professor at Notre Dame University from February to May in 1965.116 Rosa Goglia says that 
Fabro had about 30-40 students signed up for his class entitled, ‘Principles of Immanence and 
the Genesis of Atheism’.117 God in Exile is an updated translation of Fabro’s earlier two-
volume work, Introduzione all’ateismo moderno (1964)118 and represents over a decade of his 
engagement with figures like Marx, Feuerbach, Hegel, and Heidegger.  
Fabro’s massive tome comprises of over 1200 pages and is divided into nine parts. The 
English subtitle aptly depicts the central thread of Fabro’s book: A Study of the Internal 
Dynamic of Modern Atheism from Its Roots in the Cartesian Cogito to the Present Day. 
Fabro’s argument is that the Cartesian cogito is the seed that contains and yet evolves into 
modern atheism. Although this claim is anachronistic in respect to the faith of Descartes 
himself, what Fabro latches on to here is how the quest for certainty after Descartes divides 
the mind from the world in terms of inner and outer, bracketing the creative activity of God 
                                                
113 Fabro, 'Newman E Kierkegaard,' 120-139. Although Fabro is not mentioned in recent Kierkegaard 
scholarship, his insightful comparison has been corroborated, see Ferreira, 'Leaps and Circles: Kierkegaard and 
Newman on Faith and Reason,' 379-397. 
 
114 Fabro, 'Newman E Kierkegaard,' 133. In fact, as George Pattison has shown, although he was not technically 
a reformer himself, ‘Kierkegaard’s “attack on Christendom” would become central to twentieth-century 
theological debates about the nature of the Church and its relation to society and, especially, to modern society’, 
see Pattison, Kierkegaard and the Theology of the Nineteenth Century, 199. 
115 Fabro, God in Exile: Modern Atheism. For more on Fabro’s American reception, see my chapter entitled ‘God in 
Exile in the USA’ in Fabro e Brentano, ed. Antonio Russo (Roma: Studium, 2014) pp. 245-252. 
116 Fabro, Goglia, and Fontana, Appunti, 75. n. 67. 
 
117 Goglia, Fabro: Profilo Biografico, 131. 
118 Cornelio Fabro, Introduzione All'ateismo Moderno (Roma: Editrice Studium, 1964). For more on this text, see 
Robiglio, 'Aspetti Di Introduzione All'ateismo Moderno Di Cornelio Fabro,' 139-164. See also, Robiglio, ' La Logica 
Dell'ateismo: Il Principio Di Non Contraddizione Secondo C. Fabro,' 120-143. 
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by focusing instead on the productivity of human rationality. In Fabro’s own words, he says 
that the ‘chief aim of this volume is to chart the main thrust of the void gouged by the 
Cartesian cogito insofar as it has driven man to that blank despair’.119  
Fabro arrives at ‘the inner nucleus of modern atheism’ by first defining the phenomenon, 
and then showing how it came to be by charting important philosophical controversies in a 
tour de force: examining the work of figures like Descartes and Spinoza, to Hobbes, Locke and 
Berkeley, up to d’Holbach, Lessing, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Feuerbach Engels, Marx and 
Lenin, to Bradley and Dewey, on into Nietzsche, Jaspers, and Heidegger, to the dialectical 
theologies of Barth, Bultmann, Tillich, and Bonhoeffer, to the radical theologies of Robinson 
and Altizer. At the end of each part of the book, the translator Arthur Gibson has attached 
some of Fabro’s clippings in the form of appendices. Gibson also provides a helpful 
introduction that summarizes the book, which helps orient the reader. It is worth noting that 
against the claim of ‘death of god’ theologians, Fabro says that  
Kierkegaard does indeed stand at the antipodes of the latest Protestant theologizing of 
the Altizer sort, the theology that that desists from any critique of modern atheism and 
indeed claims to start from it … Kierkegaard does categorically reject the “death of 
God” and he refutes the negative conclusions of Hegel and Feuerbach; and this not 
only [stems] from theological motives [but also] because of his own deep religious 
aspiration.120 
In some respects, Fabro’s genealogy of atheism stands unrivalled until its argument was 
further nuanced by Michael J Buckley’s At the Origins of Modern Atheism (1987),121 or Charles 
Taylor’s Sources of the Self (1989).122 Indeed, prior to Taylor’s monumental work, it would be 
difficult to find in the English speaking world a more resourceful compendium of the history 
of modern atheism, than Fabro’s God in Exile (1968). For it was Fabro’s staunch resistance to 
Neo-Scholasticism and its rationalistic orientation123 that led him to encounter Kierkegaard 
and incorporate Kierkegaard’s critique of modern philosophy into his own thinking as a way 
of overturning ‘the dominate interpretation of the Scholastic and Neo-Scholastic tradition 
which portrayed Aquinas as an Aristotelian’.124 Although Fabro is not associated with the 
                                                
119 Fabro, God in Exile, xli. 
 
120 Fabro, God in Exile, 1040-1041. 
121 Michael J. Buckley, At the Origins of Modern Atheism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987). 
122 Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self : The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1989). 
 
123 Fabro, Goglia, and Fontana, Appunti, 29. In fact, Elvio Fontana calls for a study to be done just on this topic 
alone in his essay ‘Fabro e il Neotomismo Italiano alla Soglia del Concilio’ in Giampietro De Paoli, ed., Cornelio 
Fabro E Il Neotomismo Italiano Dopo Il Concilio (Roma: Bibliotheca Edizioni, 2011), 107-135. 
 
124 Fabro, Goglia, and Fontana, Appunti, 32. 
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ressourcement movement in pre-conciliar theology, there is enough evidence to include Fabro in 
this renewal movement, indeed furnishing the groundwork for some of its central insights.  
6.6 Concluding Remarks 125  
Secular/radical theologians have often laid claim to extending Kierkegaard’s work in 
pronouncing the death of God,126 but this is a common misreading of Kierkegaard asserts that 
his critique of Christendom implies an anti-ecclesiology.127 But Fabro seeks to correct this 
misunderstanding by saying:  
The Kierkegaardian principle simply says that in order to be a Christian, it is not 
enough to accept a creed from a church in which one is baptised as a member. To be 
saved, one needs to live in the every day reality of this faith because Christianity is not 
a doctrine but a communication of existence that must separate us from collusion with 
the aspirations of worldly gain: career, wealth, pleasure, prestige. It is this that 
constitutes in concreto the Imitation of Jesus Christ. Through this principle, the Church 
has its basis for Kierkegaard, and explains his polemic against the situation of the State 
Church.128 
Fabro reminds us that one cannot be a second generation Kierkegaardian because one cannot 
perform the critical abseil without depending upon the structure which one criticises. Hence 
for all of his critical remarks, Kierkegaard presupposes, indeed loves the Church. So, 
Kierkegaard’s criticism of the Church is best understood as finding fault with the Church for 
not being what it really should be, and claims to be. By declaring this in terms of the Church 
being absent, Kierkegaard thereby reinforces the underlying assumption that the Church is 
being what it is not and not being what it is. Thus, Kierkegaard’s problem with the Church is 
disappointment not disbelief; he believes too much not too little.  
 In the face of the contemporary crisis of faith, Fabro puts Kierkegaard before us 
because Fabro values how Kierkegaard, albeit as some kind of Lutheran, still possesses a 
strangely Catholic sense of the Church—in terms of its structure, performance, sociality, and 
sacraments.129 Indeed, Fabro turns to Kierkegaard’s writings in order to break-up an overly 
                                                
125 I am gratefully indebted to Paul Murray and Philip Ziegler for the following remarks on an earlier version of 
this paper. 
 
126 For a critique of secular theologians’ appropriation of Kierkegaard, see Pattison, Kierkegaard and the Theology of 
the Nineteenth Century, 202-213. See also, George Pattison, 'From Kierkegaard to Cupitt: Subjectivity, the Body and 
Eternal Life,' The Heythrop Journal 31, no. 3 (1990), 295-308. 
 
127 For an endorsement of reading Kierkegaard’s writings as anti-ecclesiology, see David R. Law, 'Kierkegaard's 
Anti-Ecclesiology: The Attack on ‘Christendom’, 1854–1855,' International journal for the Study of the Christian Church 
7, no. 2 (2007), 86-108. 
 
128 Fabro, 'Newman E Kierkegaard,' 128. 
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secure notion of ecclesial presence, and Fabro turns to Newman as one who had embraced 
the church, but who gets his view of the Church from his wrestling with being an Anglican—a 
view of the church that Catholicism typically finds difficult to sustain as fluidity cools into 
solidity of structure and category. With both Kierkegaard and Newman, Fabro is resourcing 
Catholicism not simply with its own internal resources—as most of the other ressourcement 
theologians tended to do—but instead, Fabro resources Catholicism with the broader 
catholicity of the Christian tradition that had been lost to view. In this light, Fabro is a fellow 
traveller with someone like Yves Congar, but because Congar read Kierkegaard too closely to 
Luther, Congar failed to see the resemblance between Kierkegaard and Newman.130 In the 
end, Fabro’s comparison between Kierkegaard and Newman highlights the need for reform 
and renewal in light of the Catholic tendency to think in terms of stable structures of grace 
which can be seen to under-emphasise human action and needs to be rejuvenated by an 
emphasis on grace as a continually renewed act.131  
In this chapter, I have shown the distinctive contribution that Fabro offers not only to 
Thomist studies, but also to Kierkegaard studies. To do this, I have shown what Fabro learns 
from Kierkegaard and the Catholic sensibility Fabro identifies in Kierkegaard’s writings. My 
study of Fabro here has not been an exhaustive attempt, but rather a representative one that 
shores up for the English-speaking world the originality of Fabro’s approach. As a result, my 
hope is that readers engaged in Catholic studies and Kierkegaard studies would turn to Fabro’s 
work in order to further flesh out a mutual exchange that benefits both disciplines. To 
accomplish this, more of Fabro’s writings must be translated into English. But this task must 
be left for another day. For now, it has been my claim that Kierkegaard was just as influential 
for Fabro as Thomas, and this was not merely circumstantial, but necessary to the ongoing 
development of Catholic theology and Kierkegaard studies. Jamie Ferreira has it right when 
she concludes that  
An appreciation of the significance of Kierkegaard’s writings will, therefore, have to 
include his reception by very different kinds of audiences ... much of the lasting impact 
of Kierkegaard’s writings will be on readers who find in these writings something that 
resonates with them, that provokes them in profound ways, that awakens them to 
something of value in themselves, and helps them revision and cope with their lives.132 
                                                                                                                                              
129 For more on where Kierkegaard gets this Catholic sensibility, see Barnett, Kierkegaard, Pietism and Holiness. See 
also, Stewart, Kierkegaard and the Patristic and Medieval Traditions. Also, Fabro, 'Spunti Cattolici,' 251-280. 
130 Congar, 'Actualité,' 9-36. See also, Congar, 'Notes Bibliographiques: Kierkegaard Et Luther,' 712-717. See also, 
Paul D. Murray, ‘Expanding Catholicity through Ecumenicity in the Work of Yves Congar’ in Flynn and Murray, 
Ressourcement : A Movement for Renewal in Twentieth-Century Catholic Theology, 457-481. 
 
131 For more, see Paul D. Murray, 'St. Paul and Ecumenism: Justification and All That,' New Blackfriars 91, no. 
1032 (2010), 142-170.  
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What is of importance in Kierkegaard must be appropriated anew,  
but in a strict critique that grows out of our own situation.  
Blind appropriation is the greatest seduction ...  
Not everyone who talks of ‘existence’ has to be a Kierkegaardian.  
My approaches have already been misinterpreted in this way. 
 
- Martin Heidegger 1 
 
Conclusion 
This thesis was written during the 200th anniversary of Søren Kierkegaard’s birth and 
the 50th anniversary of the Second Vatican Council. Both celebrations gathered together a 
global community of scholars, which are convinced not merely of the historical significance of 
their reason for celebrating, but both communities are convinced that this historical 
significance has an enduring relevance today. I have tried to inhabit that celebratory mood 
throughout this thesis, but I have refused to let each party carry on without the other. Instead, 
my thesis sought to bring these two disparate celebrations closer together.  
This thesis was borne out of my frustration with the preconception that Kierkegaard 
studies and Catholic studies have little in common, are even antithetical to one another. To 
demonstrate that this preconception is actually a misconception, I set out to show how these 
two disparate disciplines have an unacknowledged historical and conceptual indebtedness to 
each other, which could be mutually edifying if that relationship were constructively explored, 
articulated, and celebrated. My claim in this thesis is that Kierkegaard’s writings have 
stimulated reform and renewal in twentieth century Catholic theology.  
Rather than taking my claim as merely an historical observation, I would like to 
sharpen it further by saying that the enduring relevance of Kierkegaard’s writings should continue 
to stimulate reform and renewal in contemporary Catholic theology. But in order to make good 
on my claim, two proposals must be issued in the form of a conclusion: i) those contemporary 
Catholic theologians that see themselves as doing theology in the wake of ressourcement 
theologians should read Kierkegaard; and ii) Kierkegaard’s writings should no longer be 
assumed to undermine the Catholic faith, but rather be seen as an indispensable dialogue 
partner for investigating and articulating that faith today.  
Expanding Ressourcement 
Neglecting the twentieth century Catholic reception of Kierkegaard leads to some 
negative consequences. First and foremost, overlooking Kierkegaard’s reception in Catholic 
                                                
1 In a letter to Karl Löwith dated 13 September 1920, as cited in Martin Heidegger, Theodore J. Kisiel, and 
Thomas Sheehan, Becoming Heidegger : On the Trail of His Early Occasional Writings, 1910-1927 (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 2007), 98. 
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theology is symptomatic of restricting the available resources of Catholic theologians to only 
those figures from the fourteenth century and earlier. This negative consequence is borne out 
in several contemporary accounts of ressourcement theology, which restrict its focus in just this 
way. For instance, Jürgen Mettepenningen describes nouvelle théologie as a ‘return to the 
thirteenth-century Thomas Aquinas’ that ‘served as the preparatory step and permanent 
support in a return to the sources of the faith’.2 Hans Boersma describes the primary task of 
nouvelle théologie as ‘taking seriously Christianity’s encounter with Platonism’ in order ‘to recover 
the church fathers, particularly the Eastern theologians, well known for their Platonist-
Christian proclivities’.3 Even John Milbank says of nouvelle théologie that the ‘initial aim was 
ressourcement—a recovery of the riches of Christian tradition, especially prior to 1300’.4 Finally, 
Charles Taylor says that ressourcement is primarily ‘a return to the Patristic sources, particularly 
the Greek fathers’.5 Although these descriptions rightly highlight the recovery of the patristic 
material, it only tells part of the story. Indeed, Catholic engagement with Kierkegaard reveals 
that there were contemporary resources available to Catholic theologians which allowed them 
to resist the undesireable effects of the Enlightenment, which manifested in the form of Neo-
Scholasticism and modern atheism. 
A second negative consequence is a distortion of the basic aims of ressourcement: what 
has been widely asserted as the goal of ressourcement amounts to only one of the original stated 
aims of Jean Daniélou’s programme.6 According to Daniélou, a return to the Fathers was a 
necessary but not sufficient resource for engaging contemporary issues. Indeed, Aidan Nichols 
says that Daniélou held that it is increasingly important for Catholic theologians to follow 
‘these alien philosophers onto their own home ground, the better to respond to them’.7 So 
from its inception, ressourcement was an engagement with contemporary philosophers as much 
as it was an historical retrieval of the Fathers, Liturgy, or Scripture. The specific importance of 
Kierkegaard as one of the contemporary philosophers can be seen in the favourable place he 
                                                
2 Jürgen Mettepenningen, Nouvelle Théologie - New Theology : Inheritor of Modernism, Precursor of Vatican I I (London ; 
New York: T&T Clark, 2010), 11. This perspective is echoed in Reinhard Hütter and Matthew Levering, 
Ressourcement Thomism : Sacred Doctrine, the Sacraments, and the Moral Life : Essays in Honor or Romanus Cessario, O.P 
(Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2010). 
 
3 Boersma, Heavenly Participation : The Weaving of a Sacramental Tapestry, 12. 
 
4 Milbank, Suspended Middle, 2. 
 
5 Taylor, A Secular Age, 848. n. 39. 
 
6 Daniélou, 'Les Orientations Présentes De La Pensée Religieuse,' 5-21. In his essay, besides a summons to 
Scriptural, Patristic, and Liturgical renewal, Daniélou devotes an entire section to a call for an engagement with 
contemporary philosophy. 
 
7 Aidan Nichols, 'Thomism and the Nouvelle Théologie,' The Thomist 64 (2000), 4.  
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is given in Daniélou’s original essay.8 It is in light of this that the need for an account of the 
Catholic reception of Kierkegaard becomes increasingly clear. 
In my thesis, I have shown (albeit, not exhaustively) how my first proposal for 
contemporary Catholic theologians to read Kierkegaard could be motivated by seeing 
Kierkegaard’s relevance for the work of emblematic figures like Henri de Lubac, Hans Urs 
von Balthasar, and Cornelio Fabro. But as I have indicated in the introduction, there is a 
Kierkegaardian tradition in the generation preceding these figures that is worth exploring as 
well. For a Catholic theologian like de Lubac, Kierkegaard safeguards the Christian faith from 
becoming ‘romantic sentimentalism’ or reduced to ‘Hegelian intellectualism’.9 For Fabro and 
de Lubac in particular, Kierkegaard provided constructive strategies in confronting the twin 
threat of Neo-Scholasticism and modern atheism. In so far as these two threats persist today, 
contemporary Catholic theologians would be wise to re-examine the resources available in 
Kierkegaard’s writings.  
Further research could be done in this respect with a closer look at the writings of 
Cornelio Fabro. For instance, the distinctiveness of Fabro’s version of Thomism as opposed 
to that of Etienne Gilson, Jacques Maritain, and Joseph Maréchal, could be a thesis-length 
study in itself. This research could then go on and examine how Fabro’s Thomism compares 
with that of John Milbank or Alasdair MacIntyre. Another line of enquiry could be to assess 
the nature of Fabro’s critique of Karl Rahner’s theological anthropology. There are countless 
recordings and texts available in Rome at the ‘Cornelio Fabro Cultural Project’ and the Fabro 
Foundation library, which is located at the Pontifical University Santa Croce. A great service 
could be done to both Kierkegaard studies and Catholic studies by translating Fabro’s work at 
the intersection of these two subject areas.  
Conclusion: Kierkegaard (still) matters 
 The vital importance of Kierkegaard’s writings for contemporary theology is, among 
other things, that he stands as an influential philosopher that bridges, rather than widens, the 
divide between secularism and religious faith. In a recent article, George Pattison says that 
Kierkegaard 
was among the first Christian thinkers really to grasp—existentially as well as 
intellectually—that, after the Enlightenment and the democratic revolutions of the 
nineteenth century, Christianity could no longer be assumed to be the fallback position 
of any well-meaning citizen ... [and that] We can’t go back behind the Enlightenment 
                                                
8 Daniélou, 'Les Orientations Présentes De La Pensée Religieuse,' 13-16. Daniélou mentions Kierkegaard five 
times in this essay. 
 
9 AH, 106. 
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by invoking an authority that has lost its power to compel. Christianity may have 
significant reservations and criticisms vis-à-vis the ideologies of modernity, but it 
needs to recognise the reality of what has been called the condition of modernity.10  
Although Kierkegaard had a delayed reception in Europe, he focused this issue for both 
secular and religious thinkers alike. For modern theologians in particular, Kierkegaard 
deepened their understanding of the unity of the individual subject and human freedom by 
taking seriously the threat of despair and self-deception in our contemporary age, signalling 
our dependence upon God as our only independence (UDVS 182). In short, Pattison says that 
by drawing upon Scripture and the medieval mystical tradition, Kierkegaard shows how ‘Faith 
resolves the otherwise irresolvable tensions at the centre of human existence’. In doing so, 
Kierkegaard put the first person perspective and the love of neighbour back on the map for 
contemporary thinkers, who had been told that subjectivity only impeded ‘scientific’ 
endeavours. 
The Kierkegaard Renaissance spawned by the writings of Karl Barth, Martin 
Heidegger, and Karl Jaspers, tended to focus upon Kierkegaard’s disenchantment with the 
institutional State-Church. Three schools of thought emerged out of the increasing availability 
of Kierkegaard’s writings in Europe that respectively wanted to lay claim to Kierkegaard’s 
inheritance. The first group of radical theologians (god is dead a/theology) viewed 
Kierkegaard as a pioneer of secularism. The second group of neo-orthodox theologians 
tended to portray Kierkegaard as a critic of the believer’s accommodation to secular, 
bourgeois Christendom. My thesis has focused on a third group of Catholic thinkers, some of 
whom read Kierkegaard’s critique as an indirect endorsement of Catholicism.  
To recapitulate, the focus of my thesis has been on the influence that Kierkegaard’s 
writings had on Catholic theology—particularly for Henri de Lubac, Hans Urs von Balthasar, 
and Cornelio Fabro. Throughout this thesis, I have advocated for a positive and substantial 
engagement with the writings of Søren Kierkegaard by Catholic thinkers. I have argued that 
Kierkegaard’s writings have stimulated reform and renewal in twentieth century Catholic 
theology, and should continue to do so today. To support this argument, my thesis turned to 
examine the Catholic ‘soul’ of Kierkegaard’s writings with a particular focus upon 
Kierkegaard’s theological view of history. Then, I turned to de Lubac as a model of positive 
engagement with Kierkegaard and then to Balthasar as a negative model. My point here was to 
show how vital of a resource Kierkegaard’s writings were for de Lubac, and should have been for 
Balthasar. For the first time in English, I just scratched the surface of the wealth of Cornelio 
Fabro’s engagement with Kierkegaard’s writings. As a result of, and in conclusion to my 
                                                
10 George Pattison, 'Passionate Thinker,' The Tablet 267 (4 May), no. 8996 (2013), 6-7. 
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thesis, I would like to make two modest proposals: i) for contemporary Catholic theologians 
to read Kierkegaard; and ii) to jettison the presupposition that Kierkegaard’s writings are 
hostile to the Catholic faith. My hope is that the work here in this thesis contributes to making 
good on these two proposals. In the end, it has been my claim throughout this thesis that 
Kierkegaard’s writings have stimulated reform and renewal in twentieth century Catholic 
theology, and should continue to do so today. 
What I have attempted to show at every turn is how, for these important Catholic 
thinkers, Kierkegaard’s writings offered them the resources for, as Pattison says, ‘[t]aking 
seriously the task of Christian witness in a world that is no longer in awe of the authority of 
hierarchies or Scriptures’.11 Nevertheless, the field is much larger than the three central figures 
that my thesis has treated. So, I leave it to others to further fill out the representative sketch 
that I have provided in this relatively short compass. As a result of my thesis, we can now see 
how Kierkegaard’s writings matter for the trajectory upon which contemporary Catholic 
theology finds itself. However, the question remains: can contemporary Catholic theologians 
afford to neglect Kierkegaard’s writings whilst laying claim to carrying on the legacy of the 
ressourcement theologians? 
 
  
                                                
11 Ibid. 
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